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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

THE COLLECTIVIST ORIENTATION OF QUEBEC:
ITS HISTORICAL AND SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE

BY

Ⓒ HELGA BOBERG MADSEN

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled The Collectivist Orientation of Quebec: Its Historical and Social Significance.

submitted by Helga Boberg Madsen

in partial fulfiment of the requirements for the degree of Master of ....

Charles Hobart
Supervisor

Gurston Dacks

Gordon Fearn

....

Date April 22, 1981

This study is dedicated to the
fond memories of my late father,
Soren Peter Bovbjerg, who as a Danish
immigrant, inspired me by his priorities and his
choice of alternatives to adopt the strengths,
and to learn from the weaknesses of more
than one culture, in order to arrive
at an acceptable social philosophy.

ABSTRACT

Cultural explanations, such as those based on ethnic, religious or nationalistic perspectives, have not always received adequate attention in the analysis of social change. However, cultural explanations are persuasive only after the cultural factor is carefully defined and secondly, if after research, the influence of non-cultural factors, such as geography or economic structures, can be seen to be less significant than the cultural. The purpose of this thesis is to illustrate the significance of the cultural factor in Canadian history.

The cultural factors of this research have been defined as two opposing cultural orientations: the collectivist and the individualist. Collectivism is manifested in the sociopolitical structures of the French Canadians, that is, in their policies, ideologies, legislation and institutions, while individualism is similarly manifested in the sociopolitical structures of the English heritage. These manifestations exemplify the significance of the differing cultural orientations in influencing the conflict between these two founding cultural groups. A limitation in the definition is that the cultural orientation is mainly concerned with the legitimation of authority; authority can have a collectivist orientation which is vested primarily in sources external to the individual or it can have an individualist orientation and be vested primarily in an internal

source, within the individual himself. These two cultural orientations are seen as dichotomous, that is, they are in opposition to one another and they tend to contradict each other particularly if they are in the extreme or the polar position. The collectivist orientation assigns priority to the common good and as such, it is concerned with order and conforming to the prescriptions of this common good. In the extreme position it is suppressive, giving little opportunity to individual spontaneity, creativity and rights. The individualist orientation assigns priority to the individual, that he be guaranteed rights for self expression. This orientation would restrict the means of any external authority, be it community or state, which would curb these rights. In the extreme position, it is anarchical from the point of view that it encourages individuals, those of means, to express themselves at the expense of the common good or the community. As political ideology, collectivism, using sources as Rousseau, is expressed through variants of statism and the non-liberal types of democracy. Individualism, using sources such as Locke, is expressed through variants of the liberal-individualist democracy of the Anglo-Saxon orientation. Within religion, collectivism is expressed through variants of Catholicism, while individualism is expressed through various Protestant movements, particularly those based in Anglo-American societies.

However, collectivism can for instance as an ideology, have a moderating influence on individualism, and vice versa. The effect of this moderation is to provide for a greater range of alternatives, that is, ideological diversity, where at either extreme the range of alternatives is limited to the one orientation, effecting an ideological intolerance.

The historical research for this thesis focusses on Quebec. The effect of the collectivist orientation, as a moderating influence on individualism was found to be more pervasive with the French Canadians of this political unit than with any other ethnic group in Canada. The effect of the cultural orientation was persuasive though the effect of non-cultural factors has also been analyzed in the course of the research. In New France collectivism was founded upon Bourbon absolutism, which was transplanted from the mother country, modified by conditions of the frontier, but also strengthened by geographical isolation. This deeply-rooted collectivism prevented the establishment of a bourgeoisie with a decision-making capacity. Furthermore the exigencies of the fur trade increased the dependence effect. The Conquest brought with it influences of individualism, particularly those of the Montreal merchants and, later the United Empire Loyalists. However, the influence of collectivism was significant in that the French Canadians upon recognizing their cultural differential resisted the assimilation intent of the English Canadians as well as those of New England. In the interests of imperialism, London authorities adopted conciliatory policies toward the *Canadiens*, when they became aware of what has been described as "an insipient national movement". Quebec acquired increased strategic importance as the colonies to the South were in rebellion. Therefore, London legitimized the cultural differentials in the formulation of the Quebec Act and the stage was set for further legitimation in subsequent policies and legislation, both in London and in the colony.

Perhaps the effect of collectivism is most significant in the period following the Act of Union: the persistence of duality was the most profound experience of the union intended for assimilation and an unqualified single majority rule. This experience was vitally important for the British North American federation that followed.

Though for a time collectivism in Quebec took an extreme position under the domination of ultramontanism, this position was, in time, moderated in part, by the influence of individualism. This orientation entered Quebec through many channels, among which Anglo-Saxon capitalism in the period of industrial expansion in the twentieth century was perhaps the most important. Though Roman Catholic collectivism was opposed to the ideologies of private capitalism, it was the harsh realities of the economic crisis of the thirties that exposed the exploitive potential of this capitalism. This stimulated the embodiment of collectivism into new vigorous nationalisms, political action and the institution of new state structures. Thus the Quiet Revolution saw the moderating effect of collectivism on this unrestrained form of individualism.

Far from having outlived its significance today, this collectivism, for which Quebec supplied a base, should be given greater recognition in English Canada today, we believe. It is this moderating effect that has the capacity to oppose individualism, particularly in its unrestrained and extreme forms. Most important of all, perhaps this moderating effect has the potential for sustaining tolerance and the freedom to choose between various ideological positions.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This thesis originated in an interest in the significance of different cultural orientations as factors in the development of conflict between differentiated cultural or ethnic groups, and how this conflict is manifested in their respective sociopolitical structures, policies, ideologies and legislation. In this thesis, we explore the cultural orientation in relation to the legitimation of authority, that is, whether authority has a collectivist orientation and is vested primarily in sources external to the individual, or whether it has an individualist orientation and is vested primarily in an internal source, within the individual himself. These two cultural orientations are seen as dichotomous, that is, they are in opposition to one another and they tend to contradict each other, particularly if they are in the polar positions of the dichotomy.

The collectivist orientation is concerned with the demands of the corporate whole, that is, with the demands of the social order for the common good. It sees the exigencies of the social order taking precedence over the rights of the individual, and it sets limits on the liberty of the individual for the sake of the common good. The individualist orientation focuses on the rights of the individual and restricts the means of any external authority to curb these rights. Under the individualist orientation, liberty of the individual is preeminent; the best social order is that which arises from a free exercising of this liberty. When these different individualist and collectivist orientations are legitimized through the development of sociopolitical structures, policies, ideologies and legislation, they have a significance with which this thesis is particularly concerned. (See R. Jones, 1974: 47; Tremblay Commission, 1956, II, pt. 3, p. 42; A.I. Silver, 1975: viii-x; Christian/Campbell, 1974: 20, 33 & Richer/Laporte, 1973: 52.)

Statement of the problem

In this thesis we hypothesize that the collectivist and the individualist cultural orientations are manifested in the sociopolitical structures of Canada's two founding ethnic groups, the French Canadians and the English Canadians. Secondly, we hypothesize that the conflict between these two founding groups is, at least in part, a consequence of the differences in their cultural orientations. We will illustrate* the hypotheses by examining the development of sociopolitical structures that manifest these opposing cultural orientations; for instance, property rights, education, type of government, and government policy.

---

* The term "illustrate" has been chosen over that of "demonstrate". Each represents a different methodological approach. (See Chapter III on methodology.)

Since the scope of this subject is so broad, we must define some limits for the analysis. The comparison of collectivist and individualist orientations will be limited to periods of interaction between the French Canadians of Quebec (formerly New France, Lower Canada or Canada East), and the English-speaking inhabitants of Upper and Lower Canada. These periods include: (a) the wars with the New England Colonies, (b) the protracted American Invasions, (c) the period of Union Government after Upper and Lower Canada were united,* and (d) the development of English capitalistic orientation**.

---

* At the time of the Union of 1841, the English-speaking population, which was in a minority position in Canada East and in a majority position in Canada West, consisted largely of immigrants from the British Isles who were "strongly Protestant" with the exception of the Irish Catholics. This group added a special quality to the dominant French Catholic society of Canada East. It formed part of the working class of Montreal and Quebec (Careless, 1977: 24, 27).

** The term "English capitalistic orientation" is used to describe the orientation which developed from the activities of the merchants who came mostly from New England. These merchants, distinguished from the French Canadians by "their commercial habits, their independence and assertiveness" (Morton, 1977: 151), supplied the Conquest armies. The term also includes the largely American capitalists of the twentieth century (Quinn, 1974: 81, 188).

Some attention will be given to the historical base of these orientations, that is, the Bourbon period in France, and the Puritan formation in England which in turn influenced the colonization process. However, this focus is limited to a brief analysis of selected sociopolitical developments in Quebec in the period extending from 1763, and the establishment of the Bourbon Crown Colony to the summer of 1970, which marks the end of the Quiet Revolution.

Several problems are inherent in the discussion of a hypothesized dichotomy between the French and English Canadians. In an attempt to preclude such problems we will restrict the examination of the cultural orientation to the central organizing ideas, that is, to the differences in the legitimation of authority, specifically, whether it has a collectivist or an individualist base. This difference in the legitimation of authority was perhaps most evident in the contrast between the hierarchical control of Catholic education and the spontaneity of Protestant voluntarism. However, other historians have found the contrast in the legal systems as most striking and still others have noticed the different systems of land distribution. Secondly, we will avoid, as much as possible, undue emphasis on a single causal factor in this study. Hence, we will draw attention to structural factors which affected the influence of the cultural orientation. For example, the New Englander's threat of revolt at the time of the formulation of the Quebec Act of 1774 was a factor in making the British authorities more conciliatory toward the different features of the French colony. Another example is found in the teachings of social Catholicism; although defined in the papal encyclicals of 1891 and 1931, and calling for government intervention to contravene the exploits of private capitalism, these teachings did not become incorporated into political campaigns until the harsh effects of the depression were felt.

Thirdly, we realize there is concern in socio-cultural research about the problem of defining and measuring an analytical construct such as a cultural orientation. Cultural orientation is conceptually related to "national character" studies, the "basic personality structure" or the "social character". As Inkeles and Levinson (1969: 424) observe, "perhaps the main thread running through the numerous definitions is that national character refers to characteristics that are common or standardized in a given society.". For them, this aspect of commonality or frequency refers to the modal pattern of a society or the mode of distributing individual personality variants, which requires statistical analysis of adequately large and representative samples of a society. Because the problems inherent in this type of analysis are immense, students of national character have resorted to analyzing "collective products and policies". Though analysis of these manifestations has contributed significantly to national character studies, and though analysis of "collective enterprises" is becoming "increasingly significant", Inkeles and Levinson see this approach as supplementary, the primary one being large scale studies of individuals. In this thesis, we will, in accord with the observations of Inkeles and Levinson, define a societal group as collectivist or individualist if the respective orientation appears to be common or standardized, that is, if it is manifested in the common, the prevalent, or the main social structures. However, we will not follow the suggestion of Inkeles-Levinson to give priority to the use of survey techniques and statistical analysis. We will rather resort to analysis of sociopolitical structures and policies, realizing this method is within the means at our disposal. But we will use the comparative approach in an attempt to compensate for the lack of precise measurements. It is also to be noted that the aim of this research, that of ascribing a cultural orientation to a society, is not as ambitious as that of the ascription of a national character.

In limiting the aims of this thesis, we will take a lead from Herbert Quinn and Fernand Dumont. Quinn (1974: 193) holds that the aim of his research is to give "adequate attention" to the "important role that such non-economic factors as ethnic (or religious) interest can play" in the development of sociopolitical structures. Dumont (1965: 388) argues that a study has scientific significance if it is aimed at explaining and systematizing the dominant ideologies of a society.

Finally, in the relevant literature, we find encouragement to pursue our kind of macrosociological research. Llewellyn Watson (1975: 346, 353), for instance, encourages the sociologist to pursue macro-studies and to develop the "ability to see wholes", rather than to concentrate on small-scale quantitative studies and so to lose sight of the whole. Such a limited perspective stems, in part, from a tendency among some sociologists to support research and theory only within their own field, thus severely limiting the scope of sociology particularly in a study like ours, which attempts to analyze cultural orientations. But as Gordon Fearn (1973: 75) says: "Questions concerning collective identity are difficult enough to answer in the perspective of multi-disciplinary studies; they should not be made impossible to answer because of disciplinary bias." This observation helps justify our interest in social, political, and economic history, as well as in the more conventional elements of sociology. Moreover, Herbert Quinn (1974: 194) encouraging a sociological analysis makes a "plea that much more consideration be given to the non-economic aspects of politics". And Fernand Dumont (1974: ix), in his letter to his English-speaking friends, contends that we "frequently discard the cultural fact" for a piecemeal analysis when "trying to unravel the traditional dilemma of our co-existence".

Precedent research

Perhaps the earliest precedent for the methodology of this thesis is Weber's development of the ideal type, that is, the analytical construct. It provides the researcher with a means of assessing the similarities and differences between the concrete social structure and the ideal type. Although the idealized analytical construct, such as the collectivist or the individualist orientation proposed in this thesis, can never be said to correspond to a particular, concrete social structure or situation, it provides the basis for a method of comparison. As Coser (1971: 223) explains, the analytical construct "is constructed out of certain elements of reality and forms a logically precise and coherent whole, which can never be found in that reality". There has never been a "full empirical embodiment of the Protestant

Ethic" (Coser, 1971: 223) which Weber analyzes in his work. So it is with the cultural orientation theory of this thesis. It cannot be found fully embodied in a concrete social structure such as a piece of legislation.

An equally important precedent set for us by Weber is that he has positioned his analytical constructs in a dichotomy on the basis of the legitimation of authority. Here we think of his traditional-modern dichotomy for explaining social change. Because Weber's type of analytical construct can be used as a basis for comparison and because it is concerned with the legitimation of authority, it is particularly significant for this thesis, since we will be contrasting the manifestations of the collectivist orientation with those of the individualist orientation; in other words, seeing them as a dichotomy on the basis of legitimation of authority. For example we will trace this dichotomy in policies of land distribution, and education and in ideologies to give the analytical constructs of cultural orientation some empirical relevance.

Although surrounded by controversy, Weber's traditional-modern dichotomy has been employed by Posgate and McRoberts (1976: 7) who have found this concern with the legitimation of authority to be valid for the study of Quebec. It is the significance that these researchers attach to the legitimation of authority that is important for this thesis. Explaining the development in Quebec in the sixties, they point to the "shift" of authority from the Church* to the State (Posgate-McRoberts, 1976: 117). In the traditional-modern dichotomy they see this shift as the "essence of political modernization".

However, when Christian and Campbell (1976: 31) analyze this same period, using the collectivist-individualist dichotomy, they explain that the shift from the "deeply-rooted" collectivism of the Church to the interventionist, socialistic state was, in part, an effect of the influence of imported individualism. For the authority of this state was not monolithic as was that by the Church, that is, the development of the interventist state was concomitant with criticism of this monolithic control and, subsequently with the breakdown of this authority. Yet the influence of individualism was, in turn, checked by their pervasive collectivism. So we see forms of socialism developing to replace the authority of the Church's collectivist traditions.

We find the explanation by Christian and Campbell, using the collectivist-individualist dichotomy to be more relevant to historical situations than the traditional-modern dichotomy in two ways. First, in the collectivist-individualist-dichotomy we do not have to be concerned about the meaning or implications of the term "modern". For as Christian and Campbell (1974: 20-24) point out, the current trend has been for some countries to develop socialism to counteract capitalism, whereas in a country such as the United States, the trend of modernization has not embraced the development of an effectual socialism. The term "modernization" thus refers to very different developments in these two instances. In short, the collectivist-individualist dichotomy releases us from the use of the term "modern" and the confusion associated with it. Secondly, we can use the collectivist-individualist dichotomy to explain oscillations, that is, movements between capitalistic and socialistic developments. For example, in this approach, we are not concerned whether socialistic developments such as those in Quebec are regressive or progressive when compared to the capitalistic developments in Ontario. Nor is it a concern whether the lack of socialistic measures in United States is regressive when compared to socialism in European and African countries. In short, the collectivist-individualist dichotomy[*] goes a long way toward releasing us from a cultural bias.

---

* In this thesis, the term Church refers to the Roman Catholic Church of Quebec.

When we turn to Weber's analysis of the influence of the Protestant ethic we see that some of his proponents, such as Richard Tawney and Hebert Luthy, have pointed to a conflict between collectivism and individualism, although it was not of central concern in their analysis. Tawney (1944: 176) points to a "collision" between "increasing individualism" and the "corporate morality" in England, which was expressed through the authorities in the Church and through Parliament. The "individualist movement" was opposed to this traditional authority, and it expanded its influence into the economic, the political, as well as the religious structures. Tawney (1944: 179, 198, 232-235) further notes that the "protest" of Puritanism against the collectivist authorities was the "most fundamental" of the religious theories affecting social change in England. Luthy (1968: 94) would agree that Protestant self reliance in religion reduced the effectiveness of the "external spiritual authority" and was the most important factor in this historic socioeconomic development.

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[*] Perhaps the most definitive statement of this oscillatory pattern can be found in England in the latter half of the nineteenth century. A.V. Dicey (1962: xxx-258) has documented how legislation reflected the move from collectivism to individualism and then back to collectivism with the introduction of forms of socialism; that is, collectivism was first manifested through Toryism, then individualism in the form of capitalism broke down this authority. But these forms of capitalism were in turn moderated by socialistic measures when the exploits of capitalism became excessive.

But where Tawney and Luthy refer to this conflict in passing, the analysis by Christian and Campbell (1974: 18-32) centers on it. They have developed a theory to explain the conflict between Canada's two ethnic groups, developing ideas similar to those of Weber's proponents, Louis Hartz and Kenneth McRae.* Christian and Campbell (1974: 19) look at the dominant ideologies exported from Europe and argue that these exported ideologies or "raw materials" represent only some of the ideological developments in Europe. For example, Catholic collectivism which had been exported from France did not have the opposition of the Gallic state in Quebec after the Conquest. Nor was it subjected to criticism by the proponents of the French Revolution. Similarly, individualism exported through Puritanism to the New England colonies did not have the opposition of the socialistic developments that were active in England. Another point to consider is that the ideological developments which followed on North American soil were further modified by conditions of the frontier. For example, the frontier experience had a certain levelling influence on the stratification patterns of feudalism.

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* See Louis Hartz, 1955, The Liberal Tradition in America, and 1964, The Founding of New Societies; and Kenneth McRae, 1964, "The Structure of Canadian Society" in The Founding of New Societies. Here he applies the Hartzian approach to Canada from a continentalist perspective.

With this focus on the historical background of the ideological developments in Canada, Christian and Campbell (1974: 18-40) find that the Hartzian approach goes a long way to explain the dominance of collectivism in Quebec. It was deeply rooted and hence strongly opposed to individualism of the English tradition, particularly as it developed on the American frontier. (We are at one with these researchers in being interested in the development of individualism in what became the United States for this influence extended into Canada.) Collectivism in Quebec before the Conquest developed into a dominant form in the absence of opposing ideologies. The Hartzian approach can therefore be used to explain the intense antagonism that developed between the two extremes of the collectivist-individualist dichotomy. This antagonism was a factor in moving a reluctant Quebec to join Confederation, a move that now has been interpreted to be basically an "unAmerican activity" (E. Black, 1976: 5). Kenneth McRae (1964: 219-274) applied the Hartzian approach unconditionally to Canada, but his critics have contended that individualism developed differently in the two countries. In Canada, the dominance of individualism was tempered by several factors, such as the tendency of immigrants to keep their collectivist orientation from Europe. This contrasts with the New England colonies where the conditions were already present that worked toward the development of a "one-ideology country" (Christian-Campbell: 21). The early settlers in the American colonies were mainly bearers of the individualist-liberal ideology and this ideological uniformity,once achieved became "self-perpetuating". Hence, Quebec was not as antagonistic toward the individualism of English Canada as it was toward the type of individualism that was developing in the colonies south of the border during the Confederation period.

The Hartzian approach can also explain the conciliatory policies of the British authorities in the period extending from the Conquest to Confederation. These policies, both in London and in the colony, encouraged accomodation of the collectivist structures of Quebec and provided for their apparent legitimation in the Quebec Act of 1774. On the other hand, the Act aroused intense antagonism in the emergent American colonies and provided one of several pretexts for a military assault on Canada. Through further legislation collectivist structures were more firmly established, particularly those of the Church, in spite of the assimilation threats of the Act of Union in 1841. We suggest that the consequences of these acts point to the significance of the collectivist orientation. We will also discuss the perspectives of Hilda Neatby (1971: 47) in the post Conquest period, for they complement the Hartzian approach by pointing out that the laws of the differentiated founding groups "reflected different economic interests and different social values".

In pursuing the significance of this conflict in the post Confederation period, A.I. Silver (1975 & 1976) and Brown and Cook (1974: 26-32) argue that this ideological conflict, which originated in Europe, was further extended into Canada with the vigorous imperialisms of the late nineteenth century. From these researchers we gain insight into the effect of Roman Catholic imperialism with its vigorous ultramontane movement and an insistence on religious authority. In contrast, the "new imperialism" of the Anglo-Saxons spoke for the superiority of those individuals who were now on the forefront lines in the fields of industrial and scientific advancement. The effect of this conflict is evident. Quebec developed collectivist ideologies and nationalistic movements in the twentieth century to combat the ideals of private enterprise system, even though the system had been ushered into Quebec under the sanctions of its own leaders, Taschereau and Duplessis. The Depression of the thirties exposed the harsh realities of capitalistic exploitation. It gave fresh impetus to remedial policies which would invoke government action to check this exploitation. After analyzing the rise and fall of the Union Nationale (1936-1960)* and comparing it to the fall of Taschereau's Liberals in 1936, Herbert Quinn (1974: 188) concludes that both regimes were turned out of office by opposition parties with collectivist and nationalistic platforms, that is, platforms which were in keeping with the collectivism of the electorate. But the defeat of the Union Nationale in 1960 permitted the Lesage ministry to implement the new nationalist programs of reform and so usher in the Quiet Revolution.

The significance of the collectivist orientation in the decade of the Quiet Revolution is illustrated by the development both of ideologies and of sociopolitical structures to oppose those of private capitalism. The ideology of statism, and particularly that which is labelled étatism, devised for the unique situation in Quebec, was formulated and to a degree implemented through the effects of a positive, interventionist government. Of interest here are the observations of the Christian-Campbell (1974: 30) study regarding this conflict.

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* The Union Nationale dominated the politics of this period, although they did not hold office throughout this period, being interrupted by the Liberal rule from 1939 to 1944.

While those of the individualist-liberal persuasion were quick to praise the steps taken to inaugerate changes to bring Quebecers more into line with their own thinking, steps like the secularization of education and the increased emphasis on economics, "they were sometimes shocked by measures which seemed to favour neither individuality nor liberty.". As Christian and Campbell contend, if the significance of collectivist ideologies is taken into account, this development could be expected. Because their observations are particularly relevant for this thesis, we conclude this brief overview with a lengthy quote:

> This (the implementation of collectivist policies such as government intervention) should not, however, surprise us, for the idea of community or collectivity is, as we have seen, deeply rooted in Quebec's past and has clearly tempered the liberalism imported from the English world. This continuing effect of the past is evident then in both nationalism and socialism in French Canada. . . .
>
> That socialism should arise in Quebec in conjunction with, or following upon, the incursions of liberalism and capitalism is hardly surprising from a Hartzian viewpoint. For socialism is the primary collectivist answer to modern industrial society, and Quebec's stock of political ideas includes a strong collectivist element. This collectivism is deeply embedded in Quebec's institutions; from the earliest days of New France, the government actively intervened on a broad scale in economic affairs; in later years this activity declined, except for promoting colonization, but government action in

> social and cultural affairs remained. The church, by its nature a collectivist institution, has long encouraged community enterprise, whether in establishing charitable or educational institutions, or in more specifically economic terms in encouraging land settlement and parish credit unions. (Christian-Campbell, 1974: 30).

Organization of the thesis

This thesis has eight chapters. Chapter I includes the introduction, a statement of the problem, a discussion of the previous research in the area, and an outline of the thesis organization. In Chapter II we deal with theoretical perspectives, focusing on the cultural orientations and the conflict model. Chapter III is concerned with methodology.

In Chapter IV we look at some of the aspects of the ideological conflict between collectivism and individualism as it developed in its historical situation in France and England, respectively. This research follows the Hartzian view, which points to the significance of the historical roots of the conflict. Furthermore, this research attempts to clarify the problematic terms associated with collectivism and individualism.

Chapter V analyzes the colonial experience of the French Canadians before the Conquest and includes aspects of the social clash resulting from the interaction of the two founding groups after the Conquest. In this period, collectivism became entrenched through the actions of the interventionist Bourbon state, which succeeded in subordinating the ambitious Church. We will also study the argument that French Canadians at this time did manifest a collectivist orientation to the extent that the decision-making process remained centered in Versaille. Hence, the argument goes, a bourgeois element could not develop in New France and those government officials involved in the decision-making process returned to France at the time of the Conquest, leaving the colony vulnerable to the ambitions of the Church.

Chapter VI deals with the significance of collectivism in the post-Conquest period, particularly in regard to policy making and the legislative process. Particular attention will be paid to the Proclamation of 1763 and the Acts of 1774, 1791 and 1841. The latter effected a dualism that in turn anticipated the federated union of 1867. This period is very instructive. The dual governments in the Union of Upper and Lower Canada threw into sharp relief the differences in legislative activity. In this period we observe that the Church gradually strengthened its control over a disillusioned and conquered people, imparting to them a cohesiveness which increased their resistance to assimilation and therefore their ability to survive culturally.

Chapter VII examines the significance of collectivism in the conflict during the post-Confederation period, wherein ideological antagonisms between the two differentiated founding groups became more intense and in some cases, even militant. These antagonisms continued into the twentieth century, but were masked by the process of industrialization and its subsequent changes. However, the conflict again became overt in Quebec's reaction to the influx of English-oriented capitalism, its ideologies and its practices, which were thrown into bold relief by the depression of the thirties. This reaction became politicized as the sixties approached.

The research of Chapter VIII deals with the decade of the Quiet Revolution. Here we find the collectivist orientation transferred from a reluctant Church to a vigorous, new state.

The final chapter consists of a summary and a statement of conclusions.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

This thesis examines the validity of two interlocking hypotheses: first, that the French Canadians of Quebec manifest a collectivist orientation, the English Canadians an individualist one; second, that conflict between these two founding ethnic groups is, at least in part, a result of this difference in their cultural orientations. To discuss these hypotheses, we need to give consideration to our theoretical perspectives, that is, to explain and define our use of the term "cultural orientation" in the first hypothesis and the conflict model implied in the second hypothesis. Included in the discussion of the "cultural orientation" will be an explanation of the use of the term "manifest".

The cultural orientation

To explain the use of the term "cultural orientation", we have drawn on Richer and Laporte (1973: 52), who attempt to synthesize the scattered efforts of earlier researchers into a single theoretical construct that accounts for the commonly recognized differences between French and English Canadians. The "cultural orientation" thus includes social philosophy, governing policies and cognitive styles. For example, the

"Protestant ethic" is much more pervasive in English Canada, than in French Canada. The social structure of the two societies also differs: the French Canadian family structure tends to be authoritarian, while the English Canadian family is more egalitarian. Further, Richer and Laporte postulate that the differences between what they call French Canadian collectivism and English Canadian individualism can be translated into a basic difference between the two cultures' predominant cognitive styles, that is, between their approach to problem-solving.

The collectivist or "group" orientation of the French Canadians is related to a tendency to be more dependent on others, and more willing to subordinate individual needs to those of others, than English Canadians are. In problem-solving, this tendency is expressed through the French Canadian preference for group discussion, a process enjoyed for itself, rather than for its end results. Richer and Laporte (1973: 56) point out that when this approach to problem-solving is used in the economic arena, the French Canadian style seems inefficient and ineffective. The French Canadian, using different tactics than the English individualist, will feel stress, frustration, and eventually hostility toward the English. The collectivist orientation, therefore, is related to inter-cultural tension in economic relations between the French and the English in Canada.

Richer and Laporte (1973: 51) also mention the relationship of culture to public personality. This thesis, however, is not concerned with a type of public personality, such as a collectivist personality for the French, or an individualist for the English. The concept of public personality is too tenuous to be useful to our study of history. We are interested not in a typical French Canadian "public personality" or a "national character", but in an orientation of the cultural groups that manifests itself in historical developments, in legislation, for instance, or in sociopolitical movements. Moreover, our major concern is with selected areas of the two cultures where we can most clearly discern a dichotomy.

We will also discuss the Hartzian approach. As mentioned above, Hartz and his proponents trace collectivism and individualism from Europe to the colonies of North America, but view the two as dominant ideologies. The Hartzians, as such are concerned mainly with the philosophies of various political parties. For our purposes, collectivism and individualism have a broader significance, encompassing political philosophies, but including other aspects of culture as well. For this reason, we refer to them not as dominant ideologies but as cultural orientations. The work of Hartz and his followers is still important to us, however, for it provides an important historical context, showing the relationships of history, culture, and sociopolitical structures. We will consider this in more depth later in this thesis.

Drawing on the above, we are now ready to define several key terms used in this thesis. The collectivist orientation is an expectation that the sources external to the individual, rather than the individual himself, be vested with the authority in decision-making processes. The collectivist orientation is, therefore, the tendency to legitimize external sources as being the valid source of authority for they speak for the needs of the group, or the good of the whole. Individual needs are subordinated to those of the community or the group.

The individualist orientation is an expectation that the individual, rather than sources external to him, be vested with the authority to make decisions. The individualist orientation is a tendency to legitimize the autonomous individual as the source of authority without expecting him to consider the needs of the group or community, for these sources may be restrictive of his cause.

Before closing our discussion of cultural orientation, we must consider some major criticisms of the concept.* Because of its broad scope, it cannot adequately explain inconsistencies within the whole or the group. We recognize, therefore, that internal variations exist within the groups we describe as having either one or the other cultural orientation, but we also point out that this thesis is concerned with the dominant, prevalent cultural orientation of two large, conflicting groups. This type of an analytical construct cannot deal with internal variation; it most effectively deals with broad issues. Any attempt to capture the details of variation will lead us away from an examination of the dominant ideas that to us, as to Dumont (1965: 388 & 1974: ix-xvii), are considered to be the essence of sociological research. We also share the anthropologists' perspective which encourages studying "the broader ideas" for they are likely to be expressed in "concrete acts" (Francis Hsu 1963: 18, 19). Thus we increase our perception and understanding of the distinctiveness of social groups.

We are aware of the need to specify the limitations of this concept of a cultural orientation approach. David Elkins and Richard Simeon (1979: 127-131) define the term, "political culture" as a "mind set" or a "disposition" which, in effect, predisposes a cultural group to choose from among one range or set of alternatives rather than another. From this point of view, "mind set" closely resembles the cultural orientation of this thesis in that it is an orientation which predisposes the group toward the collectivist or the individualist set of alternatives. As Elkins and Simeon (128) emphasize, the "mind set" represents a disposition to favour one range of alternatives, which means that "by corollary another range of alternatives receives little or no attention within a particular culture". To take an example which we will be analyzing, in the controversy related to the control over education following the Act of Union of 1841, the disposition of the French Canadians was to have authority for education centralized under the Church, whereas the English Canadians were disposed to favour voluntaryism, which sought to place the state in control over education and left religious institutions free from state intervention, dependent on voluntary support. However, there was never a complete separation of church and state in Canada, for some private schools requiring state support were instituted. Yet the differential dispositions between the two ethnic groups was manifested in the different types of legislation, which was chosen from a different range of alternatives.

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* This criticism will be dealt with more fully in Chapter III.

The other concern expressed by Elkins and Simeon (1979: 130, 131) is that researchers acknowledge that cultural influences interact with other factors such as the structural or geographical in effecting social change. It is for this reason we will be using Richard Tawney rather than Max Weber as the source for explaining the rise of individualism. Tawney looks at the interaction between the economic, the political and the religious factors, whereas Weber in his analysis of the "Protestant Ethic" tended to isolate the religious factor. As examples from our Canadian sources, we point to the economic structures of New France, particularly the fur trade. In spite of vigorous economic activity, an autonomous bourgeoisie, did not become established in the French colony, for here the men engaged in business remained deferential to the decision-makers in Paris. Furthermore, the tendency was to aspire toward the goals of the French nobility rather than invest in indigenous enterprises. Again we see that the French Canadians chose from among the collectivist alternatives while the dependent effect was aggravated by the fur trade.

Another example to be analyzed is the assimilation intent of Macdonald's ministry during the Confederation period. The economic factors and the threat of American annexation, to which we will be drawing attention, weakened Quebec, making it more vulnerable to the federalist intent. However, in time, French Canadians developed a vigorous resistance to this intent, a resistance nourished by the dimly perceived, yet deeply rooted cultural differentials. Perhaps this effect is the clearest example from our sources which supports the argument that cultural explanations "can be persuasive" only after we rule out structural and geographical factors (Elkins-Simeon, 1979: 129).

The conflict model

For the purpose of this thesis, we analyze Canadian society making use of a conflict model, one that assumes two major social groups with orientations and interests that not only differ but that, in fact, contradict each other. A number of social theorists have discussed the conflict models of society. We will use the work of John Rex (1961: 115, 122-34 & 1974: 4), Harry Hiller (1976: 104-114, 116-119), and Fernand Dumont (1965: 386-405 & 1974: ix-86). Each of their models complements the other in some way. As we noted in the section on cultural orientation, the focus of this study is necessarily broad. For this reason our conflict model is not designed to explain the conflicts between segments of the social groups, but rather the larger conflict situation, that is, between the groups in question. Rex (1961: 131) notes that his conflict model "has been developed in relation to the study of total social systems and with special emphasis upon their overtly political aspects". Dumont moves his basis for study away from the specifically political orientation of Rex: "any scientific interpretation of a total society will inevitably take into account the dominant ideologies of the environment" (Dumont, 1965: 388). For our purposes, "cultural orientation" replaces Dumont's "dominant ideologies", but we retain his view and Rex's, that the useful conflict model is one which studies the total social system and is therefore tolerant of the inevitable minor variations in restricted segments of the social groups in question.

Rex adds a further dimension to the conflict model by showing how two groups, in interacting with each other, but with differing orientations, ideologies and interests, will move towards conflict. Within each group, the achievement of its aims requires the cooperation of like-minded allies "who will add to the strength of the sanctions they can bring to bear against the other side. Allies will be found who have a similar situation and out of the alliances there will emerge groups structured for participation in conflict" (Rex, 1961: 122-123). At this point, he says, the aims of individuals become the aims of the group. Conflict has produced solidarity, and solidarity, in this case, aggravates conflict.

Hiller's (1976: 104-112, 116-119) work complements Rex's for he adds the specific dimension of ethnicity to Rex's more general observations. Hiller (1976: 111) notes that relative deprivation, "the disadvantage a person feels when comparing his own status or opportunities with those of someone else" reinforces the solidarity of a group united by ethnic homogeneity and this aggravates the conflict between different ethnic groups. Moreover, he points out, the common ethnic heritage of the minority group (which for our purposes comprises the French Canadians) creates in it a strong tendency to act as an "in-group", which also reinforces the group's solidarity by reminding it of the threat of assimilation by the "out-group" majority.

Hiller's model, then, explains the results of such studies as that of Richard Jones (1972: 47), who finds that French Canadians developed an adamant opposition to the English Protestant group in order to protect their own culture from the perceived threat of that out-group. Furthermore, this contrast between the two groups allowed the French Canadians to develop a "consciousness of kind", a self-awareness that the Tremblay Commission (1956) pointed out (Jones, 1977: 47). Dumont and Rocher (1965: 182-83) also mention this French Canadian spirit. Because it was increasingly difficult to formulate, it was necessary to contrast French "spirit" with English Canadian or American "spirit". This "in-group" feeling of the French Canadian culture aggravates the conflict situation and is one reason the French Canadians are at odds with the English Canadians when, for instance, the Swedish Canadians are not. Our conflict model then, assumes French Canada's ethnic solidarity as well as its cultural orientation.

Our model must also be able to explain changes within one of the conflicting groups, or between them. To put it another way, our model must be able to explain the process of moderation due to the influence of the opposition. As Rex (1974: 4) says, "the most revealing form of sociology" is "that which constructs types of social relations and structures which may be used in analyzing the flux of observed human behavior". The collectivist and individualist orientations are not constant and stable; they are fluid and flexible. For example, Christian and Campbell (1974: 28) point out that, because of Quebec's relatively minor position in North America, its collectivism was moderated as it came into contact with its opposite, liberal individualism, first with the influx of merchants after the Conquest, then with the rise of capitalism under the regimes of Taschereau and Duplessis. Quebec's first reaction was to reject the ideas and to retreat behind the ramparts of the collectivist ideology and structures. But as the nineteen-sixties approached, Quebec began coming to terms with the invaders. Some of the traditional collectivist structures changed; so did some economic policies. But the invaders were held at bay with government intervention in the economy.

The interaction of the two opposite cultural orientations accounts for these, and many other changes. Our conflict model therefore accounts for change in some areas, while underlining the basic continuing conflict. This conflict between the French and English societies within the province explains Quebec's lively, and sometimes explosive, ideological diversity. The United States provides an illuminating contrast with Canada (Christian-Campbell, 1974: 22, 29-32). There, any significant incursion of the collectivist orientation is viewed not only with suspicion, but with hostility. Canada may in some ways suffer because of the continuing conflict between its French and English components, but it benefits, too, from the resulting ideological diversity, and from the relatively great tolerance Canadians, in general, have toward collectivist ideas and structures.

Manifestations

In defining the term "manifestations", we are influenced by Richer and Laporte (1973: 51). They postulate that anthropologists have attempted to delineate societies according to their "predominant value patterns", which are "manifested in modal personality types characteristic of each society". In this thesis, we are attempting to delineate ethnic or cultural groups according to their dominant cultural orientation which is manifested in sociopolitical structures, in ideologies, in policies, and in legislation. We have chosen the term "manifest" rather than the term "reflect" which is used by Neatby (1971: 47) in referring to laws which reflect different economic interests and different social values. For our purposes, "manifest" is also preferable to "illustrate" a term used by A.V. Dicey (1962: xxxiii) for his argument that "laws . . . directly illustrate the progress of collectivism" (or individualism, whichever he is studying). For our purposes, "manifest" conveys the appropriate shade of meaning: it is not as concrete as "illustrate" nor as abstract as "reflect". "Manifest" suggests that the cultural orientations we hypothesize are indeed observable in historical situations.

Statement of hypotheses

First hypothesis: The French Canadians of Quebec manifested a collectivist orientation whereas the English who interacted with them, manifested an individualist one.

Second hypothesis: The conflict between the French and the English Canadians in selected areas was, at least in part, a result of this difference in their cultural orientations.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

In our study of the conflict between the collectivist and the individualist orientations in their respective manifestations, we will use comparative analysis in a historical frame of reference as does Francis Hsu.

For more specific suggestions regarding the types of data we can abstract from these historical sources, we will consider the following: Inkeles and Levinson point to the importance of analyzing collective products and policies as indicators of the manifestations of an analytical construct; more specifically, A.V. Dicey and Hilda Neatby underscore the significance of legislation; and Jean-Pierre Wallot of institutional structures. For critical comments regarding the use of these types of data sources, we will examine S.D. Clark and Gordon Fearn.

We will return to Hsu for his suggestion that the method of illustrating hypotheses can be used rather than the demonstration method. Illustration is more appropriate for the broad scope type of research in this thesis. Finally, we will consider the problem of finding reliable sources of historical data.

The comparative approach and the historical frame of reference

Francis Hsu (1963: 24) defends the use of the comparative approach: "I firmly believe in the importance of the comparative approach, whether applied to single institutions or to whole societies and cultures.". He argues that when precise measurements are problematic, comparisons will highlight the characteristics of cultural manifestations by putting them in contrast with those of another.

> How permissive must be child-rearing practices of a people be to be designated as permissive? How oppressive must a political regime be to merit the adjective oppressive? The terms "individualistic", "freedom-loving", "superstitious", "autocratic", and many others have been applied to many peoples in many parts of the earth, but one will be extremely hard put to it to find any reliable criteria for any of them in most of these writings. One way to remedy the situation is through the comparative approach, so that instead of saying "A is oppressive", we can say "A is more oppressive than B but less oppressive than C". In this way, while still wanting in exactitude in the strictly quantitative sense, our statements at least gain in relative perspective.
> (Hsu, 1963: 24).

In using the comparative for the assessment of the cultural orientations, we will at least gain a relative perspective. For example we can say that the legislation or the ideology of the French Canadian community indicates a higher degree of collectivism than that in the English-speaking community. Though this comparison may not be stated explicitly in the research of the subsequent chapters, it is implicit throughout.

In the use of the historical reference frame, we have set certain limits. First, the focus is on the collectivist manifestations in Quebec while references to those of the individualist orientation will be restricted to sociopolitical interaction between the French and the English Canadians in the four periods named in the Introduction (p.3). Secondly, the historical reference frame will include a survey of some aspects of the cultural orientations as they developed in Bourbon France and in Puritan England at a time when colonizing was taking place both in New France and in New England. The aspects referred to will be those related to the legitimation of authority. Thirdly, in keeping with the methodological approach, the analysis of the cultural orientation will be at the macro level. Specifically we will analyze the cultural orientation in a general way to see whether it is legitimized by being manifested in a collectivist or an individualist social structure. Macroanalysis will serve to prevent our research from becoming unwieldy with too much historical data, as because of the importance of the macro level of analysis we will deal with it under a separate heading.

The wide scope of macroanalysis

Hsu (1963: 18) defends the "wide scope" and "sweep of ideas" of macroanalysis. He holds that this approach has a valuable contribution to make to the social sciences, for it facilitates an understanding of the characteristics of large cultural groups and their relationships. To the charge that macroanalysis may be superficial and fails "to take into consideration all internal variations with the same culture", Hsu counters:

> To begin with, internal variation is to be assumed in any human group, however small, for the capacity to vary is one of the basic characteristics of man. In fact no two individuals are alike. But on the one hand, not all individual pecularities are relevant to his life as an active member of his society; and, on the other, unless we wish to equate the science of man with a science of individual differences we are obliged to deal with men in terms of larger or smaller collectivities which must, by definition, ignore some of the factors making for variation within each collectivity.
> (F. Hsu, 1963: 18).

The wide scope method is particularly appropriate for an examination of historical sources related to the conflict hypothesis of our thesis. We noted Christian and Campbell's view above (p. 10) as well as that of

Dumont (pp. 26, 27) and it is appropriate to expand upon their methods in this chapter. Christian and Campbell favour the wide scope method for studying the ideological differentials of our two founding cultural groups: "ideologies can be distinguished one from another in terms of the central or organizing idea or ideas around which each is constructed (Christian-Campbell, 1974: 18). In their research, as well as ours, the focus is on the central idea of authority, whether it stems from individual rights or from the collectivized group. Through this approach Christian and Campbell can explain not only conflict between two groups of different cultural orientations, but also the effect of moderation as well as that of domination. This approach can thus explain the moderating effect that one cultural orientation can have on the other. This moderating effect is an important aspect in the study of the opposing cultural orientations in question. In studying the conflicts which emerged in the Quiet Revolution, Christian and Campbell find that Quebec's "deeply-rooted" collectivism has "clearly tempered" the liberal-individualist ideology imported from the English world.

Fernand Dumont (1965: 388) also finds that the wide scope method has certain advantages, for it permits the study of dominant ideologies, a study which he sees as having scientific significance.

> When a sociologist or anthropologist wishes to formulate an interpretation of the whole of a society, he examines the main ideologies of the society in question. Before the science of a society is elaborated, this society has already given a coherent picture of what it is. The ideologies with which we are concerned are analogous to the rationalizations with which the psychoanalyst has to deal. Among other results, this situation implies that any scientific interpretation of a total society will inevitably take into account the dominant ideologies of the environment. Sometimes this interpretation is simply the explanation and the systematization of these ideologies.
> (F. Dumont, 1965: 388).

Using a similar approach we intend to demonstrate whether the French and English cultural orientations have been legitimized through a collectivist or an individualist social structure, both of which include political and religious institutions.

Another historian whose approach accords with ours is Ramsay Cook. His macrolevel type of analysis has been especially endorsed by David Cameron who studies nationalistic movements. Cameron (1974: 7) referring to Cook asserts that it is "only when one ascends to the level of a general theory that one can discern the march of history". He further asserts that at this level one can grasp the "essence" of a phenomenon, such as a sociopolitical movement. This essence is harder to come by if one tries to "stick closer to the ground".

The social structures selected as indicators

In this research we have selected certain social structures to use as indicators of the manifestations of the collectivist or the individualist orientation. The selection has been based on the following sources. First, for an overview we consider the suggestions of Inkeles and Levinson (1969: 425), who in reviewing the relevant literature find that most assessments of national characterizations have proceeded on "the analysis of collective policies and products-rituals, institutional structures, folklore, media of mass communication, and the like". Though their discussion on methodology is related to the validation of a national character, which we have emphasized is beyond the scope of this thesis; it is instructive for this type of related research. Inkeles and Levinson (1969: 425) inform us that in the research of national character, the method of using collective social structures, policies, and enterprises has been the most prevalent in the interests of economy. However, they argue that this method should supplement large-scale statistical analysis, which should be regarded as the primary source. Here we take into account the argument raised by I.L. Horowitz (1973: 348) that "hard" data abstracted from social structures, particularly those related to economic control, reveal differentials more than data from motivational-attitudinal tests. Therefore, upon the assumption that social structures can yield valid data, and upon the precedents set by extensive use of social structures and policies, we will proceed to select specific types of social structures to be used in this research.

First, we have selected the method used and advocated by A.V. Dicey in his study of nineteenth century England and implied by Hilda Neatby in her study of New France. Dicey (1962: 17-61) uses examples of enacted legislation to indicate whether public opinion in England of that time was collectivist or individualist. His term "public opinion" is very close to our "cultural orientation". In his words: "There exists at any given time a body of beliefs, convictions, sentiments, accepted principles or firmly rooted prejudices, which, taken together, make up the public opinion of a particular era " (Dicey, 1962: 19).

Whereas Dicey limits his study to certain periods where the parliamentary process for legislating was in effect, Neatby uses legislation as an indicator in post-Conquest Canada where law-making had not been limited to the parliamentary process. By the event of the Conquest, the two types of political systems were thrown into juxtaposition: the Bourbon system where laws were enacted through the workings of paternalism, vulnerable to the process of lobby, and the British parliamentary system.* Yet Neatby does not discriminate between the laws of these two different systems as to their value as indicators. For instance, she contrasts the French Canadian laws of inheritance with the English. The French recognized a community of property between husband and wife and restricted the husband's power to alienate, whereas English law permitted the husband (as the legal owner) to dispose of property, commonly held, at his own discretion unless elaborate precautions were taken to protect the property rights of the wife (Neatby, 1971: 46). Through her study of these contrasts, Neatby (1971: 47) holds that "the laws, in fact, reflected different economic interests and different social values" of the two founding groups of our society. In looking at legislation as an indicator, we are reminded of the note of caution expressed by S.D. Clark (1968: 287) that we must be careful when we use indicators such as "legislation" which, in their historical development, undergo change in meaning. However, on the strength of the precedent set by the Neatby research, which points to the effectiveness of the lobby, we will proceed to use enacted legislation of the two founding groups, both before and after the Conquest.

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* Although Dicey (1972: 12) is careful to limit his methodology to the particular situations where the parliamentary system is in effect, he does point to the influence of the lobby and the groups or "classes" behind the lobby. From this perspective he is at one with the historians of New France who also point to the influence of particular groups who acted as a lobby in the law-making process both in Versailles and in Quebec. It seems that paternalism was very vulnerable to influences such as patronage and cabals.

We must explore other forms of indicators, however. Some historians and sociologists do not refer to legislation but to other types of social structures, such as institution policies and ideologies. As previously noted, Christian and Campbell use dominant ideologies which are organized around the idea of authority, whether collectivist or individualist. Concerning the developments in New France, Fernand Ouellet (1955: 94-100) uses the ideology of the Bourbon regime which was collectivist to the extent that it prevented the emergence of the "capitalist bourgeois" with the vigor and drive of private enterprise. Hebert Quinn (1974: 193-4) uses the ideology of social Catholicism, which when translated into party policy became an indicator that political opposition based on collectivism was growing, and would defeat the policies of Taschereau and Duplessis which favoured the influx of English oriented capitalism. Ramsay Cook (1969: 147) uses "public philosophy that divides Canadians" to explain the differences in legislative preferences of the French and the English, respectively, the preference for "group rights" and individual rights.

Other historians use institutional developments as indicators of cultural influences. A.I. Silver (1976: 450) suggests that Quebec's "national institutions" differed from those of the other provinces - "they might be based upon a French character which was the exact opposite of the English character". A more definitive statement defending the use of institutions as indicators comes from Jean-Pierre Wallot (1971: 121): he speaks about the significance of studying the "two social structures ethnically differentiated". These social structures "were pitted against each other through political, economic, social, cultural and religious conflicts - points of friction between the two societies". In this conflict the institutions, particularly for the minority group "came to constitute, for them, a sort of armour, hampering but necessary to insure the survival of French Canada and defeat the assimilation plans of the British colonists". And like armour, the institutions of our study reveal to us the shape of that which they protect. We can see in them the forms of collectivist orientation that was being opposed by the individualist group. This view is particularly evident in historians such as Pierre Deffontaine (1965: 18), Yves Zoltvany (1971: 57), and Jean Falardeau (1965: 31) who see the collectivist orientation behind the rang pattern of settlement, the interventionist policies of the Bourbon regime, and the administrative policies of the Church. Other historians, such as J. Careless (1977: 163, 215), use institutions as indicators of the "clash" of different cultural orientations which became evident in the Union Government of 1841. These selected institutions therefore seem to be valid manifestations of cultural orientation.

Critical appraisal of the use of these indicators

As we have noted, there is some reservation about the validity of such cultural indicators. S.D. Clark, for example, cautions the researcher to be aware of the changing historical conditions to which a concept under investigation is subject. This word of caution influenced our decision to eliminate the use of the indicators of the vote and the authority structure of the family. But we have retained the use of legislation as explained above.

Fearn (1973: 92) expresses concern that the use of narrative comments by historians be checked against the evidence that can be obtained from documents, such as laws and records of legislative debates. In our research, we have made an effort to include references to these types of data, but our sources have been other researchers, such as historians. Secondly, Fearn (1973: 92) expresses concern that the type of data selected be able to "record all important patterns of variation". The research of this thesis has proceeded on the assumption that the selected indicators such as legislation or policies can record variation, but in the interests of following the wide scope method and in the interests of space, these variations have not been systematically analyzed. However, at this time, it is appropriate to point to two examples of such variation. Our preliminary research of the policies of the French trade unions indicates that while some of them were collectivist in line with the policies of Social Catholicism, other unions came under the influence of the Anglo-American based unions. Then there was the additional complication that the French Canadian worker protested more vigorously against his employer if he was in any way identified with Anglo-American capitalism. (See Morton, 1971: 409 and H. Quinn, 1974: 195.)

Another more recent example of variation is the apparent rise of a new French-Canadian business elite with entrepreneurial policies. According to an article in Macleans (April 14, 1980: 30) "big business has become an object of infatuation among Quebeckers. The energy and effervescence that have for years imprinted Quebec music, art and film have now been appropriated by a new set of idols - ascendant business leaders who are giving francophones their own formidable multinationals and, more importantly, are creating a strong new class of power wielders." However, we find that the new policies of the business elite appear to have a high degree of family orientation and so the variation itself can be seen in relation to the prevailing cultural pattern. Our indicator, namely that of policies and ideologies can be used to detect this type of variation, and to see it as a wider perspective, but for the reasons stated above, we have not dealt systematically with variation.

Illustration as a method rather than demonstration

Another aspect of our methodology is the preference given to illustration of hypotheses over demonstration. Illustrations require only supportive data, while demonstrations require analysis of contradictory evidence. Even though Hsu (1963: 25) argues that the method of demonstration gives stronger support to validate the hypothesis and is the desired goal of research, a degree of validity sufficient for this thesis can be achieved through illustration. Then, too, our stipulated aim seems to be in accord with the widescope method of our thesis, which permits us to ignore a systematic analysis of internal variation.

The problem of reliable sources

Our last concern, that of finding reliable sources of historical data, has been dealt with in the following ways. First, we have selected works by sociologists, anthropologists, polotical scientists, and historians, which demonstrate high academic and scholarly achievement. Second, we have used materials from French and English Canadian sources in order to compensate for bias related to the ethnic factor. For Chapter V which deals with the colonizing experience of New France, French Canadian sources were translated especially for this thesis. Third, we have used critical assessments of historians by historical analysts which uncover some of the bias related to ideological differences. For example, Ramsay Cook (1967: 3-17) and Philippe Garigue (1964: 186-192) both detect a historical bias in analyses of French Canada which are conditioned by the period in which the historians were writing. Thus the "traditionalists" place much more emphasis on the role of the Church, while the "modernists" such as Fregault and Ouellet emphasize the role of the economic factors. But even amongst the modernists there are differing points of view. For example, there is contention over the so-called "bourgeoisie thesis" which proposes that in New France a bourgeoisie did develop which was destroyed by the Conquest conditions. Fregault defends this thesis, while Hamelin and Ouellet challenge it, arguing that the ideological influence of Bourbon paternalism prevented an effective bourgeoisie from becoming established.

We deal with these conflicting views in our research. Then also, analysis of historians by historians has been used to steer us toward the critically balanced sources, and away from the more radical French Canadian historians such as Leandre Bergeron (1971), who denounce the British unequivocally, and English-speaking historians such as J.A. Lower and C.P. Stacey who denounce the French. Fourth, we have sought to use sources which complement one another as to the focus of their study. For example, A.I. Silver focuses on the imperialism of Roman Catholicism while Ramsay Cook examines the "new imperialism" of "Anglo-Saxonism" (Brown-Cook, 1974: 27). In short, we have attempted to reduce historical as well as ideological-ethnic bias in the formulation of our thesis.

Summary

In this chapter we have explained the methods we will use to validate the hypotheses of this thesis. We have attempted to justify our use of the wide scope approach and have discussed the methods used to deal with the problems inherent in this approach. To compensate for the lack of precise measurement we compared our findings in the two historical reference frames of the two founding ethnic groups. That is, we compared the manifestations of French Canadian collectivism in Quebec with those of English Canadian individualism as these ethnic groups interacted in specific political events and situations. By the use of comparisons, we at least gained the relative perspective. Hsu's wide scope method also permitted us to eliminate internal variation and to use the method of illustration of the hypotheses rather than demonstration.

We followed the Christian-Campbell suggestion to limit the analysis of the cultural orientation to the central organizing idea related to the legitimation of authority, that is, whether the cultural orientation is legitimated through being manifested in social structures that have a collectivist or an individualist orientation. It is in this way that we attempt to "simply" systematize the cultural orientations, a method which Dumont considers to have scientific validity. This simplified analysis of the cultural orientations in their respective manifestations permits us to see them as being in conflict with each other. But this conflict can be viewed positively as Christian and Campbell do. In other words, the influence that one orientation can have on the other can be one of moderation - an effect which works toward cultural diversity rather than dominance of one by the other.

Our selection of indicators has been limited to four types of social structures: enacted legislation;

explicit policies; prevailing ideologies, both related to the legitimation of authority; and institutional structures of the church and the government specifically concerned with administration of authority.

We also sought to attain a measure of historical scholarship and for this made use of critical assessments of historians by historians in order to uncover bias due to writing in different historical periods, or due to the ethnic-ideological factors.

CHAPTER IV

ASPECTS OF THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF COLLECTIVISM AND INDIVIDUALISM

Introduction

In this chapter we will look at some of the aspects of the ideological conflict between collectivism and individualism in the European background, since the conflict between the French and the English colonies has its roots in their respective mother countries. An exploration of the historical background serves to clarify the characteristics of each society and to trace the antagonistic relationships. Christian and Campbell's "raw materials" thesis (1974: 19) is especially pertinent here, since it emphasizes the importance of the ideologies and institutions imported from France and England to the adjacent colonies in Canada.

Kenneth McRae (1964: 219-273) also applied the collectivist-individualist dichotomy of Louis Hartz to the colonies of New France and New England.* He traces these differences imported from the mother countries (1964: 221, 222): New France was the projection of a highly centralized, authoritarian state, whereas New England was the projection of a state that fostered the individual's right to dissent from external authorities and to engage in private enterprise without government interference. McRae describes this second projection as a "dogmatic" form of liberalism (McRae, 1964: 240).

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* The fact that McRae as a continentalist has been taken to task for applying this dichotomy unconditionally to those of the English orientation whether they were in United States or in Canada need not concern us here, for the difference in the development of individualism did not become evident until after the founding of the Canadian nation. (See Christian and Campbell, 1974: 22-23).

Two other historians point to the significance of this conflict as it became evident during the Conquest. The most eloquent is Guy Fregault (1969(a): 9-16) who researched the newspapers of the Conquest period. He is critical of the English "cult of liberty" (13) now becoming rooted in American soil, which was directed against the French immigrants. The English, those of the colonies even more than those in the motherland, "despised" the French for "bowing under such despotism" (10) as that implemented by the king of France. Under the banner of newly proclaimed liberty, the English extolled the liberal philosophy and the British constitution as the "quintessence" of all historical developments. This loyalty to the liberal cause led to a condemnation of practically all that was French. The British colonists branded the French Canadian troops as more "ferocious" in battle than even the Indians, the French manners as "seductive", and the French women as "frivolous" (14). Moreover, this anti-French attitude took on a religious fervour: the English of the colonies believed that defeat of these benighted and enslaved people would be a victory for God. On the other hand, the religious convictions of the French Canadians, as seen in the writings of the nuns, were equally firm in defending Catholicism as the true religion of God. As Fregault (1969(a): 10) succinctly puts it "ideas would wave like flags over the opposing camps".

The second historian, W.J. Eccles (1972: 226), describes the "clash of social values" in terms reminiscent of Neatby. Though they were only "dimly perceived" at the time of the Conquest, the differences between the two cultures were manifested in their different legal perspectives. Under the English system, the rights of the entrepreneur were given priority, whereas under the French, priority had been granted to the consumer. Through the French office of the intendant, a certain controlling process was in effect, for instance, the regulation of lawyer's fees. Under the English system the office of the intendant was abolished and the rules of the market were allowed to dominate. An individual, such as a lawyer, was permitted to set what price he pleased on his labour (1972: 227). Through the works of these historians, we see that the conflict is sociological, and not limited simply to differences in political ideology, as the analysis by Christian and Campbell could lead us to believe. In this chapter we will explore this sociological aspect in greater detail.

Historical Overview

Heberle's (1951: 32-80) overview of the "great social movements in the West" argues that the individualist movement emerged in the seventeenth century to oppose the excessive encroachment of the state on the individual. We are speaking here of an opposition by ambitious individuals who had the means to attain their ambitions. Heberle (1951: 33) refers to the leaders of this opposition as the bourgeoisie, meaning the various kinds of capitalistic entrepreneurs, especially in commerce, banking and industry, who were gaining authority from the state. This bourgeoisie was beginning to demand a larger share in political authority and in the economic assets that previously were under the control of the Tudor regime, in one way or another.

The individualist movement took root in England and grew quickest there, for England was advancing most rapidly in the field of industrial expansion. This movement became embodied in the political ideology of liberalism. Thereafter liberalism, as a very attractive aid to attaining these new ambitions and as the handmaid of capitalism, gradually became so dominant that new forms of collectivism were developed to contradict these ideologies and these practices. The forms of collectivism referred to here are various forms of state socialism, nationalistic conservatism, and communism. Heberle (1951: 43-80) refers to this oscillating pattern using broad terms, whereas Dicey refers to the same type of oscillations using specific terms. We referred to Dicey's (1962: 17-61) work in the chapter on methodology and note that he uses enacted legislation in nineteenth century England to trace the oscillations between a collectivist type of public opinion which then changed to take on an individualist orientation.

Contrasting the constitutional developments and theories of state in France and England of the 17th century, Harold Laski (1936: 101) finds the "great distinction between the two lies in the individualist note which begins to pervade the whole English habit of thought". In the emerging English liberalism, the central tendency was to surrender the idea of social initiative and social control to the idea of individual initiative and control (Laski, 1936: 12, 47, 96, 101). Because liberalism developed as a definite reaction to excessive types of collectivism, Laski (1936: 15) finds it lends itself more to specific characterization as a theory of state than do the collectivist types. Since Laski's focus is on individualism, his research will therefore be complemented with that of John Nef (1964) who focusses on both types, the Bourbon and the Tudor regimes. He contrasts the interrelationships between the industrial and the constitutional developments in each society.

The analysis by Richard Tawney (1944: 197-253) focusses on the individualist manifestations of Puritanism. In this religious movement, individualism developed into economic individualism and "negative government", that is, the non-interventionist government of the *laissez faire* model. Because Puritanism was the most significant force in legitimizing negative government, Tawney gives us a comprehensive account of its development and the force of its influence. The theory of individual rights, backed by Puritanism, became the "most potent explosive force" (1944: 229, 230) in condemning the old "external order" as unspiritual and ineffectual, and ushered in a new liberal order. When secularized and generalized, the compelling energies of Puritan individualism found expression in the activities of government, business, and industries.

The analysis of Laski and Tawney complements the interpretation of the historians of French Canada, which centers on the collectivist manifestations of the French regime. This analysis also serves to clarify the confusion surrounding the issue of whether there were significant manifestations of individualism in French Canada, for instance, in the form of representative government or the establishment of a bourgeoisie. In the following pages we will compare the manifestations of individualism in French Canada to those in England to see if they similarly opposed and contradicted the collectivist manifestations. More specifically, we will compare the manifestations of individualism in the French colony with those in England to see if there was a group in the colony who were able to wrest control from the state and gain access to the decision-making process as they did in England, a group that could be characterized as a bourgeoisie or an entrepreneurial group.

The Significance of Individualism in the Rise of Liberalism

Laski (1936: 11-160), in his analysis of the rise of liberalism, perceives the ideological conflict from the same general perspective as we do in this thesis. He focussed on whether the state/community or the individual was legitimized as sovereign. Hence in his work we see the conflict manifested in terms of liberalism, as a theory of state, opposing statism. More specifically, political philosophies that perceived the individual as sovereign authority contradicted political philosophies that considered the nation-state sovereign, the good of the whole taking precedence over the individual. As Laski (1936: 94, 95) notes, the good of the whole was defined in very different terms after the theories of liberalism had been worked out and had "joined hands with the religious spirit of Puritanism". In his words, (95) "a sense that private advantage makes for public good permeates, especially after

1660, the whole outlook of Puritanism" as well as the ideology of economic individualism. We quote at length from Laski to illustrate the significance he places on the role of individualism in this emerging political-religious philosophy.

> It [liberalism] sought to vindicate the right of the individual to shape his own destiny, regardless of any authority which might seek to limit his possibilities; yet it found that, inherent in that claim, there was an inevitable challenge from community to the sovereignty of the individual. ...
>
> It has sought, almost from the outset of its history, to limit the ambit of political authority, to confine the business of government within the framework of constitutional principle; and it has tried, therefore, fairly consistently to discover a system of fundamental rights which the state is not entitled to invade .... It has attempted, where it could, to respect the claims of conscience, and to urge upon governments the duty to proceed by rule rather than by discretion in their operations; but the scope of the conscience it has respected has been narrowed by its regard for property, and its zeal for the rule of law has been tempered by a discretion in the breadth of its application....
>
> But liberalism, as I have urged, is hardly less a mood than a doctrine. Its tendency has been sceptical; it has always taken a negative attitude to social action. By reason of its origins, it has always regarded tradition as on the defensive, and for the same reason, also it has always preferred to bless individual innovation than to sanction the uniformities sought for by political power. It has always, that is, seen in both tradition and uniformity an attack upon the right of the individual to

> make of his own affirmations and insights a universal rule made binding not because authority accepts it, but because its inherent validity secures for it the free consent of others. There is, therefore, a flavour of romanticism about the liberal temper the importance of which is great. It tends to be subjective and anarchist, and to be eager for the change which comes from individual initiative, to be insistent that this initiative contains within itself some necessary seed of social good.
>
> (H. Laski, 1936: 14-16).

Laski (1936: 26-29) goes on to explain that with the emergence of liberalism there developed an expectation, and in fact a sanction, for individual ownership of wealth and property, whereas under forms of statism, this right to acquisition was held by a corporate body, such as a family, a religious order, or the crown. However, the fervent opposition to the state which developed in England and the driving power to reduce its authority was inspired by the enormous energy of Puritanism, which as Laski says, "joined hands" with this political philosophy to form a formidable barricade confronting the state. Hence, we next look at the influence of Puritanism on individualism.

The Significance of Individualism in the Puritan Movement

Having analyzed the significance of the Puritan movement, we turn to Tawney for a comprehensive description of its development on English soil. He not only accounts for the overt effects of its religious zeal, but also characterizes the "inward spiritual" forces of this movement, which often elude the historian.

> The growth, triumph and transformation of the Puritan spirit was the most fundamental movement of the seventeenth century. Puritanism, not the Tudor secession from Rome, was the true English Reformation, and it is from its struggle against the old order that an England which is unmistakably modern emerges. But, immense as were its accomplishments on the high stage of public affairs, its achievements in that inner world, of which politics are but the squalid scaffolding, were mightier still.
>
> (Tawney, 1944: 198).

The most significant aspect of this "inner world", according to Tawney (1944: 198, 200-216, 231), is the Puritan "will". It developed from the predicament of the isolated Puritan, who had to seek his salvation alone and in an evil world. Because the traditional collectivist means of gaining religious assurance were played down, the Puritan sought to gain assurance through his own individualized conversion. He, therefore, turned with an "almost physical horror from the vanities" (1944: 200) of the world and shunned earthly pleasures that would distract him from his relentless pursuit to find his God and glorify Him. As he made his lonely pilgrimage through a "world given over to the power of darkness" (1944: 200) his only equipment was his will. When this "will" was inspired with the fervour of newly discovered religious beliefs, disciplined by the demands of the Puritan faith, driven by the compulsive energies of ambitions straining to be fulfilled and organized into a social movement, the effects on society were phenomenal: "Puritanism worked like a yeast which sets the whole mass fermenting" (1944: 231).

Tawney (1944: 199-231) explains how this social movement was a factor in reforming not only the life styles of the Puritans but also the religious and political institutions so they would accomodate and support the emerging ambitions of this group. The religious institutions were the first to be reformed. The church authorities who would have enforced a moral code and compulsory uniformity upon the members, were not permitted to rule in England as they did in Geneva. Hence, individualism in religion was achieved and to an extent a religious tolerance was developed. But the concept of the strong-willed, self-reliant individual gradually developed into a religious meritocracy, which, then were in a position to enter into the decision-making processes of government.

Gradually the Puritan ideas became embodied in political groups, such as the Independents, who then could agitate and lobby for the desired changes. Subsequently, the Puritan concepts of self-reliance and individualized achievement were translated into political ideas to be used to transform government structures and introduce economic individualism. For the Puritan inspired politicians abhorred compulsory conformity in economic activity as they had in the religious area. Therefore they fought to eliminate governmental regulations and restrictions which they held were imposed to hamper individual enterprise in the "name of either social morality or the public interest" (1944: 227).

Though the process of secularization and generalizing of the Puritan beliefs was gradual and complex, occurring as the *nouveaux riches* acquired social, economic and political power, though this process was influenced by structural factors, such as the industrial expansion in England, Tawney (1944: 219, 227) holds that the individualist orientation of Puritanism was a significant factor in this "momentous" change occurring in English history. He concludes as follows:

> A spiritual aristocrat, who sacrificed fraternity to liberty, he drew from his idealization of personal responsibility a theory of individual rights, which, secularized and generalized, was to be among the most potent explosives that the world has known. He drew from it also a scale of ethical values, in which the traditional scheme of Christian virtues was almost exactly reversed, and which, since he was above all things practical, he carried as a dynamic into the routine of business and political life.
>
> (Tawney, 1944: 230).

We look at Tawney's description of the individualist movement in greater detail, for it provides a basis of comparison with the developments in French Canada. This individualist movement in England was able to oppose the positive government of the Tudor regime and to reduce its authority to the point that a negative government could be introduced, one that retreated from intervention in the economy.

> Behind the elaborate facade of Tudor State control, which has attracted the attention of historians, an individualist movement had been steadily developing, which found expression in opposition to the traditional policy of stereotyping economic relations by checking enclosure, controlling food supplies and prices, interfering with the money-market, and regulating the conditions of the wage contract and of apprenticeship. In the first forty years of the seventeenth century, on grounds both of expediency and of principle, the commercial and propertied classes were becoming increasingly restive under the whole system, at once ambitious and inefficient, of economic paternalism. It was in the same sections of community that both religious and economic dissatisfaction were most acute. Puritanism, with its idealization of the spiritual energies which found expression in the activities of business and industry, drew the isolated rivulets of discontent together, and swept them forward with the dignity and momentum of a religious and a social philosophy.
>
> (Tawney, 1944: 234-35).

Tawney goes on to analyze the conflict between interrelated socioeconomic processes, wherein the individualist social philosophies gradually came to dominate the collectivist. The philosophies which spoke for the fraternal rights and the sense of corporateness were undermined, their political efforts rendered ineffectual. A case in point is the representations the

State made on behalf of the consumers against the middlemen, and of the craftsmen against the merchants. The middlemen and the merchants did not retreat from the ground they had gained. Their petitions to Parliament accused the government of holding on to its control of industry by enforcing antiquated rules and thereby gaining profit for the Tudor regime and its "hangers-on" (1944: 236). Through Parliament, then, the Puritans engaged in a systematic reduction of the power of government, so that business affairs could be left to businessmen, "unhampered by the intrusions of an antiquated morality or by misconceived arguments of public policy" (1944: 238). Tawney refers to this Puritan method as "administrative nihilism" (1944: 238) and says that it became the accepted policy in the following century.

Therefore, as a result of reduced state control, the "commercial magnates of the day" (Tawney, 1944: 252) were able to transform the right of acquisition and the pursuit of gain into a moral duty of the devout. Acquisition and control of wealth became a legitimized individualistic enterprise, whereas previously the rights to this acquisition and this control were vested with the crown or with a communal group, such as the extended family, a guild, or a religious order. In other words, the capitalist spirit, previously collectivist, was now individualized.*

Laski (1936: 143-153) describes the same process, using the term "rising bourgeoisie", to denote those who opposed ecclesiastical or royal intervention and developed the theories of laissez faire and negative government. Laski summarizes the complex process:

> The rising bourgeoisie adapts, first religion, then culture, to its purposes; the state is the last of its conquests. ... It is only when the new order of things has firmly established its foundations, when freedom in the economic sphere seems an obvious inference from its attainment elsewhere that the bourgeois moves to the final assault. He has then supreme coercive power in his hands. The chief use of the state to him is merely as a police agency. He bids it keep outside that realm of economic action he now proposes to exploit on his own terms.
>
> (Laski, 1936: 145).

Laski illustrates further how economic control and the legitimation process which santions it, can be vested either with the bourgeoisie, as in Tudor England, or with the state, as in France. However, the bourgeoisie in England did not achieve their period of domination until after the Restoration, when the movement toward laissez faire gained new momentum. "By the end of the [seventeenth] century the attitude is prepared out of which Hume can urge, and Adam Smith demonstrate, the full philosophy of economic individualism" (Laski, 1936: 147). From this point on, Laski then illustrates aspects of the contradictions and antagonisms in the struggle between collectivism and individualism in relation to the acquisition of wealth and the means to legitimize this acquisition.

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* For a fuller statement on the above concept see Laski (1936: 27) and Tawney (1944: 26). From this perspective the pursuit of gain is as old as recorded history and it is not to be associated only with the rise of Puritanism or liberalism in England. The individualization of this pursuit, however, and the legitimation of authority to support this acquisition is the new development in England. It stands as a marked contrast to the forms of collectivized acquisition and control such as what might be called the state capitalism of Louis XIV.

Comparison of Constitutional Developments in France and England

John Nef's research entitled *Industry and Government in France and England, 1540-1640*, also explores developments in religious and political thought in the period which was influential in shaping the cultural orientation of the two groups of our study. It deals with the constitutional developments in these two societies as they relate to industrial expansion. Nef illustrates how absolutism triumphed under the Bourbon regime and how the Tudors, attempting a similar expansion of state control, met opposition. Factors which favoured the growth of absolutism, identified by Nef, are the following: (1) The political philosophy of the French favoured divine right of kings, for it promised relief from further devastations of civil wars. (2) The constitutional traditions in

France offered but a weak bulwark against the encroachment of the state on the individual. (3) The recruitment policies and surveillance practices of the appointed officials eliminated potential antagonists and fostered the loyalty of officials. (4) The regulation of industry and the participation of the crown in industrial enterprises was legitimized and legally sanctioned (Nef, 1964: 3, 37; 153; 7, 11, 12-47; & 7, 58-102, respectively).

Nef illustrates how very different developments took place on English soil. Although he deals with specific legislation, the general thrust of his argument overlaps somewhat with that of Tawney and Laski, so a brief summary will be sufficient. Nef shows that whereas in France political philosophies interacted with constitutional developments (those related to industrial growth) to influence a further expansion of the state into the field of commerce and industry, in England the opposite conditions prevailed. Nef (1964: 4) finds that "the contrasts between the constitutional histories of England and France from 1540 to 1640 were as striking as the contrasts between the industrial histories." After tracing related constitutional and industrial developments in both societies in this period, he arrives at this conclusion:

> In one case [France], the crown was stepping into a field that the mercantile and landed classes had little inclination

> to occupy. In the other [England], the crown was encroaching upon a field that private interests were bent on exploiting.
>
> (Nef, 1964: 150).

Nef's analysis looks at the effect of excessive state control on industrial growth in France and concludes that individual initiative and enterprise were stifled, just as they were by modified Bourbon absolutism in the colony of New France, as we will see later. Nef (1964: 68-98) points out that in France the middle and upper classes had for many years been accustomed to leaving the incentive in industry to the crown. They catered to the crown in order to gain revenue and provide access to other means of wealth. However, apart from overtaxation of the peasants, the French collectivist policies promoted some forms of social justice. They increased the national dividend, regulated competition, encouraged the fine arts, and helped to maintain high standards of workmanship in the crafts.

Socioeconomic effects of government developments in France and England can also be contrasted: in France the financial resources were directed toward buying administrative positions close to the crown, rather than toward investing in private industry. Furthermore, the middle and upper classes aspired to the social goals of the Court, to the development of refined social intercourse and trained aesthetic judgment, whereas the English aspired to the fulfillment of the "new philosophy" of material improvement for the individual (Nef, 1964: 135-157).

The Nef analysis complements that of Laski-Tawney by illustrating the contradictions between the two societies in constitutional developments as well as in related socioeconomic effects. The differences in the patterns of development in France and England which these three researchers study correspond roughly to the collectivist-individualist dichotomy of our thesis. The Nef study also brings us closer to the influences that were brought to bear on the French colony from the homeland. Nef's work therefore, lends concrete evidence to Eccles's generalization concerning the "clash of social values" between the French Canadians and the New England merchants, when the Conquest effected interaction between these divergent cultural groups. (For above see also Benn, S.I. & Peters, R.S., 1959 & Trevelyan, G.M. 1979.)

Summary

In this chapter we have looked at the background of the collectivist-individualist conflict through the interpretations of several social historians. To Laski, the conflict is between constitutional ideologies and theories of liberalism and those of statism. The liberal emphasis is on the individual rather than the collectivity and therefore, the priority for the legitimation of authority is correspondingly vested with the individual rather than with the state, community, or group. Liberalism spurns the collectivist authority that prevents the individual from developing his potential by forcing policies of conformity upon him. Furthermore, liberalism encourages individual initiative and aggressiveness in socioeconomic activities, and interprets intervention from an external source as a binding chain rather than a helping hand. In Laski's analysis the characterizations of collectivism are not expanded upon, for his focus is on the development of liberalism that arose as a reaction to forms of statism, which at this period in England had become an excessive encroachment on the enterprising individual.

Tawney perceives the "growth of individualism" first in the religious zeal of Puritanism and then in the calculating ideology of economic individualism. As the authority of the individual advanced, the power of the state receded until it became the servant of the private enterprise system. In his description Tawney analyzes the cause of the prodigious growth of individualism and points to the Puritan inception of will - "will organized and disciplined and inspired" (Tawney, 1944: 201) to achieve the goals of Puritanism. It was this driving and energetic will that was able to challenge and to triumph over collectivism in religion and in government. Tawney makes the significant observation that these conflicts had their "deeper cause in the collision of incompatible social philosophies" (Tawney, 1944: 237).

The Nef analysis complements that of Laski and Tawney, for they do not focus on the manifestations of collectivism in France. Nef systematically and precisely draws contrasts between the governmental developments and related industrial changes in France and England. He also describes the socioeconomic effects of these contrasting developments. The French became accustomed to the crown taking the initiative in industrial expansion, whereas English entrepreneurs moved aggressively into this area themselves. This contrast highlights the different cultural orientations of these two societies and, particularly relevant for us, the different processes they subsequently employed in their colonization efforts.

In the study of the colonial experiences, we will again encounter the terminology of conflict: Eccles (1972: 226) refers to the "clash of social values" and Fregault (1969(a): 10) to the "two opposing camps" each waving ideological banners at the time of the Conquest. The next chapter expands upon the perspective of these two historians and draws upon others who studied the significance of this conflict.

CHAPTER V

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF COLLECTIVISM IN NEW FRANCE

Introduction

In this chapter we will analyze the manifestations of collectivism in the institutional developments of New France, that is, the developments in the government, the seigneurial system, and the church. We will include a look at the organizational aspects of the fur trade, which, controlled from Versailles, reinforced the centralizing tendencies of the government in the colony. The centralizing effects of the fur trade extended even further, for this industry was the primary source of income, outside of crown revenues. The last section of this chapter contrasts the characteristics of collectivism in the French colony with those of individualism in the English colonies. These contrasting characteristics became evident in the interaction of the two cultural groups during the period of the conquest.

The institutional developments of the French and the English reflect the different orientations of these two colonial groups. For example, the French-Canadian tendency toward political passivity was increased. It is noteworthy that there was never any serious agitation among the French colonists to gain access to that part of government which had the decision-making capacity. Though the inner circle could appeal to the King, though they could gain the governor's favour or apply pressure directly to the Crown in France, this form of influence had limitations. Similarly, although the *habitant* and the *coureur de bois* might seem notoriously independent, they remained dependent in so far as economic or political decisions were concerned. For these reasons we argue that a bourgeoisie or entrepreneurial class did not develop in French Canada: the King and his ministers embodied the absolutist principle and the king ruled over all by divine right using a fascinating variety of methods and policies to implement this absolutism.

The contrast with New England is striking. There, forms of self-government had been instituted, and the people had grown accustomed to taking the initiative both in governmental affairs and in economic enterprises. When the two cultures collided during the Conquest, the different cultural orientations and the different expectations they had of their respective institutions became very apparent.

The Influence of the Fur Trade on the Development of Collectivism

The fur trade dominated socioeconomic activity in New France, and this virtual economic monopoly contributed to the colony's dependence on the government of France for several reasons. The colony was almost completely dependent on the fur trade as its source of revenue except for the crown revenues which even further reduced the colony to a dependent position. Furthermore, the dependence on the fur trade and the excitement this industry generated drew energy and interest away from other types of industrial or agricultural enterprises. Manpower for agriculture was further depleted when the militia were posted away from home to protect the interests of the fur trade.

A number of other aspects of the fur trade attracted men toward it and away from agricultural pursuits: (1) the fur trade delivered immediate and enticing profits in comparison to other industries; (2) it was neither capital intensive nor labour intensive for the colonists; (3) it appealed to the spirit of adventure and provided escape from regulated living; (4) it met the colonial requirement of being a source of revenue for the mother country, providing France with a raw material that was scarce in Europe. (Innis, 1954: 110-118; Eccles, 1972: 103-131; & Morton, 1977: 61-72.)

So the colony was reduced to dependence on France even for the food it required for existence. In contrast the agriculture of New England was well developed and its industry was diversified (Careless, 1963: 85 & Eccles, 1972: 103-124).

The fur trade was bound by a highly centralized machinery of control based in France: its financial resources were controlled by either the Crown or the merchants of La Rochelle who were subject to the Crown. Moreover, the market for furs was determined by the vagaries of French fashion. These factors reduced the colonist's resistance to the centralizing policies of the Bourbon regime, which bound not only the fur trade but also the other institutions of the colony. As Harold Innis explains:

> Through these organizations - the trading organization of the interior and the monopoly organization of the external trade - there developed in the colony a highly centralized system of administration. This centralization was shown in agriculture, in industry, in the church and in the colonial government. The tendency toward centralization was responsible for the development of paternalistic government.
>
> (H. Innis, 1956: 113).

The fur trade's operational features also aggravated the colony's dependent position: (1) the crown granted and withdrew monopolies; (2) the crown fixed prices that stabilized the market and guaranteed profits (except during the crisis when the French market became glutted); (3) the colony depended on France for manufactured goods to trade with the Indians, and was unable to manufacture goods in competition with France; and (4) the French Canadians expected that the crown take the initiative and the responsibility in industrial enterprise, an attitude inherited from France (Eccles, 1972: 103-131).

This form of state domination and monopoly had a crippling effect on individual initiative and enterprise. When the market became glutted, the crown refused to grant further licences and the traders faced bankruptcy. In the distress that followed, these people, now retired from active service to the crown, continued to look to it for positions and support. Furthermore, they were unskilled for other industries and agriculture. Morton holds that these effects have been long term:

> Accordingly they sought commissions in the Troupes de la Marine, government positions in the colony or as commandments of the new fur posts, pensions or other gratuities from the Court. This proud but dependent class was a principal element of Canadian society, and it embodied an attitude towards government which can still be seen among French Canadians today.
>
> (Morton, 1977: 98).

Facing bankruptcy, the Montreal traders sold their rights to merchants in France and so lost the control they had acquired. Though these steps did much to rehabilitate the fur trade, they also revealed that the nascent business group in French Canada failed to develop the strength to become a self-sufficient business class (Morton, 1963: 103).

Similarly, the *coureurs de bois* failed to come to terms with the French authorities; instead they retreated to the interior to continue illegal trade with the

English rather than seeking aggressive remedial action (Morton, 1977: 95 & Eccles, 1969: 109-131).

Innis (1956: 115, 118) sums up the crippling effects of the fur trade: its operational factors reinforced "paternalism of French regime" and it prevented the colony from taking an independent position from the old world.

Thus, the fur trade was important in influencing the "tendency toward centralization" shown by government and religious institutions and in impeding a diversified economic development.

The Manifestations of Collectivism in Governmental Institutions

In the colonial period of French Canadian society prior to the Conquest, collectivism was so entrenched that individualism in economics could not take root. A strong, independent bourgeoisie did not develop as it did in the British colonies. Certainly the *potential* for an entrepreneurial middle class existed: the colony had a trade base strong enough to support entrepreneurs; the *habitant*[*] was not always compliant in obeying regulations that did not please him; and there was mediation by traders and merchants who sought to influence the officials of the crown. From these facts, the development of a bourgeoisie, a group controlling its own decisions and managing its own capital, would seem possible. But we hold that in New France such a bourgeoisie did not develop. Because of their collectivist orientation, the colonists remained politically inactive; they failed to achieve an independence in trade or industry; and they established no effective voice to speak for their interests and needs in the government. The following section of the chapter deals with these concerns more thoroughly, first detailing the developments of the Bourbon absolutism, and then illustrating that a strong, independent bourgeoisie did not emerge in New France as it did in the British colonies.

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[*] The "habitant" was distinguished from the nonpermanent wage earners. The former had cleared his land and had thus gained the status of a permanent land owner. The "habitant" was also granted permission to engage in the fur trade for private profit. The term was used extensively in Canada because it lacked the service connotation associated with the peasants of France (Eccles, 1969: xi & 67).

The institutional developments of absolutism

Zoltvany in his summary describes the effects of Bourbon centralism, which was enforced in 1663 when the failing colony, under the control of the fur trading companies, was taken over by the French Crown, Louis XIV and his able minister, Colbert.

> Such in bare outline was New France's machinery of government from 1663 to 1760. It was highly centralized and, having been conceived to further Louis XIV's grand design to securing total obedience from all his subjects, authoritarian. Obedience, however, was not secured callously by the use of force but by humanely giving the people good and fair government in order to win

> their loyalty and devotion. This master idea was frequently embodied in the king's instructions to the governor and the intendant, urging them to be kind and just toward the Canadians, mindful of their needs, and to protect the poor and the weak against the rich and the strong. Supreme authority, in other words, sought to maintain itself by using confidence, not force, as its bond with the people.
>
> (Zoltvany, 1969: 12).

Eccles similarly maintains that the influence of absolutism stemmed from the time the trading colony became a crown colony in 1663. He also points out that the absolutism of Louis XIV was modified* when transplanted to Canadian soil.

> It was Louis XIV, his ministers, and their appointed officials who had harnessed the latent energies of the Canadian people, given them direction and the necessary means to pursue the aims of the French Crown in North America. Had Canada, after 1663, had to rely solely on its own resources in capital, manpower, and administrative talent it might have survived a while longer; but then again, it might not. In short, Canada in 1701 was yet a colony, a royal province of France, albeit a unique one. Although its

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* The term "modified absolutism" in reference to French Canada applies specifically to the colonial experience: absolutism was further adapted to the conditions of the frontier after it was changed by Louis XIV as a result of social disruptions experienced in France. For instance, Louis XIV reduced the authority of the seigneurs, who as a class of landed noblemen in France had challenged the authority of the crown. Frontier conditions, like the difficulty of communications, further weakened the effect of absolutism.

> achievements, its aspirations, its very flaws were to a considerable degree the product of the Canadian people and their environment, Canada still bore the unmistakeable impress of one man, Louis XIV.
>
> (Eccles, 1964: 251).

The significance of this "impress" makes it important to understand some of the methods and policies Louis XIV used to enforce his desires. The political philosophy in France permitted the king to rule by divine right, and held that service to him was an honour as well as a duty. Hence, in the colony the king could take the prerogative to appoint certain administrative positions, which were held only at his pleasure. These were: (1) the governor general, recruited from the ranks of the *noblesse d'epee*[*], who was first in status, and was responsible for relations with the Indians and the English. Initially, the governor could override the decisions of the Intendant and the Sovereign Council, but after Governor Frontenac abused his power the king restricted him and granted more power to Council and Intendant, an act that gave rise to a semblance of constitutional government. (2) The Intendant, usually recruited from the *noblesse de robe* or business circles, was the chief civil administrator, head of the Sovereign Council (later changed to Upper Council because the title of sovereign was misleading) and responsible for the general well being of the colony. (3) The members of the Sovereign Council, who were appointed jointly by the governor and bishop until a controversy arose concerning who had the right to appoint. After this dispute, the privilege of appointment reverted to the king. The Sovereign Council, like the *parlements* of France, was limited to promulgating the royal laws, serving as a court of appeal, and legislating for the particular needs of the colony through ordinances. But the king reserved the right to change, amplify, or annul any of these ordinances. Under the Sovereign Council the three districts of Montreal, Three Rivers, and Quebec were granted a subordinate court of law, whose decisions could be appealed to the higher court. (4) The captain of the militia was a *habitant* appointed by the governor to represent the king on the parish/seigneury level. The seigneur was thus deprived of the military allegiance and political status that he enjoyed in France. (Zoltvany, 1971: 2-7; Eccles, 1964: 10-38, 79-90; 1965: 7-12; & 1969: 60-82.)

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[*] In France there were two types of nobles - the old aristocracy, claiming descent from the Franks, was called the *noblesse d'epee* (nobility of the sword); and the new aristocracy, deriving noble status from high judicial and administrative offices purchased from the crown, was known as the *noblesse de robe* (nobility of the robe), from the long robe worn by members of the legal profession. (Eccles, 1969: xi).

Though no provision was made for a deliberative voice through a representative body, there was official recognition of the need for consultative government.

Annual assemblies of carefully selected appointed representatives were instituted and chaired by an official of the Crown. This exclusive assembly then heard the people, gathered a consensus, and arrived at a decision. Consultative government was also extended to the merchants of Montreal and Quebec, giving them permission to institute a type of chamber of commerce, known as a *bourse*. Here, business men could meet to draw up petitions for forwarding to the authorities at Quebec or Versailles without the supervision of government officials. But with the exception of the *bourses*, all public meetings had to be officially supervised. Unauthorized meetings were considered a serious crime. In addition, authorities chose the subject as well as the speakers at the public assemblies, yet were not bound by the expressed opinions. (Zoltvany, 1971: 5, 6; & Eccles, 1969: 80.)

The intention of the government nevertheless, was to be paternalistic and benevolent, just and beneficial.

> In its behavior towards the people, the government was paternalistic. The governor and the intendant were regularly told in their instructions to be kind and just to the Canadians, mindful of their needs, and to protect the poor and the weak from the rich and the strong. A study of the legislation of the period of the royal regime shows that this philosophy of government was not a vague ideal.
>
> (Zoltvany, 1971: 6).

Under these conditions, was there opportunity for a bourgeoisie to emerge? "Bourgeoisie" we have defined in terms of the rise of Puritanism, when individuals gained control of the decision-making process, both within their own enterprise and within the government. The bourgeoisie were most concerned about controlling the distribution of wealth and industrial resources. They demanded that the private sector control exploitation of industrial resources and that the wealth from this also be under private control. To illustrate that this shift of authority did not occur in the French Canadian colony we will examine three aspects of institutionalized absolutism which prevented the emergence of such a bourgeoisie. First, the crown could eliminate possible opposition and abolish any form of representative government. Secondly, the crown could intervene in all aspects of the economy. Thirdly, interventionism promoted a certain measure of social justice, which nullified criticism of Bourbon paternalism.

The elimination of all forms of potential opposition

Because of its fear of accomodating the legitimizing opposing views, the Bourbon Regime would not allow any form of representative government. Though the government would permit an individual to speak for himself, it would not permit a deputized representation. For as Guy Fregault 1969(b): 116 points out, then government would then be dealing on a "power to power level" - that is, with opposition on an organized and permanent basis.

We will argue that a number of policies and practices were instituted, in order to eliminate opposition or to make it ineffectual. First, the syndics as elected institutions were abolished in 1670, since they could conceivably nourish potential leaders and become galvanized into quasi-political groups. But the demise of this office cannot be equated with the abolishment of representation for the syndics were a consultative rather than a legislative body (Eccles, 1965: 13 & Zoltvany, 1971: 5). As noted above, assemblies were severely restricted by presiding officials and by their organization as occasional rather than regular sessions (Zoltvany, 1971: 6 & Fregault, 1969(b): 141). Secondly, the publishing of newspapers did not receive active support from France and there was little incentive in the colony for this (Eccles, 1972: 132). Thirdly, the official sanction and dominance of the Jesuits legitimized a strict censorship of new ideas developing in Europe (Walsh, 1964: 44-51). Fourthly, there was no direct taxation. Lacking this "bone of contention from which usually stems the urge for political power or at least change, the people of Canada were quite content to leave government to the appointed officials." (Eccles, 1965: 17).

We agree with Zoltvany (1971: 58) that the policies and institutions of Louis XIV were significant in rendering the colonists "politically passive", for these policies accustomed the colonists to external control. Though historians have argued that the *habitants*, particularly the *coureurs de bois*, were "insubordinate and notoriously independent", the fact remains that they seldom, if ever, "took positive political action". Gustav Lanctot (1929: 140) explains how resistance was passive and inertial.

> The inhabitants of New France had no idea of what constituted common action in the political field. Lacking every form of organization that could have grouped them together or directed them, they had become accustomed to submitting passively to the ordinances of the intendants, the orders of the governors, and the edicts of Versailles. Sometimes, they sought to have them withdrawn or modified by making representations to the authorities, but most of the time they submitted to them. If they found a law or a project of the administration particularly distasteful they did not demonstrate but resisted with inertia's unyielding force.
>
> (quoted in Zoltvany, 1971: 58).

Fregault (1969b: 128) also comments on the unyielding force of the *habitants*, illustrating how they displayed their disapproval of certain local legislation through various means. But even the most militant opposition - the standing at arms to resist the rare imposition of the *corvee*, (forced labour) did not culminate in positive political action to have their rights legitimized. In spite of their vigor and insubordination, the Canadian people only participated in the administration rarely and from a distance. Consequently their role was to make very few decisions and to carry out the orders received (Fregault, 1969b: 129).

Although members of the colonial oligarchy - the appointed officials and other aspirants to power were not politically passive, lobbying seemed the only effective means to gain access to the decision-making process of the Bourbon regime. The techniques of lobby amounted to influencing the royal officials at Versailles through Quebec's annual dispatches sent through an envoy or through the influence of a relative or a friend at the court in France. (Eccles, 1964: 77-98; Fregault, 1968a: 178 & Zoltvany, 1974: 10-85.) In his study of the influence of oligarchical lobby, Fregault (1969a: 178), finds that the social history of the colony is that of a succession of oligarchies and of the crises preceding and accompanying the transfer of power from one group to another. He goes on to explain the bases for the oligarchical development. Traders and merchants collaborated with government officials to gain access to the fur trade monopoly; the officials gained financially, over and above their salaries, in this mutual collaboration. But given the authority of the most rapacious of the oligarchies - the Bigot/Du Quesne regime - the fact still remains that they held their position to accumulate wealth only at the king's pleasure. Therefore, as a result of the complaints received from rival interest groups, governor Du Quesne was recalled, though Bigot, through skillful defence, was able to keep his post and thereby postpone the sentence of the external authority - imprisonment in the Bastille (Fregault, 1969a: 28-34).

In another study, Fregault (1968a: 179, 231) analyzes the oligarchies involved with Governor Vaudreuil in the first decade of the eighteenth century. Here he grants them more significance, according them the status of "parties". However, Zoltvany's (1974: 10-85) very detailed analysis of this regime emphasizes that these oligarchies can more accurately be called "cabals" or "interest groups":

> They had no internal organization, no body of followers, no programme of action, and represented neither a region, a social class, nor an ideology. They were merely small, intimate groups that sought the protection of the governor or the intendant to promote their private interests.
>
> (Zoltvany, 1971: 96).

Though these cabals were ambitious and powerful in maximizing their self-interest, they lacked the initiative and the means to take over and control the decision-making process, and thereby to legitimize their authority to make decisions. They continued instead to cater to external authorities for their own self-interest. These interest groups were far less effective than the Puritan movement in taking control of government, that is, taking over parliament, and thus can be distinguished from a bourgeois class (Zoltvany, 1971: 99-105). Zoltvany counters the arguments that there was a bourgeois class in New France, a group entrenched at the top which controlled the state by dominating the decision-making process, by stipulating a definition of "bourgeoisie":

> A bourgeois presence in New France becomes much more difficult to detect if one proceeds along classical lines of inquiry by seeking to ascertain if there was in the colony a group of men who were accumulating capital, reinvestin it into economic ventures, and developing an awareness of their distinctive personality and interests.
>
> (Zoltvany, 1971: 104).

Zoltvany emphasizes the significance of the bourgeoisie's ability to control and dominate the decision-making process in relation to commercial activities and developments. Ouellet is more definite in pointing to the characterization of individualism as a bourgeoisie development:

> Aware of individual values, the capitalist bourgeois is characterized by economic dynamism. Consequently, he rejects all paternalism while remaining capable of using political power for his own ends. His activity is oriented towards production.
>
> (Ouellet, 1955: 95).

Ouellet goes on to explain why individualistic values were not manifested in political-economic enterprises of the French Canadian oligarchy. The oligarchs aspired towards positions of influence near the Crown, rather than towards establishing independent business.

Jean Hamelin (1960: 136, 137) quotes texts to illustrate the utter dependence of the French Canadian merchant classes on France. They lacked the aggressiveness, the means and the organizational ability to develop into a powerful bourgeoisie. In his words,

> The absence of a strong French-Canadian bourgeoisie in 1800 thus appears to be the result of the French regime, not as a consequence of the Conquest. For the problem of French Colonization in Canada is one of not being able to form a French-Canadian bourgeoisie based on the rational exploitation of the natural resources of the country. Trade with the metropolis, the great fisheries and the monopoly of the beaver trade were in the hands of the metropolitans, while the ship-building yard and the St. Maurice Ironworks were in those of the King.
>
> (J. Hamelin, 1960: 137).

In brief, the Bourbon regime's prerogative to abolish any form of representative government prevented the emergence of a bourgeoisie as we defined it. This prerogative to intervene in the colony's economy served to enforce collectivism.

The importance of the prerogative of royal intervention in the economy

This prerogative of royal intervention was founded in part, upon the French colonists belief that the crown, as the most powerful economic-political organization, acted to save the colony from extinction in 1663 and would continue to give it support and direction.

A precedent for intervention was set by the colony's initial request for royal support. This request was made on behalf of the governor, the bishop and the "beaver aristocracy" who judged the weakened condition of the colony to be due to the failings of the private company and the threat of Iroquois attack. When the envoy returned, bringing with him a promise of royal intervention, a surge of hope went through the colony which was not unfounded. The crown did give colonization and the fur trade an impetus it had not received before. Given these immediate problems, and the deep-rooted cultural expectation inherited from France that the state be strong and active, the stage was set for royal intervention. (Eccles, 1964: 52-58; Morton, 1964: 55 & Fregault, 1968a: 195 & 1968b: 352.) Eccles further illustrates the significance of the colony's cultural expectations of the "social system of France".

> Thus, with the Crown monopolizing the nation's supply of brains, ability, and capital, any expansion of the national economy, at home or in the colonies, had to be implemented by the Crown. Under Colbert this expansion took place with great rapidity, and he accomplished in twenty years what the English and Dutch had taken over a century to do under private auspices. It would be worse than futile to debate the merits of the two differing systems. The social system of France, hence of New France, dictated the need

> for state direction and paternalism, if there was to be any expansion and betterment of conditions for the people in Canada. Suffice it to say that state direction and paternalism in New France did not stifle initiative, rather the reverse, for without them the colony could not have survived, and what it became was due largely to the efforts of the Crown officials.
>
> (W.J. Eccles, 1964: 57).

Fregault (1968b: 351) investigates France's aggressive role in investing in the colonial enterprises, particularly those related to the defence of the colony. He concludes that the rate of investment, which increased astronomically after the Crown became actively interested in the colony, is an indication of Bourbon paternalism. To use his words, "in this way it becomes evident what an essential role the metropolitan State played in the development of Canada".

Interventionism, its precedents set in the early history of the colony, continued through two policies of the Crown: the control of the posting of officials, and intervention in commercial activity. Because government positions were completely at the discretion of the royal will, government officials had to be more concerned with the image they created at Versailles than with assertive and independent action in the colony's decision-making process. A few examples will bring out the significance of this situation. For instance, the crown finally became convinced of Frontenac's malfeasance by the unanimity of of complaints in the despatches. He had aggressively expanded the fur trade at the expense of colonial welfare. Even his influential "connections" at Court of Versailles did not render him immune from the recall (Morton, 1963: 67-69 & Eccles, 1964: 77-98). In this case "intervention" had positive results for the colony, but this was not always so.

Governor Pierre Vaudreuil (Canadian-born son of the former governor, Phillippe Vaudreuil) differed with Montcalm, the general sent out from France over military tactics. This conflict arose in the critical years before 1760 and centered on whether to employ the formal tactics of European warfare used by the French regulars, or the guerilla warfare, that the colonial troops had developed during the Indian wars and had found to be extremely effective. Vaudreuil's position was overruled by that of the French general when their envoys brought their case to Versailles. This interventionist decision served to frustrate further the capable leadership of Vaudreuil (Morton, 1963: 133-139).

But whether interventionist decisions were constructive or destructive, government appointment of officials provided an important source of revenue. State salaries were stable even during fluctuations in the fur trade. Fregault (1968b: 350, 351) has shown, through a comparative analysis of two historical periods, that the huge sums allocated for the colony's defence purposes made the difference between good and bad years in the colony. Hence, dependence on this reliable source of income increased the colony's tendency to cater to the crown.

Intervention in the economy to promote social justice

There is general agreement among historians that interventionism did promote some form of social justice. Though historians differ as to degree of social justice, there is a general consensus that intervention did prevent tyranny, that is, one group exploiting the other. Bourbon regulation supported an organic view of society, recognizing a hierarchy of groups, each with its own limits and privileges. The view that society consisted of free and equal individuals was not popular. (See Eccles, 1965: 8, 15, 17; 1968: 33-40; 1969: 75; 1972: 49 & Zoltvany, 1971: 57.)

Hence restrictions applied to groups rather than individuals. The first concern was to restrict government bureaucrats and other officials who could challenge the authority of the Crown. The seigneurial class in France had been stripped of political authority and economic privileges after challenging the rule of the King. In the colony where wealth had not yet accumulated to any extent, the effects of this reduction were far reaching. Since the seigneurs were limited in political authority and could not make profit on land dealings they did not become an effective challenge to absolutism. The legal profession was also deterred from exploitative practices. By appointing notaries to do the legal work, the King attempted to spare the colonists from the gross abuses of France's powerful legal fraternity. Furthermore, all officials had their fees regulated, from the lowly clerk or bailiff to the royal judge. They were also restricted by royal edicts, like the one promulgated in 1679 to forbid imprisonment without trial. Though justice could usually be described as inexpensive, equitable and immediate, there is evidence of abuses, as we can assume from a royal edict declaring that poverty must not bar a subject from seeking justice (Eccles, 1969: 68, 73-79).

Restrictions were also placed on groups engaged in commercial activity of any type. We noted the close regulation of the fur trade. But activities within the colony could be regulated even more closely. To mention only two examples, the weights and measures of shop keepers were inspected regularly, and the number of tradesmen allowed to open shop was regulated in order to prevent an over supply. But the colonists believed that close regulation was necessary and as Eccles (1969: 75) explains, "the intendant's *ordonnances* were not regarded as the dictates of a despotic government interfering with the freedom of the individual, but as necessary measures to prevent, curb, or remove abuses".

The second area of intervention is that of institutions of social welfare. The state was generous in providing for the needy, as shown by legislation that had to be passed distinguishing between giving assistance to the "deserving poor" and the mendicants. There is also evidence that the state provided adequately for public education, as well as for the care of foundlings, orphans, the infirmed and the aged (Eccles, 1968: 33-36; 1972: 129). Eccles' detailed analysis lends support to Fregault's generalization (above) that tyranny was held in check and human dignity was valued in the colony.

Though interventionism did bring about a degree of social justice, though it sought to defend the legitimate interests of everyone and not merely of a privileged few, as Eccles emphasizes, interventionism also had negative effects. It frustrated leadership, it promoted the Crown's aspirations instead of seeking indigenous solutions, and it stifled incentive in economic enterprises. As Zoltvany points out, the Bourbon state defined the common good in radically different terms than the colonists were to encounter in British social philosophy.

> The French government of the *ancien regime* accepted as axiomatic that it must safeguard the interests of all society, not merely those of the affluent few. . . . Such a philosophy, Eccles points out, differed radically from the one introduced in Canada by the British conquest, according to which the common good would somehow result

> if every individual pursued his private advantage to the best of his ability.
>
> (Zoltvany, 1971: 57).

The colonists thus expected the state to have a "sense of social responsibility" (Zoltvany, 1971: 57). This attitude exacerbated the conquered colonists' feeling of helplessness towards their English conquerors, for the new state imposed on them did not have this sense of responsibility.

The manifestations of collectivism in the seigneurial system

The seigneurial system of New France promoted collectivism to a certain extent.* Because the seigneurial system was modified in the colonies to the extent that it was definitely subordinated to the absolutist government it could not challenge the authority of that government, nor could it provide the base for an emerging bourgeoisie.

When the Bourbon regime took over the colony in 1663, it implemented legislation and policies to reduce the political and economic powers of the seigneurial class. The seigneurs could no longer act as immigration agents and thereby influence policies regarding colonization and settlement. Huge tracts of land, formerly granted to them by the now defunct Company of One Hundred Associates, were returned to the Crown. The new seigneuries were too restricted in size to serve as a base for personal power. Measures were also adopted to discourage land exploitation, such as keeping the dues payable to the seigneurs on a low level. Speculation was discouraged through such means as exacting a heavy sales tax. Furthermore, there were prohibitions against land transfers. Thus the seigneurial system was reduced to "an instrument of colonization" (Zoltvany, 1969: 14). The seigneur had merely to distribute the land which he held in trust from the crown. Legislation was implemented which gave the privilege of representing royal authority to a habitant rather than to the seigneur. This habitant was known as the captain of the militia and military allegiance flowed through him to the governor leaving the seigneur in a very marginal position regarding political or military decisions. This was a marked change from the situation in France where the land owners had been the king's advisors. Through these means the Bourbon regime removed the potential threat that the seigneurial class posed to the cause of absolutism in the colony. (Zoltvany, 1969: 14 & Adair, 1954: 193.)

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* Our position lies between R.C. Harris's (1968: 7, 8 & 1974: 42-44) radical devaluation of the influence of the seigneurial system, and Munro's (1907) which overrates its influence.

As the seigneurs were stripped of economic and political power, they resorted to achieving status through social factors. They enjoyed high social status because there was prestige connected with the ownership or the supervision of land, an inheritance from Feudal France.

But the social prestige of the seigneurs in the colony did not measure up to that of their counterparts in France. The seigneurial class in the colony did not possess the prestige that resulted from being of noble birth and inherited rank. They were rather a motely group. Their status was limited to enjoying deference shown to them in daily affairs and in religious festivities. They had the honour of heading processions and had seats reserved for them in church. With this social status there were certain obligations which drained them financially. For example, they were expected to assume costs of festivities, build the grist mill, and provide a court and a church. But these last two obligations were seldom met because of the expense involved, and even the providing of the grist mill was sometimes neglected on that account. In short, the status derived from the social prestige tended to weaken their economic position rather than to strengthen it. (Adair, 1954: 193, 197; Munro, 1907: 89, 91, 126, 143, 161; & Harris, 1968: 41, 62.)

Since status was largely limited to social factors, the seigneurs were encouraged to look to the social aspirations of the French *noblesse*, that is, to aspire toward the military exploits and the conspicuous consumption of this class. Hence, they lost interest in colonial enterprises and in indigenous affairs. Eccles (1972: 113) holds that this was a factor mitigating against the "latent urge for independence" that was emerging in the English colonies and that was conspicuously absent in Canada. He explains:

> With the accessibility of military careers to the Canadian seigneurs, the ethos of the nobility rather than of the bourgeoisie gained a much stronger hold on the upper strata of colonial society. Although few of the seigneurs or the Canadian officers, were nobles, the majority being simple *gentilhommes*, yet they aspired to become nobles and they all sought to live like the nobility.
>
> (Eccles, 1972: 113).

The collectivist manifestations of the rang

Collectivism was manifested in the rang pattern of land division, a system which encouraged conformity and equality rather than competition and differentiation. According to Pierre Deffontaines (1965: 14), "the rang was the fundamental social unit" of the French Canadians and it promoted "a unifying spirit of brotherhood". This type of fraternal collectivism was encouraged in several ways, according to Deffontaines (1965: 3-19). First, the land was divided into long narrow symmetrical lots, each with an equal length of river frontage which provided access to food and trade as well as transportation. These equal divisions therefore served to mitigate against competition in land dealings and the economic differentiations which would have subsequently arisen. Other factors were that the establishment of the rang preceded that of the parish which encouraged demographic concentrations, and the close proximity of the houses discouraged the growth of villages which would have been more accomodating to trade and commerce. However, the parish and the village were in time established in response to the "unpredictable over-expansion of the population" (Deffontaines, 1965: 16).

Secondly, each rang had its own social organization, such as the rang council, the rang school, and the rang chapel, thus developing an autonomous social unity and the habitant identified with it rather than the parish during the colonial period.

Thirdly, the closeness of the houses and the lack of a hierarchy among the habitants promoted a spirit of fraternalism. There were house to house collections to take care of the less fortunate and mutual aid for building projects. However, there were differences in status; those who had secured river frontage had higher prestige than those who came later to occupy the second and the third rangs.

The persistence in establishing the second and the third rangs in this same type of symmetry is significant, for it indicates a desire for conformity rather than competition. This type of property division also prevailed in areas outside of Quebec where the seigneurial system had not been instituted.* With the introduction of survey techniques in Quebec, the new rangs became even more symmetrical even when the practical disadvantages of farming these elongated lots became obvious. Deffontaines (1965: 9, 15, 19) maintains that the French Canadians were obsessed with this symmetry in land distribution: it became their "trademark" which distinguished this frontier from others which were characterized by the ascendance of the large estate.

Harris and Warkentin (1974: 40-42) also draw attention to the prevalence of this peculiar symmetrical layout on the French Canadian frontier in Quebec and outside of Quebec. They argue that it was a cultural inheritance rather than a feudal imposition. However, we posit that this system of land distribution reinforced an inherited collectivist orientation. Harris and Warkentin (1974: 42, 62) do concede that though the seigneurial system did not gain significance as a "fiscal institution" in the colonial period, it was significant in that it implemented a "machinery of control" on the French Canadian frontier. They also compare the French Canadian frontier and the New England settlements in much the same way as we do:

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* The rang-pattern of land distribution was introduced without appreciable regional variation into French Canadian settlements wherever they ranged, from areas around Detroit to areas in Northern Alberta, in the regions of Lake Labiche, St. Albert and the Peace River (Deffontaines, 1965: 18).

> Although Canadian rural society was loosely structured, it would be wrong to conclude that the people who shaped the landscape of the lower St. Lawrence were the frontiersmen of American legend. The machinery of control had come to Canada, and if its authority could rarely be imposed, it could always be turned to and frequently was. Moreover, the Canadians were extremely fond of convivial pursuits - they were not found striking out into the wilderness to establish a farm miles ahead of the vanguard of settlement. They often left as young men for the wilderness - for the profit and excitement of the fur trade - but most of them returned to their cotes along the St. Lawrence. Finally, the drive for material success was less than in the English colonies. Most habitants lived well enough. In coming to a colony where land was abundant and the charges for it were low, it was not too difficult, at least by the second generation, to achieve a higher living standard than that of most French peasants. The habitants were not forced into the interminable round of work that many French peasants undertook merely to stay alive or that many New Englanders followed out of the compulsion of the Puritan ethic.
>
> (Harris and Warkentin, 1974: 62).

Of particular significance to this research is the Harris-Warkentin reference to the influence of the authoritative type of control in the seigneurial system. It was a factor in the habitants' internalization of the desire for security, and their reluctance to engage in aggressive colonization in the wilderness where this type of control and security had not been instituted.

The Manifestations of Collectivism in the Church

As was the seigneurial system, the Roman Catholic Church was subordinated to the state, but the conflict regarding Church-state authority was long and bitter, and fought on French as well as on colonial soil. The conflicts that appeared in the colony, like those over the sale of brandy to the Indians, or the disputed control of welfare facilities and the parish supply, were extensions of the more basic conflict regarding whether Church or State should dominate in New France. These issues were in turn a reflection of the controversy raging in France between Gallicanism and ultramontanism. But the Jesuits had a tenacious hold on New France, and their resistance to the French state's domination had far-reaching effects on the sociocultural life of New France, particularly after the Conquest, when the threat of the French state had been removed.

The conflict between Church and State has many complex issues, including rivalries between the Jesuits, the Recollects, the Sulpicians, the Jansenists and the Huguenots, both in France and in the colony. The Jesuits emerged victorious in the power struggle because of their efficiency and order, they were the best equipped to achieve dominance: they were the most zealous and disciplined; and they had the greatest financial and educational resources at their disposal. A crucial factor in the power struggle was the emergence of Francois Laval, a Jesuit, as Vicar Apostolic of New France in 1659. In 1674 he became bishop of Quebec and so could legitimately impose on the colony his ultramontanist views that the Church should be centralized in Rome rather than in France. The power of the Jesuits became concentrated in the colony when they were expelled from France in 1764 because of their resistance to Gallicanism. As a compensation, they were commissioned to do missionary work in the colony. The unrepentent Jesuits then came to regard New France as the potential location for developing a strong, centralized Church with a powerful papacy to save Christianity from slipping into irretrievable error. When the Jesuits attained supremacy, they sought to keep out the opposing views presented by others, like the Huguenots, Jansenists and Quietists. (See Eccles, 1972: 25 & 1969: 32; Morton, 1956: 50 & Walsh, 1964: 50.)

In looking at some specific examples, we see that the brandy issue was the most contentious. Laval, upon taking office in 1660, promptly banned the sale of liquor to the Indians and threatened to withhold the Church's absolution from those selling the liquor. Agitation continued and in 1668 Talon, through the Sovereign Council, had the ban rescinded though with some reservation. Finally at the "Brandy Parliament" in 1678 Frontenac succeeded in having the ban more definitely rescinded by choosing representatives for the Sovereign Council who had a vested interest in the fur trade. The following year the King, also favouring the fur trade, issued an edict which definitely subordinated the position of the clergy to the state in this crucial matter (Eccles, 1964: 14, 72, 87, in general 36-89).

Other examples illustrate that though Laval achieved some success in the strictly parochial area he met staunch government opposition when he attempted to extend his control beyond this area. Laval kept a close surveillance of the priesthood by keeping them under his direct supervision and sending them out as itinerant priests rather than permitting the parishes to have resident priests. But by threatening to withhold funds, the intendant in office forced Laval to modify his position and to establish some parishes. Moreover, when Laval attempted to control the social service institutions, traditionally the domain of the religious orders, he was rebuffed on the grounds that the intendant, rather than the bishop, was responsible for the physical welfare of the people. Laval was opposed even in moral matters. He issued strictures against the women for their manner of dress but these were overturned by the state authority. In dealing with this issue, the intendant appealed to the senior clergy organization in France on behalf of the women who had chosen to follow the dictates of Paris fashions (Eccles, 1964: 222-239).

Thus after years of strong controversy, the State's power prevailed over the Church's, and "the bishops who succeeded Laval accepted without qualms the doctrine of royal Gallicanism" (Zoltvany, 1969: 13). By the end of the century, a formally militant clergy were anxious to avoid trouble. "Religious zeal and fervour had subsided" (W.J. Eccles, 1964: 239).

This discussion has been limited to relations between the clergy and the state. The effects of excessive collectivistic practices and policies on parishoners are more difficult to ascertain. Eccles (1972: 136-138) finds that having religious needs satisfied by an authoritarian Church tended to make the parishoners inert and passive. The prescriptions of the Church were not seriously challenged and "unity of religion" could prevail. Eccles (1972: 138) contrasts the French Canadians' faith and the activist form of religion in New England, as does Jean Falardeau:

> But the French-Canadian *habitant* did not play, and for that matter was never able to play, at any time, an active role in the life or in the administration of his community. This situation is the reverse of the one which prevailed in the villages and cities of England where the initial organization, the administration, and the success of the municipal life were the immediate concern of the inhabitants. . . . He is much less an active and enterprising citizen than a submissive and faithful parishoner.
>
> (J. Falardeau, 1965: 31).

This contrast drawn by Falardeau closely parallels that drawn by Innis and Zoltvany regarding passivity and inertia in the decision-making capacity of governmental and commercial areas.

Summary

In this chapter we have analyzed aspects of selected institutional developments of the Bourbon regime in New France and have thereby, to some extent, validated the first hypothesis, that the French Canadians manifested a collectivist orientation in their founding period of history. Our analysis has not included any reference to manifestations of the asserted conflict, for during this period there was little, if any, interaction with the individualist oriented group. In analyzing indicators of collectivism, we pointed to the centralizing aspects of the fur trade and its dominant influence over the colony's economy. Other indicators were the policies and regulations instituted by the Bourbon regime which had these effects: (1) elimination of all forms of representative and deliberative organizations in government which would have given the colonists access to the decision-making process of the Bourbon regime; (2) intervention in the economy on behalf of the King's interest which stifled the initiative of aspiring colonial entrepreneurs; (3) subordination of the seigneurial class and the Church hierarchy which otherwise could have threatened the absolute authority of the King;

(4) introduction of certain measures of social justice which gave the colonists security and hence diverted criticism of Bourbon paternalism.

Because we have not analyzed manifestations of the individualist orientations, we therefore preclude analysis of the asserted conflict and validation of the second hypothesis in this chapter. But we contrasted the differentiation in the two cultural orientations which was a factor in providing the base for the subsequent conflict of the Conquest period. We contrasted the collectivist orientation of those involved in the fur trade, who remained bound by the lobby as the only means of gaining access to the Bourbon decision makers, with the bourgeoisie of England and later of New England who gained control of the decision-making process in government. Similarly, we contrasted the habitant, who had been socialized to accept the security of the non-competitive seigneurial system, with the colonizer in New England, who was ready to stake out his establishment in the wilderness and resisted any curbs on this enterprise. The parishoner in New France had also been socialized by the collectivist policies of the Church and did not become the active, energetic, and restless community leader we find in New England.

We hypothesize that through the influences of collectivism in commercial activity, government, system of land distribution, and Church, the collectivist orientation became entrenched in New France in contrast to the individualist orientation which took root in New England. The differences between the French Canadians and the New Englanders were manifested particularly in the expectations that the respective colonists had of their institutions. In New England, the institutions permitted the vigorous, demanding, and expansive energies of the colonists to find fulfillment. In New France the institutions tended to have corporate expectations:that is, the institutions were a support system which in turn required supporting. French Canadians were therefore more concerned with fraternity and loyalty to authority. We see the ground work was being laid for the French colony's loyalty to its conqueror of 1760, in spite of the differences in cultural orientations, in religion, and in political philosophies. This loyalty can again be contrasted with the rebellion which emerged in the New England colonies. By showing these contrasts in this chapter we anticipate the conflict which emerged with the Conquest of 1760.

CHAPTER VI

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF COLLECTIVISM IN QUEBEC FROM THE CONQUEST TO CONFEDERATION

Introduction

In this chapter, we will analyze the influence of *Canadien* collectivism on the legislation of the important acts that related to institutional developments in the period extending from the Conquest of 1760 and leading up to Confederation of 1867. Since the historical events of this period resulted in a more definitive interaction between the two founding ethnic groups, we will be analyzing the assimilation intents of these acts and the *Canadien* reaction to them. As the *Canadiens* resisted assimilation, they gradually developed, to some extent, their own identity, their own laws, policies, customs and religious orientations. At first these differentials were barely discernible but then they were legitimized through governing policies and legislative acts.

Though the overall intent of the British was to assimilate the *Canadiens* through legislation, their approaches varied. The Acts which were most intent on assimilation were the Proclamation of 1763 and the Act of Union of 1841. The Quebec Act of 1774 and the Constitution Act of 1791 gave some degree of recognition to the perceived differences in the laws, customs and religion of the two founding groups. However, it can be argued that though the *Canadiens* were not assimilated the British did gain the loyalty of the majority through conciliatory legislation, a crucial event in the emerging military threat from South of the border.

The interaction processes of the period, particularly those in the Union period (following the Act of Union), provides us with indicators for analyzing the contrasting developments of collectivism and individualism. This interaction began with the influx of the English, particularly the Montreal merchants* at the time of the Conquest. It gradually became apparent that there was a divergence of cultural orientations as the ideas of each community became more identifiable and became embodied in their respective types of legislation. Significantly, these differences were perceptible at the time of the Conquest; they were particularly evident in the two different legal systems, differences which had already been established and through which precedents had been set.

Because the Church** was the main collectivizing agent in this period, we will include in this introduction an analysis of its philosophy and the political situation which permitted the maximization of this collectivism. Before examining these philosophical and political aspects, we will briefly look at the social influences of collectivism which in turn affected the political events. It is interesting to note that D. Creighton (1970: 160) holds that the different cultural orientations in Quebec played a more important role in exacerbating what he labels as the "economic and social clash" than linguistic or religious differences. In his words:

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* This term designates the merchants who followed the British army northward at the Conquest to profit from the needs of the army. Many of them were representatives of English exporting and contracting firms, but some came directly from the Thirteen Colonies. The great majority were Protestants, and they were said to be the most "purposeful and assertive of all Canadian social classes" (Creighton, 1970: 22-25).

** This term designates the Roman Catholic Church of Quebec, while the Protestant churches will be specifically named, i.e., the Anglican Church.

> The essential grievances of the merchants and their supporters can be seen clearly in the body of criticism which they began at this time to direct against French-Canadian culture. It was not the different religion or the different language of the French which exasperated the merchants. . . . This was the real purpose of the merchants (to engage in aggressive enterprise) and what goaded them to fury was the Canadians' lack of enterprise, their persistent failure to move with the swiftly moving times. To the commercial group, the chief sin of this spineless and unadventurous generation was its complete failure to conquer and exploit the country in the approved American way. As a settler and colonizer, the French Canadian was despised.
>
> (D. Creighton, 1970: 159).

J.S. Careless (1977: 27) also points to the social significance of this lack of aggressiveness. The reluctance of the *Canadien* to leave the traditional community, to open new frontiers, and to try new farming methods caused a serious deterioration in land use through overproduction. The Agrarian decline and unrest was clearly a factor in the Rebellion of 1837. It also caused large numbers of people to emigrate to work in American factories. In the meantime, immigration was steadily adding to the English population. As a consequence, the French Canadian suspected the successful achievements of the alien farm-proprietor, while the English looked down on the "indolence" of the backward French. In short, the agrarian problems added to what Careless calls the "ethnic tensions" in Quebec.

It can also be noted that the different cultural orientations present in the French colony were influential in the first overt conflict, namely that between two groups of Englishmen, one, the governors and their patronal parties, and the other, the merchants. The military background of the governors and their political affiliations with England inclined them to favour the collectivist habits of the *Canadiens* and oppose the aggressive individualism of the merchants with their defiant attitude toward the established authorities, their daring procedures and their militant behaviour. Although a few *Canadiens* sided with the Montreal merchants, gradually the *Canadiens* consolidated their position so they could legislate collectivist goals, like the preservation of their laws and customs, in opposition to legislation favoured by the merchants, like that developing the St. Lawrence seaway. (See Creighton, 1970: 112, 113, 127; A. Burt, 1968: 105 & H. Neatby, 1971: 30-106.)

Overview of the Church's influence as a collectivizing agent

In this period we observe that the philosophy and the policies of the Church reinforced the collectivism which had been established by the Bourbon regime. With Neatby (1971: 47) we note the significance of the differentials which had been established in the legal system: "the laws, in fact reflected different economic interests and different social values". She goes on to explain how the rights of the community in *Canadien* law took precedence over the rights of the individual, that is, the entrepreneur, whereas English law put the "maximum power and responsibility into the hands of the individual businessman". Similarly, the Church espoused a collectivist ideology in contrast to the individualist beliefs and policies of the Protestants. As A.I. Silver (1975: vii-x) points out, Catholic philosophy holds that society is not just a collection of autonomous individuals, but an organic unity, whose members are held together by common institutions, language and traditions and are given purpose by the Catholic religion. The Church, as such, stood in vehement opposition to "United States, mother of revolutions, embodiment of republicanism, secularism and conscienceless individualism". In the wars with the American states and in the Confederation debates, this position had significant influence.

The Church was also able to exert significant influence on the formation of policies and legislation in the period under consideration. After the Conquest, the Church was the sole surviving cultural institution which could give hope to the disillusioned and defeated people. Speaking in broad terms, the Roman hierarchy were gradually able to expand Church control into the void left by the Bourbon officials. As the governors perceived the extent of the Church's influence, they sought to appease its leaders in order to win the loyalty of its subjects. The governors, moved by military interests rather than denominational, were able to influence legislation in favour of the *Canadiens*. Hence, we will pay particular attention to the role of the governors in the main part of the chapter. At this time we will look more closely at specific historical events and other factors which permitted the maximization of Church control. (1) The defeat of the Gallic state permitted the Church to encroach on civil matters of the *Canadiens* and impose on this society the ultramontane Roman views of Church supremacy over the state. (2) The absence of the Gallic state permitted the

Church leaders to impose a policy of subordination over all, from the highest to the lowest throughout its administration. (3) The clergy were able to assume that they were the natural leaders of the people, since many of the merchant and official classes had either returned to France or had been replaced or suppressed by the British. (4) Furthermore, *Canadien* society resorted to being predominantly rural, agricultural, and for the most part, illiterate and consequently vulnerable. (5) Most of the clergy who took over were indigenous and had little or no interest in new trends of thought, like liberalism or the enlightenment that they associated with secularized France or Protestant England. The *Canadien* clergy preferred instead to keep the colony isolated from these divisive factors. Furthermore, tolerating dissenters was not an established tradition in Quebec: Huguenots had early been barred from entering the colony. (6) The morale of the *Canadiens*, their sense of defeat and disillusionment, and their in-group feeling were all factors in causing them to look for leadership in the only institution that was still functional and not alien to them. (See Neatby, 1971: 108-124; Morton, 1963: 153-156; and Seigfriend, 1968: 19-42.)

The collectivist tendencies of the *Canadiens* therefore encouraged the religious leaders to press for legislation to protect and eventually to promote their rights, their language, their customs, their laws and their religion. As W.A. Riddell (1961: 131) says,

> The success of the Roman Catholic church, however, would be difficult to explain if it were not that it was dealing with a population remarkable for its homogeneity and mental and moral unity.

Looking at the interaction with historical events, John Moir (1972: 64) also points to the significance of collectivism. The "internal stability" of the Church and community was a factor in preventing any effective establishment of the Anglican Church and English policies, such as the separation of church and state in education. It is to be noted that at this time, England was preoccupied with the European wars, leaving the Anglican Churchmen to struggle without too much benefit from England. But it must also be noted that the *Canadien* Churchmen had not received any help from France after the Conquest to build up the Church's weakened structure. They were aided primarily by the generally submissive attitude of *Canadiens* to external authority. Finding ways of retaining Canada for imperial trade and for its strategic position to combat increasing rebellion in the thirteen colonies was becoming a dominant concern in England. Hence political realism and the need for military security paved the way for a new religious tolerance. In his research on the policies of the British government in this period, Vincent Harlow (1964: 668) documents the changes in London's political attitude toward the *Canadiens* and the attempts made to incorporate this "foreign body" into the imperial system. For example, there was regret over the crude form of Anglicization of the Proclamation of 1763. Another example was the appointment of governors who were sympathetic with the *Canadiens*. Their influence became evident when the requests of Guy Carleton were incorporated into the Quebec Act.

In this new spirit of conciliation, the Church gradually consolidated its position. As the leaders of the Church gained control over their members, they urged them to submit to British authorities, who in turn passed legislation that further enhanced the Church's institutional growth and its control over the legislative process. To take one striking example, as a reward for loyalty shown the British in the War of 1812, Bishop Plessis was admitted, with full title, to the Legislative Council of Quebec, where he could further influence the legislative process (Moir, 1972: 70).

The complexity of this interrelation cannot be examined fully in the space of this thesis. Therefore, we will restrict our examination of the significance of collectivism to its influence in resisting two major attempts by the British to assimilate the *Canadiens*. The first was the Proclamation of 1763 (October) whose assimilative intentions had to give way to the Quebec Act and the Constitution Act of 1791. The net effect of these two acts was to recognize the French/English duality by granting to each ethnic group its own province wherein each could promote its own legislation. This legislation had particular significance for the *Canadiens,* for within their provincial boundaries they could develop what Moir (1972: 69) calls the "French fact". The second attempt was the Durham Report and the Act of Union of 1841. Like the Proclamation of 1763, it did not give recognition to this "French fact". In spite of the assimilative intention of the Union Act, the new Union experienced profoundly the French fact and the impossibility of assimilation, experiences which were important for the future federal state (J.M. Careless, 1977: 222).

The Proclamation of 1763 (October)*

The Proclamation of 1763 which gave Canada its first civil constitution, was a general statement for all of the territories gained in North America by the Treaty of Paris (February, 1763). The colonies were valued for what they could contribute to the imperial cause. Hence the Proclamation of 1763 was an expression of mercantilism and implied assimilation, giving no particular consideration to the needs of Quebec. This can be seen in the summaries of its terms. H. Neatby focusses on the constitutional aspects, and J. Moir on the religious aspects of the Proclamation.

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* The Royal Proclamation of 1763 has come to be known as "The Proclamation of 1763" because of its significance in Canadian history (H. Neatby, 1972: 6).

> The Proclamation of 1763, apart from its extensive regulation of Indian affairs, did three things: it enabled land-seekers to move to the newly acquired colonies, including the mainland colonies of Quebec and the Floridas; it promised them elected assemblies to make laws and levy taxes; and until such assemblies could be summoned it promised prospective settlers that they could rely on "the enjoyment of the benefit of the laws of our realm of England."
>
> It seems certain that the precise constitutional and legal impact of this law on the province of Quebec was not understood or even considered. The wording of the Proclamation implied that in the newly acquired provinces English law was already in force and that, therefore, all who moved into those provinces might rely on it for protection.
>
> (H. Neatby, 1971: 47, first published in 1966).

> The first, the famous Proclamation of October, 1763, closed the Mississippi Basin to settlement, defined Quebec's boundaries and provided it with the constitution common to royal colonies - a governor and appointed council, an elected assembly, and a legal system "as near as may be agreeable to the laws of England." Murray became the first governor of Quebec and his commission and instructions completed this outline for government. He was charged to respect and protect the

> Church of Rome in Quebec but not "to admit any Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction of the See of Rome". The Church of England would be established "both in Principle and Practice" with government support under the direction of the Bishop of London, and the governor was authorized to fill all Anglican vacancies. Finally, all new subjects must take an oath of loyalty to King George or quit the colony. As a result of this British Policy the Roman Catholic Church found itself cut off from its physical and financial resources in France and its spiritual roots in Rome. The Roman Church had been the established church on New France; now it would be only a tolerated church of legally second-class citizens, controlled by an alien and Protestant king. Quebec was to become an English and Anglican colony - at least in theory.
>
> (J. Moir, 1972: 38).

As Moir comments, the intent of the Proclamation was assimilation. But the proponents of assimilation had not taken into account the passive resistance of the *Canadiens* that, as it developed in the decade after the Conquest, became a significant influence with which British authorities had to contend. Neatby (1971: 128) finds in the debates preceding the passage of the Quebec Act that this resistance "for want of a better word must be called an incipient national movement". However, as she explains, a "critical moment in the formulation of opinion" (127) for the defence of *Canadien* rights (as they were embodied in the Quebec Act) was Murray's Ordinance of 1764. Even before this Ordinance, there was a movement towards conciliation in London (Vincent Harlow, 1964: 668).

As the resistance in Quebec was observed, there was a steady movement away from the draconian Anglicization of 1763 and a desire to seek compromise with this "foreign body" in order to incorporate it into the imperial system. London did not wish to antagonize Quebec and drive it toward the anarchy developing in the Thirteen Colonies. Furthermore, Quebec was strategically located to combat this growing anarchy (Harlow, 1964: 668).

Conciliation was introduced in several ways. First, the choice of governors fell to those who were sympathetic towards the "new subjects". Neatby (1971: 17-20) holds that Murray, more than any other person, established the traditional policy of conciliation toward these conquered people, initially as military governor, then as the first civil governor.

Secondly, a policy emerged to reconfirm the privileges guaranteed in the Treaty of Paris, February, 1763 and particularly the Articles of Capitulation signed in Montreal in 1760. The Peace Treaty was a settlement of a global war and only one of its clauses referred to Canada, but it did grant its Catholic population the "liberty" to worship in their religion "as far as the laws of Great Britain permit" - a somewhat ambiguous condition. However, the Articles were more generous and at least one school of thought in England believed them permanently binding. They granted, with certain minor limitations, the enjoyment of property and the freedom of worship, implying, at least for a time, tolerance of the French laws of land tenure and inheritance.

Thirdly, a new sense of justice was developing for the rights of minorities in a multinational empire. In Quebec's case, this feeling for justice was colored by the desire to hold a strategic colony for the sake of empire. The Proclamation implied that English law was already in force and that the former system could be swept away with one stroke. The complex problems of replacing one legal system by another caused deep concern for English jurists as they were becoming sensitive to rights of the conquered. Consequently, French law was retained. The same sense of pragmatic justice prevailed in the instructions sent later to Murray providing him with the option to modify the pattern of government for Quebec's special circumstances. As well, the policy emerged that Catholics in the colonies should be permitted to hold office, although they were excluded from this privilege in England. Murray was not informed of this policy during his term, but the new religious tolerance counteracted virulent petitions sent by the merchants which denounced Murray's conciliation towards the Catholics. However, the long term effect of the merchants' agitation was to have Murray recalled and replaced by

Carleton. (See Harlow, 1964: 668-674; Neatby, 1971: 17-20, 45-55; Neatby 1972: 5-10 & Moir, 1972: 35-40.)

The role of governors in promoting collectivism

During his military rule Murray became warmly attached to his "new subjects", who, in the Bourbon tradition, regarded him as their benign protector. Murray had advised London that the *Canadiens* were "extremely tenacious of their religion, nothing can contribute so much to make them staunch subjects to his Majesty as the new Government giving them every reason to imagine no alteration is to be attempted in that point" (Moir, 1972: 37). In another despatch, Murray advised that "Little, very little, will content the New Subjects but nothing will satisfy the Licentious Fanatiks Trading here, but the expulsion of the Canadians who are perhaps the bravest and the best race upon the Globe" (Neatby, 1972: 15). Murray was also deeply concerned about military security and the chance that the colony might become depopulated. Neatby (1972: 15) suggests that the *Canadiens* used the threat of emigration in pressing for concessions. It is conceivable, of course, that because of his military disposition Murray favoured the submissiveness of the *Canadiens*, over the aggressive habits of the merchants. (See Neatby, 1971: 24-46.)

Murray established conciliation policies through his political patronage. Taking advantage of the instructions from London that permitted him a temporary modification of the pattern laid down in the Proclamation, he implemented government through council and ignored the assembly aspect. For Murray assumed that Catholics could not hold office and representative government would have placed this favoured "new subject" at the mercy of the Protestant group. Government through council permitted Murray to exploit political patronage to a great degree. Moreover, Murray's conciliatory policies were influential beyond his term, for members of his "French party" were reappointed by Carleton.

But, it was Murray's Ordinance of 1764 which spoke loudest for conciliation and therefore, which most antagonized the merchants. The Ordinance established three levels of judicial administration. The lowest and the broadest was that of the local justice of the peace, a typically English institution. The highest was the court of King's Bench, which usually heard cases in English and determined them by English law. But what was significant was that Murray placed the court of common pleas between these two levels. *Canadien* lawyers could practice in it and local judges who shared Murray's sympathies and who spoke French could sit on the bench. This court could deal with cases involving amounts as low as ten pounds, and up to any sum with an appeal to the King's Bench and up to the Privy Council in Britain.

Predictably, the reaction of the merchants was swift and aggressive. They protested and petitioned through a Grand Jury. When the seven *Canadien* jurors on the same Grand Jury discovered what they had signed through a translated version, they headed up a lengthy disclaimer, which also went to London. The merchants had added an indictment against Murray for his conciliatory attitude toward Catholics, claiming they should be excluded not only from acting as jurors or lawyers, but from the army and all learned professions. The attack by the merchants and Murray's public defence of his Ordinance and all that it implied became the rallying point for the *Canadiens'* defence of their rights against the English merchants, whom Murray described as "licentious fanatics". The agitation and conflict between the two differently-oriented groups grew more intense with each petition and counter-petition. It was during this period that the resistance to assimilation became a recognizable influence, and was labelled an "incipient national movement". The Church's leading role in its formation will be analyzed in more detail below. (See Neatby, 1971: 33-37, 47-51, 127; Neatby, 1972: 5-15; Harlow, 1964: 665-672 & Moir, 1972: 35-42.)

First, however, we will look into the deeper conflict that lay beneath the dispute which disrupted the implementation of Murray's Ordinance. As Neatby explains, the laws "reflected" different cultural orientations. In her words:

> The laws, in fact, reflected different economic interests and different social values. The English merchant was conscious of the utility of a system which made for free exchange of land, ensuring, presumably, that it would fall into the hands of those best able to exploit it profitably. He was also attached to a law which put the maximum power and responsibility into the hands of the individual business man, compelling him to support his engagements to the full extent of his property, and making it as difficult as possible for him to use the rights of his family as a protection from the consequences of his own mistake or misfortunes. The Canadian, on the other hand, valued the regard for the community and for all human rights which limited the power of a man to risk the total property of his family in the pursuit of his business.
>
> There were also very important differences between the English and French laws of inheritance. The Englishman was proud of the law which allowed him the fullest possible rights of bequeathing all property, real and personal, apart from entailed estates. Many a Canadian was equally proud of the protection afforded to his family by the law which secured four-fifths of his real property to his natural heirs. The same difference in the attitude toward the family is discernible in the laws relating to the property of married women. In English Law, effectively, the married woman was always a minor under the

> guardianship of her husband, and the power of the husband to dispose of his wife's property could be limited only be elaborate settlements placing the property in trust. French law, on the other hand, recognized a community of property between husband and wife, the rights of the husband being superior in management only and not in ownership or in the power to alienate.
>
> (Neatby, 1971: 47, 46, respectively).

This collectivist orientation, which restricted the aggressive entrepreneur or proprietor, was also influential in the *Canadien* devaluation of the jury system. From the *Canadien* point of view, the jury system was a revival of trial by combat, for it permitted the defendant to win if he was aggressive or otherwise advantaged - all under the banner of the liberty of the individual. The French judiciary also valued the general over the particular: of "great offence" in the eyes of ther merchants was that Judge Mabane (Murray's choice) interpreted the collectivist concern with general maxims, and applied it to the particular case, in the manner of the preceding Frence judges (Neatby, 1971: 49-50).

The influence of the Church became evident with its role in the formation of the "incipient national movement" as mentioned above. Churchmen took the lead, drawing up a formal petition to send to the King in 1766, urging nearly one hundred leading *Canadiens* to sign it. The petition praised Murray and his Ordinance of 1764; it asked for freedom from discrimination on religious grounds and the right to have causes heard in the French language. The wording of the petition suggested that the English jurors had questioned the right of *Canadien* jurors to act, which was seen as a threat against the use of French in legal matters. This petition, strengthened the resistance movement, for it drew on a wider representation of the population and was sanctioned by the Church. Churchmen were also responsible for the drawing up of a document, which was circulated to *Canadien* Catholics, promoting common guidelines and, in the words of Neatby (1971: 128), urging "unity for common action".

However, resistance did not end there. Churchmen also became involved in what can be said to be political campaigning, although it was conducted with much secrecy. There is no indication that J.O. Briand who was a candidate for the bishopric, was a leader in this activity, however for he was in London seeking permission for his consecration and, while there, became acutely aware of British attitude toward "meddling priests". When Briand returned to Quebec as a duly consecrated bishop, he returned in triumph, and the Church gained immeasurably in stature. Through their campaigns the priests were able to gain support for an "assembly" headed by seigneurs, *Canadien* merchants, or both, to promote their causes on the political front. One "assembly" met at Quebec and another at

Montreal, from which the English were excluded under Mabane's direction. This was opportune time for the drawing up of further petitions from the merchants and counter-petitions from the *Canadiens*.

Simply put, the net effect of this process of petition and counter-petition, which occurred sporadically in the formative period of the Quebec Act, from 1764-1773, was gradually to consolidate ethnic divisions.* The governors played a role in reinforcing these positions; each of them sought opportunity to win the support of *Canadiens*, and particularly of the Church. Murray forwarded the French petitions after he had moderated them to seem more appealing to London. As Harlow (1964: 668) concludes in his discussion of the effects of the opposing petitions: "The conflict between the two races within the bosom of a single state had begun" (See Neatby, 1971: 128-132; Neatby, 1972: 9-15; & Harlow, 1964: 664-672.)

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* The English merchants demanded English institutions and laws, but at no time did they advocate anything like civil equality for the Catholics. Hence, the few *Canadien* merchants who had supported the cause of assembly gradually grew suspicious and withdrew their support from this cause. The petition for the restoration of *Canadien* institutions (but without the checks on arbitrary government that France had built into their system) effected a type of collectivism even more excessive than that of the Bourbon rule. This system the English found barely tolerable, and they therefore increased their agitation when it became clear that the Quebec Act would deny right of assembly and other English institutions. (Neatby, 1971: 128-133).

Murray's successor, Carleton, pursued the policy of conciliation to an even greater degree than his predecessor did. Carleton did not care about anglicization or assimilation policies. Even more than Murray, his prime concern became military security. The circumstances of the colony induced a prudent governor to be a political realist rather than dream of assimilation or religious conversions. There was the increasing rebelliousness of the Thirteen Colonies and France's implied threat to recapture her lost colony. Then, too, it was not prudent to drive some seventy thousand people to revolt because a minority alien government wished to subvert their laws and their religion in a country intimately known to their experienced guerilla fighters. In these circumstances, Carleton sought to win the allegiance of the French by appealing to their religious hierarchy and to their social hierarchy, which he mistakenly believed to be the seigneurs.*

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* Carleton misjudged the hierarchy of control in Quebec. He ignored the captains of the militia and conferred the honour upon the seigneurs whose control was vestigial. In the Church, conformity and control gave way to passive rebellion during the wars with the American states. Control was not imposed until after the wars, when punishment was meted out by the Church to the minority of its members who were recalcitrant or rebellious. Carleton was very grateful to the Church for its loyalty to his cause and particularly for enforcing these negative sanctions. As such the Church provided the only dependable support system.

His own disposition also drew Carleton to favour the policies and teachings of the Church. As Morton comments:

> Like Murray, he developed a liking for the courteous and soldierly Canadian *noblesse* and for the habitant's respect for rank. He began to see the Canadians not as potential enemies but as possible allies. Certainly, he declared, the policy of assimilation had failed, "so that", ran his famous phrase, "barring Catastrophe shocking to think of, this country must, to the end of Time, be peopled by the Canadian Race."
>
> (Morton, 1977: 159).

Carleton's influence is important, for it carried more weight than any other authority in the formulation of the Quebec Act. In his liking for autocratic and paternalistic type of government, he discouraged assemblies and petitions. Until the petitions were in unanimous agreement with his political views, he did not permit them to be sent to London. As Neatby comments:

> Their petition. . . . asked for "our ancient laws, privileges and customs," the extension of the province to its former boundaries, and civil equality for old and new subjects. The fervent thanks for the privileges of the military regime, and the eulogies of the House of Hanover, are in sharp contrast to the strident tone of the untutored representations made to Murray nearly ten years before. Carleton's liking for "subordination" had been noted.
>
> (Neatby, 1971: 133).

With this petition and with his assurance that collectivism would be fitting for Canadian society (ignoring the English merchants) he approached the authorities in England in 1770 to persuade them to incorporate his views into the Quebec Act. Rejecting their alternate plans and arguing persuasively for the cause of military security, Carleton finally succeeded in bending the British authorities to his view. The time was critical. The Boston Tea Party had erupted. For the Americans, connections with England were to be severed, and Canada was to be won. (Morton, 1977: 150-160; Neatby, 1971: 87-133 & Moir, 1972: 35-47.)

The Quebec Act of 1774

Overview

This act holds a special place among the enactments which shaped our Canadian constitution, the Acts of 1774, 1791, 1840 and 1867. It was the first Imperial statute to be passed by the British parliament to create a constitution for a specific olony in the Empire, "to recognize the complexity of relations between the two groups which together were to constitute the beginnings of the Canadian people", and as such, has been considered a key piece of legislation by Canadian historians (Neatby, 1972: 1). Expressed another way, the Quebec Act, interrelated with historical events, assumed a "finality" which went beyond the expectations of its drafters, for it prepared the way for the differentiation of the provinces within the federation which became Canada (Morton, 1963: 161, 162).

Morton summarizes the terms of the Act that history finalized so effectively. We should note however, that the view of a French Canadian historian would give much more importance to French Canadianism (as a factor that influenced the formation of this Act) than to political events.

> The Act then [after the re-drawing of the boundaries] went on to assure the free exercise of the Roman Catholic faith; the clergy were to have their accustomed dues (that is, the tithe) from members of the church, and Roman Catholics were freed from the need to subscribe to the Test Act and provided with a special oath of allegiance. Civil law was to be the old Canadian law, which allowed no trial by jury, but criminal law was to be British. The land law remained seigniorial but was modified to provide for grants in free and common socage. Finally, the Act established a council with the power to legislate but not to tax, except for public buildings and roads. To repair this last deficiency, Parliament passed the Quebec Revenue Act, which imposed duties on spirits imported into the colony.
>
> In intent, it is to be observed, the Act was meant to deal finally with some matters, provisionally with others. The religious provisions were permanent. The legal ones were not, nor was the recourse to a legislative council. It was assumed that the laws would be changed, and that the constitution might be revised. Nor

> were the claims of the old subjects meant to be forgotten, as Carleton's new instructions were to show, for example, by ordering the introduction of jury trial in civil cases. But events were to give the Quebec Act a finality which would have surprised its drafters.
>
> (Morton, 1977: 161).

The Quebec Act has aroused much controversy. Some have seen it as a reactionary attempt to "woo" the French Canadian by means of "seducing" their leaders with special favours, while imposing on the mass of people a feudal system and enforced tithes. Others have seen its significance in recognizing the distinctiveness of French Canadians and in being the guarantor of their rights and their resistance to assimilation (Neatby, 1972: 1-4, 68-133 & McNaught, 1976: 50). Neatby (1972: 113) found that there was no particular preoccupation with the Quebec Act in the Newspaper, *Le Canadien,* from 1774 to 1837. But in our modern sources such as Jean Bruchesi(1950: 126), we read that "the French Canadians of today quote the Quebec Act as a law which marked once and for all the consecration of their rights and privileges and the official recognition of the French achievement." Bruchesi sees the subsequent acts in the same light and includes them all in his chapter entitled "Resistance". This same theme is carried by Gustave Lanctot (1967: 19): "With one blow, the new charter ruined the plans of the Anglo-American group" to assimilate the French Canadians.

Michel Brunet (1973: 41) of Montreal argues fervently that *Canadien* distinctiveness was a fact already established and that the British made use of it: "These [English] historians simply forget that the *Canadiens* already existed as a distinctive collectivity, and they ignore the fact that the measures adopted were absolutely necessary to assure the good administration of the new colony." Jean-Charles Bonenfant of Laval also argues for the factual existence of their distinctiveness and relates this to the Acts under study:

> As for special status, . . . the special position of Quebec within the Canadian federal system, existed in fact long before it began to be discussed in theory. It was evident "*inpotentia*" in the Quebec Act of 1774. It was recognized in practice in the unofficial federalism which developed under the Union of 1840; and in 1867 it was incorporated, through certain specific provisions, in the British North America Act.
>
> (J. Bonenfant, 1973: 64).

Influence of governing authorities in entrenching the Quebec Act

A number of factors that relate to the significance of collectivism influenced the "finality" of the Quebec Act. The first factor was Carleton's personal disposition, which, during a time of war, interacted with the collectivistic tendencies of *Canadiens* to effect a dictatorial type of rule. As Neatby (1971: 171) explains, Carleton was able to use the Act as an "instrument of dictatorship" not approved but tolerated in London during military urgency. We should not forget that it was Britain's policy to commission governors sympathetic with the *Canadiens* and concerned about military security. When the terms of the Act became known in the Atlantic Colonies, the reaction was immediate and violent. It was charged that Britain had fashioned an engine of despotism and Popery, a threat as "intolerable" as the punitive measures enacted against Massachusetts for its Boston Tea Party at about the same time. When Carleton arrived in Quebec in September, 1774, he received an express letter from Boston asking for military help, for the rebellion was gaining momentum (Harlow, 1964: 707).

With this sense of military urgency thrust upon him, Carleton was able to implement a high degree of collectivism through several means: (1) He used patronage freely, appointing three sympathetic Englishmen, Cramahe, Mabane, and Fraser to lead his party in the Council. Cramahe and Mabane were from Murray's "French Party" and Fraser was included because he had taken a strong dislike for the excesses of republicanism through his prison experience in the Colonies. The rest of the party was made up of seven seigneurs, who for the most part acted as an "obedient official party." Together this party usually commanded a majority in the Council and they voted as a bloc. (2) Carleton's concern for military efficiency encouraged him to rule through an inner circle, a "privy council", which further reduced opportunities for dissent. (3) At the first meeting he set the precedent for concealing the "instruction" accompanying the Act of 1774, which would have spoken for the English interests, such as the introduction of English commercial law. This concealment had a decisive effect, for it sanctioned the seigneurs' opposition to the chief Justice who fully expected to implement English commercial law. At this meeting the seigneurs adopted the view that the Act was a fundamental law, guaranteed by Britain and subject only to the most trifling modification in Quebec. This charter concept of the Act became the chief plank of the "French Party". (See Morton, 1977: 164-171; Neatby, 1971: 156-160, 162-170; Harlow, 1964: 707 & McNaught, 1976: 51.) (4) Finally, Carleton permitted this "French Party" to remain as the most powerful party in Council, usually commanding the majority and voting together. Hence, they became so entrenched that their influence extended beyond Carleton's term of office. As Morton reports:

> Carleton's system, however, did not depend on Carleton. It was entrenched with the French party and sustained by the war. This fact was demonstrated when Carleton was recalled and replaced by Lieutenant-General Frederick Haldimand in June, 1778. . . . But Haldimand's appointment and tenure of office made little difference in the mode or spirit

> of the government of Canada. The laws were not liberalized and the French party under Mabane continued to dominate the council. Canada was still governed for the Canadians, and only the Canadians were French. . . . The incessant warfare between the governor and the French party on one side and the mercantile minority on the other continued down to Haldimand's retirement in 1784.
>
> (Morton, 1977: 171).

By the time Haldimand had retired, precedents had been set over many years and expectations had been entrenched. The Peace of 1783 ended the hostilities between the United States and Canada. Then came the influx of the Loyalists, which precipitated the demand for representative government and consequently a new constitution.

Before dealing with this new constitution embodied in the Act of 1791, we will look at two other important factors that influenced the growth of collectivism: the influence of the Church, particularly during the American invasions, and the *Canadien* aversion to the excesses of the French Revolution.

Influence of the Church in the entrenching of the Quebec Act

During the wars of 1774-1776, the grateful clergy reacted to the generous provisions of the Quebec Act by issuing heavily worded *mandemants* to their flocks on behalf of loyalty to the British cause. But with the mass of *Canadiens* taking on a role of passive neutrality and resenting the new military role which Carleton had conferred upon the seigneurs, the governor realized he was dependent on the clergy as the only body of men in the province who were both loyal and influential.

Hence, Carleton encouraged the hierarchy to gain control over its members. He concealed the instructions which would have shown the Act's suppressive intent. He was supposed to ask for council's assistance to discipline priests and regulate the seminaries and convents. He supported the hierarchy when they sought to punish waverers and recalcitrants who had in any way aided the American invaders. The parish records were used as sources of information. Though some resented the inquisitorial procedures, there was general acceptance of them as an integral part of the French system. However, Carleton avoided vengeful methods of punishment and was satisfied to endorse the methods of the Church. This required that dissidents first seek pardon from their English king before being allowed to make peace with their mother Church. As Moir (1972: 52) says, "Bishop Briand had the final victory over the rebellious minority in his flock". (See also Neatby, 1971: 156-160.)

The Church was a major factor in swaying the *Canadiens* from mass neutrality at the outset of British rule toward active support for the British cause. The

Canadiens grew to resent the aggressive, brutal methods of the American invaders, particularly when the Americans imprisoned French priests. But note that it was British regulars arriving in the spring breakup, not the French, who sent the Americans scurrying toward the border. (Neatby, 1971: 152; Morton, 1977: 165 & Moir, 1972: 52.) Gustav Lanctot (1967: 224) looks at the reasons for the "political failure" (apart from the military failure) of the Americans to gain Canada and finds that the "essential cause was the steadfast opposition of the clergy to the rebel cause." Jean Bruchesi (1950: 119) claims that the preaching of submission to *Canadiens* was the factor in preventing the "whole people" instead of a few hundred from joining London's enemies.

The influence of the French Revolution

The other major factor influencing the growth of collectivism is also related to the Church's political attitudes. Though the clergy had always resisted the teachings and ideas of the French Revolution, resistance to the excesses of this Revolution and the extremists who took over in France now became a populist movement. Siegfried (1968: 29), speaking from France, said this: "That the example of France is one to be avoided rather than imitated is the view not merely of the Catholic clergy but of all Catholic French Canadians." He explains that even the liberals among them refused to take France for a model. Furthermore, the Catholic newspapers of the colony which depended on support from the priests proclaimed the decadence of France under the "regime of the freemasons".

However, as Siegfried goes on to explain, not all *Canadiens* were drawn to support the excessive form of collectivism exercised through the Church. From the time of the American invasion onwards and through the idealism of the French Revolution, ideas associated with the desire for self-government and assertion of nationalism had filtered, though almost imperceptibly, into Quebec. (See Siegfried, 1968: 30; Morton, 1963: 165, 180, 185 & Neatby, 1971: 261-262.)

Growing demand for constitutional reform

We now look at the conditions which precipitated the legislation of the Constitution Act, the imperial reaction to these conditions, and the implication this had for *Canadien* collectivism. In the period prior to the Act of 1791, there was a growing recognition of the dualistic aspects of the colony, that is, of the distinctiveness of each of the colony's two ethnic groups. Two factors encouraged this development and this recognition. The first, and of prime importance, was the influx of the Loyalists. Although they had retreated from what was to them the excesses of the American Revolution, they resented the autocratic government of Quebec. Consequently, they made demands for the benefits of British institutions through petitions: the first, sent in 1784, demanded separate government for the Western settlements.

The second factor was the emergence of the *Canadien patriote* party and a democratic element eager for self-government as a means to preserve French Canadian nationalism. Although a few of these radical *Canadiens* were willing to side with the British and Loyalists in a petition of 1784 asking for an elective assembly, they resented the Loyalists' pretenses at racial superiority and their careless contempt for the *Canadien* laws and religion. In this spirit of mutual antagonism, the *Canadien* radicals, to preserve their culture, campaigned for their own goals of self-government. But within the *Canadien* community, the patriot party was winning their battle against the seigneurs of the entrenched "French party", who claimed to be the spokesmen of the *Canadien* nation. To the patriots, the seigneurs' claim was a hollow defence for the old feudal order.

Another factor strengthening the new nationalism was its leaders: they were of the rising class of educated elite, particularly the lawyer-politician. As Neatby (1971: 262) points out, though the *Canadiens* at this time were derided by their opponents for being divided, it must be noted that they were divided, not in spirit, but only in the means to obtain their collectivistic goals - the preservation of their nationality as *Canadiens*. (See also Neatby, 1971: 260-262; Morton, 1977: 165, 180, 185; Moir, 1972: 57 & Bruchesi, 1950: 131.)

London responded to the urgent petitions by recognizing this division "in fact" and by seeking to implement a "natural remedy" in the new constitution being drawn up for the colony. Harlow reports that a clear and comprehensive understanding of the colonial situation was emerging in London.

> To combine French Canadians and Loyalists in one [elective] legislative body would, however, provoke dissension and animosity; and since their interests differed the victory of either party might well be injurious to the other. The Province was already divided, "in fact tho' not by law" and the "natural remedy" was to accept the fact and establish two distinct legislatures in which the separate interests of the Old and the New subjects would respectively preponderate.
>
> (Harlow, 1964: 756).

Bruchesi (1950: 133) finds it significant that Grenville (as the architect of the Constitution Act) praised the collectivist orientation of the *Canadiens* - their collective "attachment" to "their customs, their laws and their practices".

The 1791 Act was, as Neatby (1971: 260-261) says, framed with careful attention to the needs of each of these provinces. Significant, though unrealized, was the coincidence of the 1791 Act and the French Revolution. The 1791 Act provided the *Canadiens* with a representative assembly, and thus gave them a "national forum at the very moment when the new phenomenon of nationalism as a mass emotion was making its appearance in France" (261).

The Constitution Act of 1791

Overview

This act acknowledged the bicultural pattern of Quebec by authorizing its division into two colonies - Lower Canada, containing the French population, and Upper Canada, comprising the Loyalist settlements along the upper St. Lawrence River and the lower Great Lakes. Each colony was given its own representative assembly. Though the Act gave legal recognition to dualism, it also attempted assimilation, with its intended establishment of the Anglican Church, a provision that died on the books. (See Harlow, 1964: 715-773 & Moir, 1972: 61-75.)

Morton summarizes the terms incorporating both dualism and assimilation:

> The Act [Constitution] embodied the whole scheme of government, except that the boundaries of the new provinces could not be given statutory definition because of the uncertainties caused by the retention of the western posts. A clear structure of government, modelled exactly, as its draftsmen

> believed, on the British Constitution in Church and state, was provided in governor, executive council, legislative council and representative assembly to correspond with King, Privy Council, Lords and Commons. Each part, executive and legislative, was largely independent of the other, but legislation and taxation required their concurrent action. Membership in the legislative council might be made hereditary, if it should seem fitting to create an aristocracy. The Act further ordered the reservation, for the support of "a Protestant clergy," of what was to amount to about one eighth of all Crown lands alienated, and authorized the founding of rectories for the clergy of the Church of England.
>
> Yet perhaps the most noteworthy feature of the Act was that, while it replaced the Quebec Act as the Canadian constitution, it also embodied its provisions with respect to the Roman Catholic Church and persons, the civil law, and the use of French language in the courts.
>
> (Morton, 1977: 183).

The expand upon the relative positions of the Anglican and the Catholic Church we quote from Moir:

> Since the Constitution Act was only an amendment of the Quebec Act, designed to cope with the problems created by the arrival of the Loyalists, most of the Quebec Act still formed the constitution of Lower Canada. Although the powers of the governor and council were somewhat reduced by the granting of an assembly, the Constitutional Act altered the religious situation in Lower Canada only slightly. Any doubts about the status of Anglicanism as the state religion were now dispelled, yet Roman Catholicism retained its peculiar position as a semi-established church within an officiallly Protestant Empire.

> The Quebec Act had allowed Roman Catholics to enter the governor's council by permitting a loyalty oath that made no mention of religion. After 1791 Roman Catholics could vote for and even become members of the assembly, almost forty years before such political rights were given to their co-religionists in Great Britain.
>
> (Moir, 1972: 62).

In spite of the intentions of those who framed it, developments in the colony were to show that the main effect of the Act was to exacerbate ethnic and national rivalries (Morton, 1964: 233). In time the English came to dominate the Councils through official appointments, and the French gradually assumed control in the elected assembly. At the outset, the English were appointed to hold a slight majority in the Councils but this did not in any way correspond to the population, which was ninety-five per cent *Canadien*. Consequently the initial warm generosity and mutual esteem was replaced by a growing suspicion. This was registered in the elections of 1797 wherein the English merchants and seigneurs who had sided with the English were not re-elected to the assembly. Then, to add to the suspicion, the governor felt it necessary to keep a majority of English in the councils to balance the *Canadiens* in the assembly. It was this majority that began to entrench itself in the council, who obtained favours in holdings and investments - the English bureaucrats, land speculators, land owners, mortgage holders and bankers. These became notorious as the "*Chateau Clique*".

Growing demand for reform

The Constitution of 1791 had almost ceased to function in Lower Canada by the time of the rebellions of 1837. The assembly could not influence the administration of government except by refusing to vote on legislation or supply. On the other hand, the governor could influence neither the assembly nor the electorate, not even Prevost, who was prepared to speak French and admit *Canadiens* to office. The *Canadien* bloc in assembly repelled the governor's attempts to wield influence in the assembly and, furthermore, reproached the few *Canadiens* who accepted office from him. Morton (1977: 235) refers to the significance of the "national cohesion" of the *Canadiens*. Under the terms of the Act, the passing of legislation required concurrent action of the governor, councils and assembly. Hence, no action was possible: each representation nullified the efforts of the other. The deadlock aggravated ethnic and nationalistic divisions.

In the ensuing stalemate and discontent, reform parties emerged. The first, under the leadership of Papineau, attacked the economic and social injustices, perpetrated by the Chateau Clique, as well as the constitution. At the outset of this movement, Papineau drew up his Ninety-two Resolutions which were approved in the Assembly in 1834. The Resolutions as well as calling for an elected legislative council complained against the imposition of an appointed English oligarchy on a French democracy. But as Papineau became impatient and disillusioned with the callousness of the English response, he turned more and more towards a program of republicanism and annexation. This move was seen to be too radical by the majority of British immigrants, particularly those of the Loyalist stock and by the French Canadian clergy and moderates. Consequently they withdrew their support. Stripped of support by the moderate majority, Papineau's rebellion of 1837 was ill-fated. It lacked political organization, an effective military command, and populist support. Consequently, the sporadic outbursts were quickly subdued and the leaders, including Papineau, fled over the border in the first days of the fighting leaving the rebels in disarray.

But the effects of the ill-fated rebellions were felt beyond the local battle grounds. They had demonstrated to the imperial government that the old colonial model was no longer workable. As far as the imperial government was concerned, French Canada was Canada and the collapse of the system of 1791 meant a serious consideration of revision. As Morton (1977: 248) concludes, "Canadian democracy and French nationalism had broken the mould of the oligarchic ascendancy."

Facing this nationalism, a cry for reform, and the threat of further rebellions which would invite American intervention, the British sent Lord Durham to investigate the causes of rebellion. (See Morton, 1977: 190-192, 233-252; Moir, 1972: 60-62; & Bruchesi, 1950: 129.) His recommendations and their reaction in London led to the Act of Union in 1841, the second major attempt at assimilation. Before analyzing the Act of Union and the Union period, we will note the influence of French Canadian collectivism in the political area and in the Church, in bringing about the collapse of the colonial rule and ushering in reform.

Influence of political collectivism in growing demand for reform

As we noted above, "national cohesion" made the *Canadien* cause effective and one that England was forced to recognize. Furthermore, the *Canadiens* were able to consolidate their position by treating those who accepted offers from the English as deviants, as members of the out-group (Bruchesi, 1950: 131; Morton, 1963: 235, 248; & Hiller, 1976: 112). The aims of their legislation were collectivist and this legislation in turn strengthened their collective institutions. This interrelation effected what Raymond Breton calls "institutional completeness" and further consolidated their position (Hiller, 1976: 112). McRoberts and Posgate give a concise view of the effects of these collectivist aims into the union period:

> Nineteenth century politics were dominated by landmark constitutional changes, but underlying these were equally important but less formal developments: French Canadians adapted to the imposed representative institutions and began to use them for their own ends, especially for the protection of community rights.
>
> (McRoberts and Posgate, 1976: 23).

The *Canadiens* were able to have the French language recognized as the language of debate in the assembly. As well, legislation to provide funds for denominational schools deprived the Anglican school system of needed funds. (See McRoberts and Posgate, 1976: 23; Sissons, 1959: 132-134 & Moir, 1972: 66.)

Finally, collectivism was further strengthened by the refusal of any *Canadien* jury to convict the political prisoners of the Rebellion of 1837. Some prisoners were granted amnesty, some were banished; but since it was an English authority, Lord Durham, who had meted out the punishment, the effect of exile was minimal. This was exemplified by the return from exile of an unrepentant and undaunted Papineau (Morton, 1977: 250, 280).

Influence of the Church's collectivism for reform

The Church's collectivist policies influenced the demand for constitutional reform in several ways. First, the Church worked to inspire or demand loyalty for the legitimate authority, a policy the British in turn rewarded generously. This became critical in the War of 1812; faced with the threat of occupation, as in the war of 1775, the governor and imperial authorities were particularly anxious to present conciliatory policies to the *Canadiens*. At this time, Governor Prevost became irritated with the aggressive Anglical Bishop, Jacob Mountain, who pressed his case to exercise Royal supremacy over the Catholic Bishop. Facing threats to the very survival of Canada, those responsible for this survival became political realists and cooled Mountain's antagonistic ambitions. Rewards were handed instead to the Catholic Church. As Moir reports:

> By 1817 Mountains's ambitions were hopeless. Not only had Plessis been acknowledged as Bishop of Quebec but his government salary had been raised to £1000. The loyalty of French Canadians during the recent hostilities demanded rewards, not rebuffs - one reward was to admit Plessis to the legislative council. The "French fact" and the War of 1812-1814 had combined to perpetuate the limited co-establishment of Romanism and Anglicanism, just as similar circumstances four decades earlier had led Carleton to treat Bishop Briand and his church as close allies. Thereafter the Roman Bishop was reassured of complete independence

> of action and Mountain was privately informed by a member of the British government that Plessis' church "must be considered as the Established Church of Canada". Bitter in his defeat, Mountain again threatened to quit as bishop unless Anglicanism was publicly declared the religion of Canada, a demand adamantly rejected by the imperial government.
>
> (Moir, 1972: 68-69).

McNaught corroborates Moir's view:

> In Lower Canada the conciliatory policies of Prevost, together with mounting alienation from atheistic France and recognition (by the Church) that the province's special rights of religion, language and laws would be obliterated in an American union, ensured majority loyalty. At Lacolle and Chateaugay the invasion was repulsed by militia units composed mainly of French Canadians.
>
> (McNaught, 1976: 71).

In 1775, the church had difficulty commanding the loyalty of the people, but by 1812, its position had strengthened so much that public loyalty, a product of conformity, was never in question.

Secondly, the Church gained control of education. In this area of influence especially, the collectivist orientation of the Church came into full play through the doctrine of supremacy of the Church over state, and it was in the Assembly that the Church was able to implement this doctrine. When the Jesuit estates became available for the support of schools in 1801, the Anglican Bishop Mountain sought to implement a system of "free schools" to attract the *Canadiens*. These were to be supervised by the Royal Institute for the Advancement of Learning. As Morton (1977: 193) comments, "it was actually a full-blown scheme of Anglicization, which however, remained a dead letter in the face of steadfast French opposition". The solidarity of *Canadien* opposition to assimilation schemes was manifested by the Assembly's refusal to vote to supply money, and also at the grass roots level in the parishes, where local trustees balked at this alien system with its awkward and unsuitable teachers from England. However, definitive legislation for the establishment of denominational schools did not arrive until the union period. Before then, education was so poor that most were illiterate. (See Moir, 1972: 67; Morton, 1977: 193, 225 & Sissons, 1959: 129-135.)

Thirdly, the influence of the Church weakened Papineau's reform movement when he became radical - when, that is, he began to advocate American style republicanism and annexation. The Church had become identified with the reform movement and opposed the oligarchical control of the *Chateau Clique*. Therefore, though Papineau at the time of his Ninety-two Resolutions enjoyed wide consensual support, as his impatience with reform grew and his radical views strengthened, he lost his support. When the Church publicly withdrew support of Papineau in 1834, his populist support shifted to the moderates under

Etienne Parent. Morton gives us a further understanding of the Church's influence:

> The Church of Rome, despite the fact that in Lower Canada it too was semi-established, with its right to tithe its own members, and its bishop a member of the Executive Council and in receipt of a salary as councillar, did not incur any such odium [as the Anglican Church had with its identification with the oligarchy and the propertied class in Upper Canada]. It was not identified, for all the care the imperial government took to maintain its good will, with the oligarchs and the possessing classes. In Lower Canada, it was, on the contrary, identified with the Canadians who were in opposition to the political establishment; and the church was, in a broader, subtler and more comprehensive way than the national democratic movement, the vehicle of French nationalism.
>
> (Morton, 1977: 223).

That the Church's power was important is shown by the failure of the rebellion of 1837. The political crisis had come quickly to a head, intensified by commercial and agricultural problems.* In the ensuing chaos and malaise, the solid front of the *Canadiens* was seriously damaged. But we also note the emergence of the moderate reform party, the growing support of the Church for this type of reform and the increasing identification of the Church with the causes of French Canadian nationalism. This was very significant for the Union period was approaching, wherein England, through the Act of Union made a concerted effort to assimilate the French.

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* These problems are outside the scope of this thesis. However, a factor in the agricultural crisis was mentioned above relating to the *Canadien* reluctance to leave the traditional community to seek new frontiers, thus causing over-population and depleted soils. But in 1837 it was the exclusion policies of the Chateau Clique which received the whole blame for this crisis. (Morton, 1963: 245).

The Act of Union of 1841

Overview

This act incorporating much of the Durham report, was designed to stifle *Canadien* nationalism and swamp the *Canadiens* by making them a minority in a common legislature. The second aim was to grant self-government after reducing *Canadien* political power through under-representation in the common legislature.

In seeking for the possible sources of Durham's illiberal and racist views, we find that upon arriving in Canada, he had come under the influence of Adam Thom, who headed the English merchant party in Quebec. But Durham had also been influenced by Robert Baldwin, a fervent advocate of responsible government. The English party was determined to maintain the ascendancy they had gained by suppressing the rebellion. This determination was favoured by Durham who believed in the superiority of the English-speaking civilization, with its parliamentary constitution and its world-wide industrial leadership. It was therefore only in the assurance that *Canadien* control would be reduced that Durham recommended self-government. Though Durham had generous concerns for *Canadiens* as individuals, he had only disdain for their cultural and their nationality. (See Morton, 1977: 252-255 & Careless, 1977: 3.)

The formulation and the passage of the Act had to await the consent of the colonial governments. This was achieved through clever political manipulations by the new governor, Charles Poulet Thompson. (After the passage of the Act, Thompson was rewarded by being granted the position of Baron Sydenham of Sydenham and Toronto.) Thompson, while still in London and in the collaboration with the imperialist minded authorities, came to the conclusion that responsible government, as Durham had defined it, was impractical in the colony. But the authorities in London had now become aware that government in the colony could not be carried on in defiance of public opinion. It must therefore be carried on in accord with it. Therefore, when Thompson came to seek approval from the Canadian authorities, he was careful to reassure them, particularly the members of the Reform Party, that government would be carried out in accord with the wishes of the people. The reluctance of the Reformers stemmed from Thompson's apparent refusal to appoint French

Canadians to his Council.

However, in London the imperialist authorities and Thompson decided to adopt Durham's other recommendations, that the inefficient and obsolete institutions in the colonial governments be replaced by the reformed British models. A significant feature of the new institutions was to free the colonial governor from dependence on permanent executive councillors who had hitherto been appointed for life. He was now at liberty to dismiss a councillor if he proved inefficient or incompetent. The unintended effect of this new reform was to establish the necessary condition for the institution of responsible government that a minister could be dismissed or replaced, which the Reformers were to take advantage of in pressing for their cause to have the French Canadians included in the Council. The intention of the authorities was rather to create an efficient government, and through this efficiency to impose assimilation. (See Morton, 1977: 252-257 & Careless, 1977: 3.)

Against this background the terms of the Act can now be summarized:

> The Act was a comparatively simple one, and not nearly as detailed as had at first been intended. The provision of municipal institutions, for example, was left for Canadian action. Union, moreover, was not complete; . . . There was to be, it is true, only one legislature and one administration. But two bodies of law continued to

> exist. Neither the civil law of Lower Canada nor seigniorial tenure was affected by the Act. Nor were the special rights of the Roman Catholic Church in Lower Canada touched. Thus a duality continued which was reflected in the appointment of two sets of law officers, Attorney-General East and Attorney-General West, for example, and in the growth of two school systems. On the other hand, French was not to be a language of record or debate.
>
> In the Union there was also to be equal representation of the two sections which were the old Upper and Lower Canada, now Canada West and Canada East. Each section was to have forty-two members in the Legislative Assembly; the number of representatives might be altered by a two-thirds majority of the Assembly, but the principle of equality of representation must be retained. The result was a major injustice to the French Canadians, the number of whose representatives was much smaller than the French population warranted. The union, in short, was a gigantic gerrymander. A high property qualification of £500 real property was set for members. The members of the second chamber, the Legislative Council, were appointed by the Governor General in Council for life. The membership was to be not less than twenty. No provision was made for its equal distribution between the two sections.
>
> (Morton, 1977: 257-258).

In Syndenham's brief rule, as he inaugurated union government, he inadvertently set up the conditions for ushering in responsible government and for the entrenchment of duality rather than assimilation. Syndenham remained confident throughout his short term as governor, that he could promote a system of harmony and progress by manipulating and shifting support, rather than employing the principle of oligarchy rule as of the past or resorting to responsible government. The latter was the platform of the emergent, vigorous reform party which he had to hold at bay. On the positive side, Syndenham's system was extended to the reorganization of the public service so that it became a ministerial government, whose heads, in effect, became responsible to the popular assembly. For Syndenham, in his committment to efficient government had councillors removed from their seats if the public seemed to demand it. Though these policies were instituted to promote harmony, the reform group had already created conditions for the introduction of responsible government and had played well the hands of the *Canadien* bloc. Syndenham won some support during his first term by securing an imperial loan for a public works program, but opposition was developing to his system of manipulation to further his unionist aims. His attempts to minimize *Canadien* influence and to support the unionists using any means at his disposal eventually broke down his system. He indulged in unscrupulous election campaigning and in gerrymandering. He rigged and manipulated the polls, for instance, placing polling booths in hostile union territory where *Canadien* voters would be intimidated. He gave the unionists military protection, often needed since voting was by open rather than secret ballot. As a result of Sydenham's unscrupulous methods, La Fontaine, a popular reformer lost his seat. He did not contest the election for fear of further violence at the polls. The net effect of these methods was to further reduce the number of *Canadien* seats, from what had already been done in the Act of 1841. (See Careless, 1977: 37-57; Morton, 1977: 255-260 & McNaught, 1976: 96-97.)

The French Canadian reaction to the combined effects of the Union Act and the Sydenham system varied in degrees from dejected lethargy, through sullen resentment, to fervent demands for reform or repeal. This bleak outlook aggravated the sense of failure following the rebellion of 1837, which had given some Englishmen in London and in Canada grounds to rationalize their condemnation of the *Canadiens* as being tinged with the revolutionary fervour of their mother country. But, ironically, this bleak period also saw the launching of a deepening sense of *Canadien* identity (Careless, 1977: 5-7). The psychological effects of being an "embattled cultural minority" (Careless, 1977: 65) strengthened the "cohesion" of the French Canadian group.

In the Union period, we will analyze the significance of collectivism as it affected and was, in turn, affected by this new determination to resist assimilation and to re-establish the *Canadien* identity. Although the focus is on collectivism in Canada East, we will also analyze the affects of individualism in Canada West and show the differences. Our analysis will be limited to four areas: (1) the solid support of the *Canadien* electorate which sustained their leaders permitting them to pursue their goals; (2) the bloc support of the *Canadiens* in the legislative assembly which contrasts with the shifting, divisive support of the English members; (3) the contrast in the types of legislation which exacerbated the clash between the two founding ethnic groups; and (4) the recognized concept of federalism which grew out of dualism.

The collectivist orientation of the electorate

The significance of *Canadien* collectivism in the Union period is related first of all to the solid majority support of the electorate that united behind the new emergent leaders: Louis LaFontaine, whose sense of determined destiny inspired confidence at this dark moment, and Etienne Parent, editor of *Le Canadien,* the most powerful intellectual influence in French Canada. These leaders worked together with the English reformers of the West, led by Baldwin, and saw that a coalition of reformers in the union administration could usher in responsible government. Morton describes the crucial role played by LaFontaine in Canada's history:

> French and British Reformers were to unite to bring about responsible government. Moreover, LaFontaine's decision was one of the most crucial in Canadian history. He might have led the French members in a boycot of the Union; he might have led them in a permanent opposition bloc in the House. His decision to work with the English Reformers saved Canada from the fate of Grattan's Ireland and Gandhi's India, and made a plural and a liberal society possible in British North America.
>
> (Morton, 1977: 261).

But it is to be emphasized that LaFontaine could not have played this crucial role without the solid support of the *Canadien* electorate. The clearest indicator of this unswerving loyalty is LaFontaine's request that the constituency of Rimouski (ninety-nine per cent French-speaking) elect a Canadian from the West whom they had never seen - Robert Baldwin.* As Careless (1977: 75) notes, "the whole episode demonstrated LaFontaine's hold on the French *reformistes*". Furthermore, it is on record that he was elected by acclamation. During his entire political career, LaFontaine enjoyed sustained majority support, something Baldwin could not find in

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* Baldwin had been defeated in his seat of Hastings, which was a difficult constituency with a large Tory vote. Baldwin had earlier provided the same favour for LaFontaine when he had lost his seat through Sydenham's military intervention. However, it is to be noted, Baldwin asked the favour of his constituency in the warm flush of the reform movement, after which dissention and infighting set in.

Upper Canada. For example, in the election of 1844, LaFontaine, unlike Baldwin in the West, enjoyed an almost "complete triumph",* thus saving the Reform Alliance party, the forerunner of the Liberal party (Careless, 1977: 67, 75, 85, 86, 92).

We also note a significant event which consolidated the interests of the Church leaders with those in the political area. Parent, as editor, had publicly defended the "corporate rights of Roman Catholicism as against the Viger-Papineau advocates of individualist liberalism" (Careless, 1977: 162).

The bloc support in the legislative assembly

Perhaps the significance of collectivism is manifested most clearly in the legislative assembly. It is here that historians have drawn comparisons between the accomplishments of the two founding groups. McNaught comments on the effectiveness of the *Canadien* bloc.

> Strangely, the device of equal sectional representation in the legislature and elimination of French in debates, by which the British government thought to achieve assimilation, strengthened the French-Canadian sense of identity. Within the legislature the French

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* Viger and the English Tories did manage to gain two seats in Montreal ridings (Careless, 1977: 92). Otherwise LaFontaine won all of the seats in Canada East.

> operated en bloc more readily than did the English-speaking members, and soon obtained recognition for the French language in the legislature.
>
> (McNaught, 1976: 97).

Careless summarizes the effectiveness of the "firm French garrison". Since it did not break up into divisions, it held the balance of power and its demands had to be considered:

> And so, within eighteen months of the establishment of the union, the French Canadians, by very reason of their distinctive character, had come to share decisively in its direction. Social fact had confounded constitutional intent. Long before the full realization of responsible government the Canadian union had actually revealed itself to be anything but an instrument of assimilation, although English Canadians might still look to that end, and French fear it, for years to come. The union meant for assimilation would entrench duality instead.
>
> (Careless, 1977: 70).

The achievement of responsible government is perhaps the most significant work of the *Canadien* bloc, for then each group in the emerging duality could legislate for its own causes and in its own interests. Hence, the events leading up to this achievement will be briefly outlined.

To simplify, it became evident at the end of Sydenham's brief term that his facade of unity and harmony was breaking down, that he could not have weathered another session without admitting the English and, particularly, the *Canadien* reformers. Bagot, the next governor, saw that the Sydenham system, based on its exclusion policies, could not be maintained for both practical and moral reasons. But there was an additional problem: the *Canadien* bloc remained solid and treated deviants as "vendus", (traitors) who then lost their influence over the *Canadien* populace. Hence, *Canadien* representatives would have to be brought in as a bloc lending major support to their cause. As Careless explains:

> But the French party, as an embattled cultural minority, had a cohesion that was hard to break. They were very different from the English-speaking tories and reformers who had party elements both within and without the ministry: restless, factious elements, ... The power of the French block in opposition, therefore, was a major threat to Bagot's insecure administration. He became more and more worried about the problem that the French Canadians posed and more and more aware of how inadequately or even disastrously, his predecessor had dealt with them in the scheme of union.
>
> (Careless, 1977: 65).

Under threat of being defeated in the House, Bagot was driven to seek advice from members of the Reform party and as a consequence invited the prominent LaFontaine to take a seat in the Council as spokesman for his party of *Canadiens*. However, that shrewd politician refused to come in unless his ally, Baldwin, was also admitted. Bagot had hoped to avoid admitting Baldwin and his doctrine of responsible government. The net result of admitting Baldwin was that Council was reconstituted, under threat of a no-confidence motion, to conform to majority support in the Assembly. The old conservatives were replaced and the ministry became reform-dominated. It became more so as other English reformers healed their rifts and joined them in the wave of enthusiasm for reform sweeping the Canadas. (See Morton, 1977: 262-264; Careless, 1977: 51-57 & 65-74.)

The first real test of responsible government was the signing of the Rebellion Losses Bill in 1849. The passage of this bill was also the evidence of the political strength gained by the French Canadians. It was unpopular with the English speaking, for it compensated the French Canadians who had suffered in the rebellions of 1837. But the French Canadian ministers were resolved to support the bill introduced by LaFontaine, for it would pay the compensation that was long overdue. Compensation had been paid to the claimants in the West even before Union. Hence the English members could see that it would have been unjust to deny this delayed compensation. They were forced to remain silent. The passing of the Bill was evidence of the smouldering ethnic conflict which exploded into violence on the day of the signing - the Protestant Tory mob riots, the burning of the Parliament buildings and the sacking of LaFontaine's house (Morton, 1977: 281-282).

We next contrast the differences in the types of legislation of the two ethnic groups, differences which further marked the cultural disparities and then aroused further antagonisms.

The contrast in the types of legislation

The winning of responsible government and the wave of enthusiasm for reform sweeping Canada was paralleled by a resurgence of *Canadien* nationalism. The Church was emerging as the leader in this nationalistic resurgence and strong, popular interests were uniting behind it. Hence, the Church developed political interests and leaders to meet the changed conditions ushered in by responsible government. For the Church understood that now it had to deal with party politicians rather than with British officials as in former days. The result was the emergence of a Church dominated party labelled the *bleus* in contradistinction to the *rouges*. Careless adds further details to this development:

> Hence by the 1850's there was a swelling current of Catholic conservatism evident in French-Canadian affairs, even though its political exponents would still keep the label of LaFontaine reformers. It was, moreover, a reaction not only to the free-thinking of the *rouges* but also to that rationalist liberalism in Europe which had attacked the church in the revolutions of 1848 and even fought against the Pope at Rome. Its strength continued

> to grow in the fifties, while rouge support did not. In fact, a freshly zealous Catholicism, mingled with that other potent French-Canadian current, historically-minded nationalism (expressed in literary works, such as Garnneau's history), spread through Canada East, to produce a powerful *bleu* conservative predominance in politics there by the middle of the decade. But these forces were to face almost totally opposite currents arising at the same time within the English half of the union.
>
> (Careless, 1977: 162).

In looking at the collectivist "current" we note that as the Church gained control over this newly found political power, it was thereby able to influence the passing of legislation which then served to give it unprecedented control in Canada East. Moreover, the expansion program of the Church had solid, persistent, majority support, which demonstrated the Catholic belief in the integration of Church and state, religion and education.

In launching its expansionist program the Church paid particular attention to education, that is, to give education a religious base and direction. To note the most outstanding example, the Lower Canada School Act of 1846, which set up this Church centered system, remained virtually in effect for more than a century afterward. The Act provided for the two state-aided school systems, Catholic and Protestant, the latter being defined as "non-Catholic".

Though elected local authorities managed the schools, the clergy exercised control, including the decisive veto, over the selection of teachers and books. The role of government and local authorities was largely reduced to that of maintenance, although they had advisory roles in the setting up of general regulations. Then there were other pieces of legislation which provided for the establishment of residential schools and colleges outside the public system which were under the complete control of the Church.

The state did play a more important role in higher education, such as in the establishment of normal schools and universities. Although the *colleges classiques* were under the control of the Church and emphasized the French tradition of classical humanistic learning, the state played the important role in the setting up of McGill and Laval. By 1855 McGill had taken the lead in law, medicine and scientific research, although Laval had been promoted in 1852 from being mainly a seminary to a university with faculties analagous to McGill. However, Laval continued to be modelled on the universities of Catholic France, while McGill was modelled on the secular based, privately-endowed universities of English America (Careless, 1977: 215).

The education model from English America became the dominant one in Canada West. Here, the educational system came to be secularly based and directed: it was under state authority at the centre, and lay control in the localities. However, in spite of the demands of the voluntaryists,* there was not a full and formal separation of church and state, for denominational schools with state aid and recognition became established as well. But the preference was for secularization and de-centralization of authority which reinforced the ideologies of voluntaryism and the diversity of Protestantism.

Though a detailed comparison of these two systems is not within the scope of this research, we note that their fundamental differences had far reaching consequences for the politics of the Union.

In fields other than education, legislation was passed which further marked this "cultural distinction". Legislation for the establishment of welfare institutions increased the Church's control in the East which in turn gave rise to increased suspicion and antagonism in Canada West. (See Careless, 1977: 158-165, 173-184 & Morton,

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* According to Careless (1977: 163), "the 'voluntary movement' aspired to make churches truly voluntary organizations dependent on their members' free consciences for support, not on state aid or privilege, while the state was to guarantee religious equality to all but tied to none. Liberal voluntaryism was as natural a manifestation of Protestant diversity in English Canada as clerical conservatism was of Catholic uniformity in French Canada. But much of the union's politics in the fifties came to involve the clash of these opposing expressions of two very different societies and points of view."

1977: 303-304.) As Careless sees it, these conditions brought on renewed clashes.

> And now (1853) a whole series of measures came up, which brought sectarian controversy harshly to the fore. These were bills to charter ecclesiastical corporations in Canada East, where Roman Catholic zeal combined with growing affluence was proliferating new religious foundations, colleges, hospitals and charitable institutions, all under clerical auspices. A homogeneous French Catholic community looked to the church to play a leading role in providing its social institutions. But in the Protestant heterogeneity of the West, secular authority and private philanthropy were expected to furnish hospitals and educational or welfare agencies. Two different cultures clashed in misunderstanding - the "priest-ridden" and the "godless". And Western voluntaryists were perfectly outraged by the state so freely authorizing these sectarian institutions; especially when the government, itself concerned, put through a blanket Ecclesiastical Corporations Bill that was meant to cover the whole multiplicity of religious bodies seeking charters.
>
> (Careless, 1977: 180-181).

These differentiated ideologies and their respective legislations were making it clearer that two distinguishable cultures were emerging. Dualism had emerged in place of the intended assimilation. It was particularly the "contradictory impulses of voluntaryism and Catholic clericalism" (Careless, 1977: 165) that were responsible for straining the young Union. However, threats to the very survival of Canada were appearing on the horizon, external threats that called for united action by the British colonies. In meeting them, the Union's experience with duality played an important role, for this experience anticipated the concept that a plural society under a federal government would give the strength of unification, yet would permit the tolerance and freedom that majority rule would deny (Morton, 1977: 308 & Careless, 1977: 165, 184, 208).

Dualism leads to federalism

In considering the significance of collectivism in the complex development leading up to federation, we will note that the concept of federalism was a logical extension of dualism.

Because dualism in the politically united province had protected their minority rights, the French were inclined to accept federalism, expecting it to do the same. Morton explains that federalism was for the French Canadians an extension of the principle of duality rather than a process of assimilation:

> Scrutinized as they were by their compatriots, the French members of the conference (Quebec in 1864) could accept no plan of union which did not improve as well as maintain the position French nationality had won for itself in the Union. To them, as to their successors, the new union would be in effect and in law a pact between the two peoples and two cultures. They accepted it, they defended it, in

> terms of the "co-ordinate sovereignty of the two Canadian peoples", thus emphasizing the essential element in the proposed scheme of government.
>
> (Morton, 1977: 319).

Significantly, Morton also points out that the general structure and character of the federal proposal was "strictly practical", professing to be neither an advanced principle nor an enshrined ideal.

A number of events interacted with the political philsophy inherent in dualism to effect federalism. Of the events which called for the unification of the colonies, perhaps none were more effective than those related to the threat of the American Civil War and the vagaries of American diplomacy. The aggressive tactics of continentalism and the restless penetrations of the American settlers and traders into what was considered to be British territory all endangered Britain's sovereignty in North America. At this time Canada lost her preferential trading position with Britain and therefore sought trade agreements with the United States. Under conditions of war, though, these were tenuous. Added to this insecurity was the increasing reluctance of the British to supply arms and troops for the defence of a long, ill-defined and exposed border. The Fenian raids particularly underlined Canada's need to unite in the cause of defence. It will be remembered that the majority of *Canadiens*, particularly through the influence of the

Church, had a strong aversion to being absorbed by the United States, either through ideological infiltration or by military means. Hence, the renewed possibility of American aggression influenced their attitude towards the proposed federal scheme. (See McNaught, 1976: 103-117; Morton, 1977: 299-320 & Lower, 1973: 109-116.)

The second event leading to the concept of a new type of federalism was Canada's desperate need for a new constitution to resolve the complications of sectional, religious, and political rivalries, which had resulted in the 1864 deadlock. We will look at one contentious issue, Canada West's clamour for "rep by pop" to replace equal representation of the Act of 1841. Now the population of the West exceeded that of the East and the former still had problems with the weight of the French Canadian bloc. The French Canadians saw that representation by population would threaten the cultural and religious distinctiveness that they had been able to establish. The French Canadians were also threatened by the breakup of Baldwin's Reform Alliance and the rise of the Clear Grits in its place. These were the fervent exponents of voluntaryism and carried the cry of "papal aggression". Under these new threats, the overwhelming majority of French Canadians transferred their political allegiance to the Conservatives of Canada West who were emerging under the leadership of John A. Macdonald. Because the

French Canadians felt that Macdonald understood their Nationalism and because he was opposed to annexation, he was able to form a coalition with George Etienne Cartier, who led the French bloc. As McNaught (1976: 117) observes, "Thus they helped to form Canada's second major political party". The French bloc helped the cause of federalism by giving support to the Macdonald-Cartier coalition as they had given support to the Baldwin-LaFontaine coalition. The cause of federalism was aided by the general dissatisfaction both English and French felt toward the constitution of the union, which, since it did not allow independence in domestic or religious affairs, encouraged sectional rivalries in these particular areas. (See McNaught, 1976: 117-120; Careless, 1977: 173-182; Morton, 1977: 303-325 & Lower, 1973: 111-112.)

The third set of events to consider are those related to the French Canadian concern for survival and the concomitant resistance to assimilation in the new federal proposal. As discussed above, their concern for survival in the face of an American threat influenced the French Canadians to support Cartier, who with his businessman's interest in developing transport-systems across the westward lands, was a fervent advocate of federalism. Because of the French Canadian disposition to give loyal support to their leaders, they did not effectively oppose Cartier's arguments for federalism, even though they were reluctant followers. Cartier firmly believed that survival of the French Canadians could only be assured on the basis of cooperation with the English to foster large commercial and transportation schemes, in return for English support of their politics to preserve their cultural identity. With his campaign of preservation, Cartier gained the support of the Church. He was thus assured of political support for federalism in his calition campaign with MacDonald.

A political philosophy emerged between 1841 and 1867 that gradually brought the floundering colonies "into line with the great movement of the century, unification by commerce, railways and the spirit of nationality" (Morton, 1977: 307). In this new federal union it was recognized that each would lose and each would gain. For Cartier and the *bleus* of Canada East, the loss of equal representation in the House was compensated by secure control over their own cultural rights in their own province. Cartier sought to convince his people that some new framework was needed to preserve French Canadian rights, and the experience of duality within the union of 1841 had demonstrated that this preservation had been possible even with the old union's shortcomings. (See Morton, 1977: 316; Wade, 1968: 315-319 & McNaught, 1976: 122). McNaught concludes his discussion on the cause of federalism with this significant observation:

duality was the practical and attractive alternative to majority rule.

Summary

In the period extending from the Conquest to pre-Confederation, we have analyzed the legislation of important acts as they related to institutional developments to validate to some extent the first and the second hypothesis. The validation of the first hypothesis is indicated by the manifestation of collectivism by the *Canadiens* in their resistance to the assimilation intents of these acts and in their establishing an identity of their own. The intent of British legislation was to assimilate the *Canadiens,* and this intent was particularly threatening in the Proclamation of 1763, and in the Act of Union in 1841. The other acts considered to be important were the Quebec Act of 1774, and the Constitution Act of 1791 although these were not overtly assimilationist. The second hypothesis is validated by an analysis of selected areas of interaction between the French Canadians and the English Canadians, interaction which was the result of the institutional requirements of the Act of Union and the Union period following it.

At the outset of this period, the Church, the most effective collectivizing agent, gained the favour of the authorities in London and in the colony (after the granting of responsible government). Thus it was able to influence the passage of legislation that would further its collectivist causes. The Church exhorted its members to respect and show deference to the legitimate authorities, although they represented an alien culture. However in this same period, when the *Canadiens* were disillusioned and depressed following the Conquest, the Church provided pervasive, yet subtle support for the insipient national movement which was emerging in the resistance to the assimilation intent of 1763. As the Quebec Act was being formulated, this resistance won the *Canadiens* the right to adhere to their different forms of religion and law. Other factors affected the Act so it assumed a finality: the military threat from south of the border, the military disposition of the governors and the appeasement policies of these governors. The Constitution Act, in recognizing the "French fact", divided Canada into two sections. In their own province, (Lower Canada or Canada East), the potential inherent in the incipient national movement took root and became entrenched in the assembly as the "French Party". This group opposed the entrenched English party known as the "Chateau Clique". The mutual antagonism exploded in the rebellions of 1837. At the same time, the force of French nationalism from across the Atlantic was also having its effect on the colony.

Through the Act of Union in 1841 and the subsequent Union period, the English renewed their assimilation efforts, the most overt being the under-representation of the *Canadiens* in the Assembly, the preference for the English in the appointed Councils and the gerrymandering of Sydenham. However, in spite of being disadvantaged, the *Canadiens* gained political strength through their unswerving loyalty to their elected representatives so that they could promote their own causes. The bloc support given to the *Canadien* leaders in the assembly as well as to Baldwin enabled the Reform politicians to bring in the program of responsible government. After the gaining of responsible government the contrasts between the founding groups became more distinct as legislation was now a more obvious manifestation of each group. Historians have noted with interest the differences between the "firm French garrison" and the "contending, shifting divisions" of the English majority (Careless, 1977: 70).

Contrasts can also be drawn between the different types of legislation: in Canada East the legislation maximized the Church's collectivism and further raised suspicions and antagonisms in Canada West. We noted particularly the legislation which gave the Church control over education and welfare in Canada East. On the other hand, legislation in Canada West promoted the policies of the individualistic orientation, namely voluntaryism and Protestant diversity. These conflicting types of legislation encouraged the polarization process and the emerging of a definite dualistic social structure. The emergence of dualism was the harbinger of federalism as the French Canadians, now a minority, realized that under a federal scheme they would have more assurance for establishing their identity than under the rigid implementation of majority rule.

Thus we conclude that the conflict between the cultural orientations of the two founding ethnic groups, as manifested in the patterns of political support and in the different types of legislation, were factors in promoting the process of polarization and the recognition of dualism which then subsequently led to a federated scheme rather than one of assimilation. We have therefore, to some extent, validated the second hypothesis, that the asserted conflict in these selected areas was at least, in part, a result of the differences in their cultural orientations.

CHAPTER VII

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF COLLECTIVISM IN THE PERIOD FROM CONFEDERATION TO THE QUIET REVOLUTION

Introduction

In this chapter we will examine the significance of the collectivist orientation in selected sociopolitical policies, ideologies, and institutional developments in the period from 1867 to 1970.* This period perhaps more than any other illustrates the Christian-Campbell perspective, explained in the introduction, that the European ideological conflict** extended across the Atlantic to effect sociopolitical changes in the colonies. In this period the European ideologies were reflected in strong imperialistic groups, each making a claim of superiority over the other. Roman Catholic imperialism spoke for the superiority of a consensual type of religion, and the "new imperailism" of "Anglo-Saxonism"* spoke for the superiority of its members, who as aggressive individuals had gained world recognition in industrial and scientific advancement. The mutual antagonism of these two groups added fresh fuel to the smouldering in-group out-group conflict** and the perceived threat that each ethnic group presented to the other.

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* The cut-off date is 1970, before the October crisis, for in the words of Andre Laroque (1973: 80) "the decade of 1960-1970 was marked by feverish development in the province of Quebec which became, in common parlance, the state of Quebec".

** Of the resources used in this chapter, A.I. Silver (1975, 1976), David Cameron (1974), and Brown/Cook (1974) particularly point to the significance of conflicting ideologies. The findings in the latter book strengthen the contention introduced by Ramsay Cook in his earlier work (1969: 147), where he finds that in the period after the Conquest it was "this basic difference in public philosophy that divided French And English Canadians". Hence, this chapter will study ideologies as well as policies and legislation.

With our focus on the events in Quebec, we will be analyzing the reaction of the Church and then of the nationalistic movements to this perceived threat. In brief, we will examine the Church's phenomenal rise to dominance, the socioeconomic factors which permitted this rise, and the ideologies of ultramontanism which held that the Church should dominate the state. The Church then through its messianic nationalism could legitimately reduce the power of the secular state and so preserve the community from the detrimental effects of the secularism and individualism of Anglo-Saxonism. The Church was able to hold its dominant position until the combined effects of the wane of Roman imperialism and the influx of private capitalism broke down its centralizing control. With the influx of this capitalism the Church adhered to its tradition and urged the French Canadians to be deferential toward their new leaders, even if they represented an alien economic system, but it continued to be opposed to the ideologies of Anglo-Saxonism. However, the growth of the nationalistic movements exposed this ambiguous position and in the ensuing criticism, the Church's collectivistic ideologies were translated into political policies and campaigns, which in the hands of an active, dominant state were used to implement reform.

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* As used by Brown and Cook (1974: 27), the terms "new imperialism" or "Anglo-Saxonism", will refer to the claims of ethnic superiority celebrated wherever the adherents of that belief lived, that is, in the British Isles, the United States, or Canada. Henceforth, the terms, "British", "English", "American", or "English-Canadian" will refer to those particular political units.

** This term is used in Hiller's conflict model (Chapter II), to explain a specific dimension of ethnic antagonism.

The nationalistic movements bridged these periods of dominance, first under the aegis of the Church, then of the state. We will not attempt to analyze the complexities of these movements but will rather abstract for analysis the common factor - the collectivist orientation. Collectivism was particularly significant in the movements related to the expansion of Roman Catholic authority, namely the ultramontane beliefs, and in the expansion of the authority of the state of Quebec. Statism in Quebec went beyond the usual responsibilities of positive government in promoting the welfare of its citizens; it also promoted their language and cultural rights. Hence, the term *etatisme* will be used to designate the particular form of statism developed in Quebec.

To deal with the complexity of the historical events of this period, we will organize the chapter under the headings: "The Role of the Church in Influencing the Collectivistic Orientation"; "The Significance of the Collectivist Orientation in the Nationalist Movements"; and "The Significance of the Collectivist Orientation in the Quiet Revolution". Because the leaders in the Church were often also the leaders of nationalistic movements, it is difficult to categorize them under the headings of Church or State, but they will be discussed under the heading which appears to be most appropriate.

Before proceeding with the historical analysis of this period, we will define our use of "nationalism". We introduced the concept as the "incipient nationalism" of the pre-confederation period, but it was after 1867 that nationalism became a significant factor. Following a lengthy discourse on the historical and theoretical issues relating to nationalism, David Cameron (1974: 11-81) defines nationalism as follows:

> Indeed, what can be said with confidence is that as a doctrine nationalism must set national liberation above personal liberation as a value. It may be argued (and often is) that the freeing of the nation or the possession by the nation of sovereign powers for itself may be more conducive to individual welfare and liberty than any other

> arrangement. But for a nationalist this must be a statement which, however important, is logically subordinate to the primary issue, which is the welfare and liberty of the nation; whereas for a liberal democrat this statement, if he believes it, will provide him with reason for combining with nationalists because of his assumption that the advance of nationalist goals will further what is for him the primary issue, the struggle of the individual for freedom.
>
> (Cameron, 1974: 68).

Cameron stresses the privacy of the collectivist orientation in nationalism, where the needs of the individual are subordinated to the good of the whole. Focusing on the "Quebec Question" he points out that the suppression of dormant political rights and the demands of a historic community to possess its own state promote collectivism and nationalism in various forms (Cameron, 1974: 67-80, 107-123). It is on this basis that Cameron distinguishes between regional sentiment, patriotism, and nationalism such as that which has emerged in Quebec.

The Role of the Church in Influencing the Collectivist Orientation

The Church, and its type of nationalism, known variously as messianic, ultramontane, and imperialist, was the chief agent of collectivism in the period following Confederation. We will first look at the factors that permitted the Church to maximize its influence and then, at its collectivistic ideologies and policies, which laid the foundation for the introduction of positive government.

Factors permitting the Church to expand her area of influence

Because this thesis focuses on the cultural component as a factor in causing change, the tendency is to ignore the non-cultural factors which worked hand in hand with the cultural to cause change. To counteract this tendency we will at the outset of this section draw attention to non-cultural factors, such as the socio-economic conditions in Quebec, the American military threat and the centralism of the B.N.A. Act before looking at the ideology of ultramontanism.

The socioeconomic conditions in Quebec

Before Quebec entered into Confederation, where centralism became a *fait accompli*, the provincial government was weakened by serious economic ills. There was a poor harvest and uncertainty in the foreign market situation. As well, a growing metropolitan struggle between the two major cities left Quebec City peripheral to the economic centre of Montreal. Related to the growing strength of Montreal was the fact that its leading entrepreneurs, like the Molsons, Redpaths, and Ogilvies, were caught up in capitalistic expansion and cared little about the country's constitutional problems. Instead, they sought to strengthen their hold on the Quebec economy and subsequently entrenched the Anglo-Saxon capitalist perspective. The net effect of these conditions was for Quebec to accept the proposals for Confederation as offering hope to the economic ills and as satisfying the thirst for economic expansion. (See B. Young, 1978: 97, & J.C. Bonenfant, 1967: 11.)

Secondly, religious divisions frustrated political leadership. At this time, ultramontanism was gaining a foothold and making its bid for the allegiance of French Canadians. The clergy threw their weight behind this zealous movement and, particularly frustrating for politicians, they were active interventionists in the ultramontane cause. Cartier, for example, suffered from this religious strife when he was defeated in 1872. He had supported the moderate Sulpicians, whereas the bishops intervened on behalf of the ultramontane Jesuits. By diverting electoral votes, they helped cause his defeat. (See B. Young, 1978: 98.)

Throughout this period and until the election of 1896, this intervention was executed as a given right; it was readily accepted by the electorate and was carried on in a most blatant manner. The net effect was to frustrate and further weaken political leadership. (See A. Siegfried, 1966: 42-44.)

The American threat

Perhaps the most influential factor in subordinating the province to the central government was the threat of American annexation, a threat that justified Macdonald's heavy-handed centralism. According to Edwin Black (1975: 5, 28), Confederation was born of a pragmatic concern for survival in the face of an aggressive, turbulent, and disorderly American frontier. Most of the leaders of these fledgling colonies agreed that Confederation was essentially an "un-American activity". In brief, survival took precedence over arguments concerning the precise nature of the proposed constitution. In the interim period between the Quebec Resolutions and the final draft of the B.N.A. Act, no rival schemes were brought forward. In fact, Macdonald was the only one of the ministers of these colonies who "seemed to have a truly architectonic view of the entire structure" (Black, 1975: 28). The Quebec Resolutions were treated not as debates of rival interpretations but as negotiations on legislative detail and financial settlements. The French Canadian ministers in the existing Canadian government judged that their presence in a federal cabinet was guarantee sufficient to resolve any difficulty that might involve the rights of Quebec (P.B. Waite , 1977: 146-147). This judgment was based upon the precedent of good-will and co-operation set by the Baldwin-Lafontaine ministry of the Union

Government. The lively opposition from the Rouge minority was gradually submerged by the united support of the Cartier ministry and the Catholic hierarchy, as we will show below. America, not English Canada, was the perceived threat.

The threat of American annexation was influential in attracting the support of the Catholic clergy, who saw America as immoral and anarchical. However, evidence seems to indicate that they refused to commit themselves publicly until after the proposals had been adopted by the British parliament. Then, true to their propensity to support legitimate authorities, they published pastoral letters in which they left their congregations little liberty to vote against the constitution. As Bonenfant (1967: 15) concludes, the acceptance of the B.N.A. constitution was the alternative to the "morbid fear of annexation to the United States".

Since the officials in the Cartier ministry and those in the Church were united in their aversions to the revolutionary and republican characteristics of both the United States and of modern France, the weight of their influence was decisive. The Conservatives made use of this aversion in the Catholic hierarchy to strengthen their cause. When they presented to the public the argument that the proposed federation would be better than annexation to what was regarded as the most immoral of modern nations, they won over even a modest support from the Rouge minority, which had been objecting to the centralism of the proposals. With hindsight we can perceive the import of these protests, though at the time they carried little weight and were swept away by the growing aversion to Americanism. (See B. Young, 1978: 100-102; Bonenfant, 1967: 4-16 & 1973: 53-54; J. Hamelin, 1967: 4; & Y. Roby, 1967: 3-20.)

The centralism of the B.N.A. Act

Rather than elaborate on the full terms of the B.N.A. Act, we will quote from Edwin Black, whose concern is to show that the terms were designed to implement Macdonald's interest in centralism and a very definite subordination of the provinces.

> The British North America Act, 1867, provided precise controls to assure dominance by the centre. It granted to the provinces only those powers which were considered to be of local concern while the federal authority was vested with control even over matters such as criminal law, marriage, and divorce, which had been reserved to the states in the American union. All unassigned legislative powers went to the central government whose executive was authorized to disallow any new act of the provincial legislature. The lieutenant=governor was a federal officer, expected to follow the federal cabinet's direction. Appointments to all important judicial posts in the provinces were put in federal hands. The most important concerns left to the provinces were those relating to education and local

> government, and these did not bulk nearly so large in public attention as they do today.
>
> Sections 58, 59 and 90 of the Act specify the manner of central supervision of the provisions, and sec. 95 provides for federal law to prevail over provincial in the (then) two concurrent fields of jurisdiction. Section 91 gave the central government authority "to make laws for the Peace, order and good government of Canada," in respect of all matters not assigned exclusively to the provinces.
>
> (Edwin Black, 1975: 33).

Black (1975: 33-34) explains further how devices were designed and implemented that ensured that the authority of the central government could be expanded rather than diminshed. He points to the centralist interpretation given to Section 91 that the central government could "make laws" for the "peace order and good government of Canada" and to Section 93, which restricted provincial freedom in education giving the federal government ultimate authority in matters affecting aggrieved religious minorities. Black also points to the provisions making federal subsidies the main source of provincial revenues, thus increasing provincial dependence. Moreover, the Supreme Court, with its federally-appointed personnel, was also centralist.

The execution of centralism

Brian Young (1978: 101-108), D.J. Hall (1974: 38), and Edwin Black (1975: 35-39) all contend that Macdonald effectively sought to dominate Quebec through the use of the B.N.A. provisions and also through devising new policies. He never permitted Quebec to be an exception to his concept of restricted provincial autonomy and he did little to foster a bilingual and bicultural Canada. To take one example, Macdonald never gave a French Canadian colleague an important protfolio, and rebuked the Quebec premier when he protested. Moreover, when dual representation was the practice, that is, when a minister could represent both federal and provincial constitutents, he was obliged to concentrate his energies on the federal cause. This policy affected both the Quebec and federal ministers.

In time, however, this relationship of dominance and subordination was challenged by various Quebec premiers. When Premier Honore Mercier took office in 1887, Quebec politicians gradually began pressing for provincial rights. Until then provincial subordination was accepted. But as Young (1978: 108) concludes, politicians may only have been accepting the reality of Quebec's socioeconomic condition, as outlined above.

Dominance in the economic areas was far more threatening for it was more subtle and pervasive. Clippingdale

(1973: xv) shows that a pattern of economic dominance "was one of the key elements in the Confederation scheme of things". He goes on to explain that Cartier's Bleus represented, among other things, an alliance between the French Canadian political elite and the entrepreneurs, financiers, and capitalists, who were mainly Anglo-Saxon. With the long, Liberal regime under Laurier, this alliance was solidified. This regime learned to co-exist very comfortably with the increasingly dominant Anglo-Saxon capitalists. Though some nationalists protested, as we shall see, the combined weight of the social and political leaders, including Cartier's "French Canadian lieutenants" and the Catholic hierarchy, rendered these protests ineffectual. (See also B. Young, 1978: 101-108.)

This note on economic dominance brings us into the twentieth century. An analysis of the execution of centralism and the mounting provincial resistance reveals the many complicated aspects of successive crises in Canada (Black, 1975: 39-61). Black points to the problems involved in wartime centralism, particularly the conscription crisis of World War I in Quebec. But Ottawa also implemented centralism to combat the depression of the thirties, resulting in renewed French Canadian resistance at this time. But these federal/provincial crises are not particularly relevant to the topic at hand, for it was the reduction of the provincial government authorities at the time of Confederation which permitted the well organized Church to move in and rule, as it were, by default.

Ultramontanism and the subservient state

The authority of the provincial government was being further reduced within the borders of Quebec by the Church. The ultramontane zealots took advantage of the weakened state and so promoted the Roman Catholic ideal of state subservience to the Church.

Some recent historians contend that this struggle between Church and state was one of the primary issues for Quebec politicians in this period (Clippingdale, 1973: xiii & B. Neatby, 1973: 13-36). They say that both this and the Riel issue can be held responsible for the emerging of a solid Liberal party in Quebec. The moderate Conservatives, such as "the school of Cartier", left the Conservative party to join Laurier's Liberals in order to escape from the ultramontane Castor wing of the Conservative party. But though the Church was weakened by this political setback, it continued maximizing its control wherever possible (Postgate-McRoberts, 1976: 22, 27, 52-57).

We will refer to two sources to define the extent of this control. Posgate and McRoberts (1976: 23) hold that "by the latter half of the century the Church was powerful enough to have these views [of the ultramontane faction] influence the general course of French Canadian affairs". The Church was able to maintain a position of dominance until the Quiet Revolution and the development of statism (Posgate-McRoberts, 1976: 52-57). Falardeau (1965: 357), writing in 1952, was aware of the dawning of statism, but he finds that the Church was still the "main structure of society, defining the broad outlines of its ways of life and of its thinking". The Church used a number of administrative methods to maximize its control and thereby to entrench collectivism.

The social organization of the Church for instance, was centralized and collectivistic, efficiently controlled from the top to the bottom, from the bishop down to the cure in the parish. The bishop had no interference in his authority to appoint cures, to create or delimit dioceses, to decide on educational matters, and to intervene in political affairs. As we noted above, the Church regarded political intervention as its right. Only in certain cases, when intervention would arouse political opposition or when it took the form of excommincation, could the civil authority annul an election. Otherwise the Church exercised its authority, uncontested by any interference from without or within. Even though administrative and canonical disputes existed, the hierarchy presented a united front in its expansion programs and policies (Siegfried, 1968: 21-24).

The Church was most eager to expand into the area of education at the expense of the state, for it saw itself as the preserver of the true faith in the new world, and thus fervently sought to protect the youth from any disturbing influences. Siegfried explains the methods devised by the Church to control the education system:

> The functions of the central power (of the Church) under these conditions are sufficiently circumscribed. The entire administrative part is under the control of the Department of Public Instruction, headed not by a responsible minister, but by a high permanent official, safeguarded from political influences, who is described as the Superintendent. On the other hand, side by side with the Department, or perhaps it would be more accurate to say above it, is the Superior Council of Public Instruction. Its president *ex officio* is the Superintendent, and his decisions have to be approved by a member of the cabinet, who in this instance is the Provincial Secretary or Minister of Interior. The Council is essentially denominational in its composition; . . . It is easily seen that by this system the Provincial Secretary is made to hold an insignificant place, while the Department is deliberately subordinated to the hegemony of the Superior Council of Public Instruction, in which - at least as far as the Catholics are concerned - the bishops predominate without effort.
>
> (A. Siegfried, 1968: 62-63).

Control over education included higher education. To be specific, the only state participation until the 1960's was the establishment of McGill in 1821, a polytechnical school in Montreal and a school of arts and crafts in Quebec City, both founded in the 1870's; and Montreal's *Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commercial,* founded in 1910 (Posgate/McRoberts, 1976: 22 & 28 & Careless, 1977: 35).

Other methods used to maximize control were strict censorship and isolation from foreign influences. An "Index" was set up with a list of prohibited books both scientific and literary. The application of this "Index" extended even beyond schools and influenced the sale of books in "respectable" stores. So successful were they in their drive that they were able to suppress the *Institut Canadien,* founded in 1849 for the discussion and exchange of these ideas. In 1869 the *Institut* was forced to close its doors, after receiving a fresh condemnation from the Pope. The Church was as effective in suppressing the *Institut* as it was in suppressing newspapers that were too critical of the Church. Siegfried (1968: 42) concludes that these episodes show the immense authority wielded by the Church when there was no effective opposition voice to resist or modify its will. (See also Siegfried, 1968: 19-84 & Posgate/McRoberts, 1976: 21-23, 28.)

The collectivist orientation of the Church's ideology

Influence of the European ideological conflict

When we look at the extension of the European ideological conflict in the colonies, we see that at the end of the nineteenth century this conflict was so intense it became militant at times. At this time, a new age of imperialism was reaching full flood with its "spirit of Anglo-Saxon superiority and mission" (Brown and Cook, 1974: 26-27). The effects of the "psychology of imperialism" were felt in Canada, where the alleged superiority of "Anglo-Saxonism" was often used as justification for the way people of other nationalities were treated. Perhaps the most obvious case in point is the treatment of French Canadians by the Borden administration in the Conscription Crisis of 1914-18. However, the effects which we will be analyzing will be related to the development of policies that were extremely collectivist in reaction to the perceived threat of Anglo-Saxon imperialism. With Brown and Cook (1974: 26) we hold that "the new imperial spirit could be linked with the cause of social change".

A.I. Silver (1975: viii-x & 1976: 440-460) studies the effect of Roman Catholic imperialism in the same period. Silver (1976: 459) suggests that the French and the English in Canada had different approaches to foreign affairs as each ethnic group identified with the imperialism of the respective mother country. Furthermore, Silver (1975: vii-ix) questions the isolationist view that has commonly been used to explain French Canada's reluctance to participate in the Boer War and in the War of 1914-18. He noted that French Canadians participated actively in the causes of Roman imperialism, for instance, in Mexico and in Italy in the 1860-1870's.* Between 1867 and 1870 French Canadians sent troops and supplies to support Napoleon's defence of the Papacy against Italian nationalists. Napoleon III intervened against these nationalists (led by Garibaldi), returned the lost seat to the Pope, and then kept a standing force in Rome which appeased the conservative Catholic opinion in France. But the opposing imperialism of the "English and the liberal world" would have papal power reduced and therefore saw Garibaldi as a hero. (Silver notes that British Columbia named a park in his honour.)

Similarly, the French Canadian intervention in Mexico was in keeping with their taking up the causes of Roman Catholic imperialism. Silver relates this intervention to the Church's opposition to the causes of individualism:

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* In fairness to the French Canadian participation in Roman Catholic imperialism, Silver (1976: 442) notes that the energies of their drive were also directed to the conversion of the "infidels" such as in Africa. Therefore, the French Canadians occasionally took up the causes of the English forces in these African battles.

> The Mexican affair was highly symbolic. Behind Maximilian and Juarez* were the real protagonists: on the one hand, Napoleonic France, eldest daughter of the Church, champion of order and the conservative principles that held society together; on the other hand, the United States, mother of revolutions, embodiment of republicanism, secularism and conscienceless individualism. Now that the empire had fallen, predicted *Le Journal des Trois-Rivieres*, foreseeing Maximilian's death before a revolutionary firing squad, Mexico would 'fall once more into its old state of anarchy and troubles under the government of Juarez'. And standing by to pick up the pieces were the United States, ready to exploit the situation to their own advantage.
>
> (Silver, 1975: viii).

Having looked at the intensity of this ideological conflict, its extreme positions, and its effect on Canadian ethnic relations, we now analyze its effect on the formulation of sociopolitical policies in Quebec.

Influence of the extreme type of Roman Catholic collectivism on the sociopolitical policies in Quebec

Catholic thinkers at the turn of the century held the political view that there should be no separation of church and state, nor any other deviance from the monolithic rule of the Church - an excessively collectivist position.

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* Maximilian was the Austrian Archduke, battling against the anti-clerical government of the revolutionary armies led by Juarez. Napoleon had intervened on behalf of the Catholic cause and had appealed for help in the "restoration of religion and order, of government based on Christian principles (Silver, 1975: vi).

> Catholicism was not just a Sunday mass but a way of life, a divinely revealed philosophy of the Good, the Just and the moral ordering of society. . . . society was not just a collection of individual people, each pursuing his own welfare, but an organic whole, consisting of classes or communities, each with its own function and position, and working toward a common Good established by God and interpreted by religion. It followed that all social, and even political, questions must be settled by religious principles.
>
> (Silver, 1975: xvii).

Consequently, mainstream Catholicism supported policies of censorship and islationism, for all influences that would question or disturb this monolithic rule had to be kept out. Furthermore, this type of Catholicism saw Quebec as the homeland of the pure faith, uncontaminated by revolutionary, republican or secular ideas, to be isolated and preserved from any form of Anglo-Saxonism by policies of messianic nationalism and ultramontanism - the extreme forms of Roman collectivism.

The sociopolitical policies of the zealot, Jules-Paul Tardivel, were particularly influential, from the founding of his weekly, *La Verite,* in 1881 to his death in 1905. Perhaps his novel, *Pour la Patrie* is the most concrete expression of his policies. His works were widely read in the colleges and schools, and by the clergy, and were disseminated into the Roman sphere of influence outside of Quebec. The consensus of historians is that his ideological position was consistent with the mainstream of Quebec thought, except for his radical ideas on Satanism and his premature concept of separatism. (See Brown and Cook, 1974: 131; Silver, 1975: xxxvi & Mackirdy-Moir-Zoltvany, 1971: 268.)

Opposition to individualism in economics

The strongest opposition to an aggressive pursuit of personal wealth appears to have developed in the Church and with such individuals as Tardivel. We will first look at the sermon delivered by Monseignor L.A. Paquet in 1902 on the topic of the vocation of the French Canadians. We note that the monseignor is not against the accumulation of wealth when it strengthens collectivist causes, but he rails against individual acquisition when it is used to "multiply the base pleasures of the senses." (quoted in R. Cook, 1969: 158). With dramatic eloquence he encourages French Canadians to leave to others the "kind of feverish mercantilism and vulgar bestiality that rivets them to material things" (158). The mission of French Canadians is rather to "preserve and consolidate moral unity" through "complete submission" to the teachings of the Church and the authority of its leaders (159).

A similar type of antagonism toward economic individualism is expressed by Tardivel. In 1902, he stated:

> It is not necessary for us to possess industry and money. We would no longer be French Canadians but Americans like to others. Our mission is to possess the earth and to spread ideas. To cling to the soil, to raise large families, to maintain the hearths of spiritual and intellectual life, that must be our role in America.
>
> (as quoted in Brown-Cook, 1974: 131).

A more moderate voice of resistance found in government, was that of Henri Bourassa (1902):

> The French Canadian's ambition . . . does not sway him to huge financial operations. Rather given to liberal professions, to agricultural life, or to local mercantile and industrial pursuits, he is more easily satisfied than the English-speaking Canadian with a moderate return for his word and efforts. He has kept out of the frantic display of financial energy, of the feverish concentration of capital, of the international competition of industry, which have drawn this English-speaking fellow citizens to huge combinations of wealth or trade.
>
> (quoted in Brown-Cook, 1974: 131).

When we look at the exhortations of the Church and the politicians, we find they did not in general prohibit the teachings of commercial and technological subjects, but they idealized the collectivist professions - "the ideals of national service exemplified by priests, writers and politicians who had struggled for the preservation of

French Canada" (Brown and Cook, 1974: 132). Such an ideal "provided little place for the successful entrepreneur who was more naturally part of the alien English culture" (Brown and Cook, 1974: 132).

However, at the turn of the century there is on record one expression of regret about these idealistic policies, that of the economist, Errol Bouchette (R. Cook, 1969: 161-181). But his encouragement to the French Canadians to find a place for themselves in the new industrial world did not get much of a hearing. It is said of Bouchette that "he was a forerunner and a preacher; and he preached in the desert" (A. Faucher, 1966: 83). We can assume that the influence of the Church and like-minded politicians was decisive.

When we look at the colonizing policies which represent the grass-roots level of ideology, we see the pervasive influence of this extreme type of collectivism. Silver points specifically to the differentials of collectivism and individualism in the colonizing policies:

> This vision was inconsistent both with the habits of French-Canadian farmers and with the ideas of the French-Canadian elite. The eagerness of the individual farmer to make changes, to move, to pit himself against new conditions, which was assumed by promoters of western settlement, was perhaps not to be expected among Quebec farmers, whose agriculture was noted for its routine,

> its resistance to innovation . . . . But the intellectuals could not feel comfortable with English-Canadian expansionism. Aside from the fact that their view of Quebec itself as the French-Canadian country made emigration to the West seem a move into exile, their ideological dispositions led them to see in the English-Canadian enthusiasm an unhealthy obsession with growth, movement, expansion; . . . . Considering that the great advantage of agriculture was a certain moral relationship between man and his environment and not a winning of riches by the mastering of it, French-Canadian colonizers sought to use settlement to build that relationship - a Catholic, conservative, and romantic relationship - rather than to promote individualistic material progress. Would-be settlers seeking a fast fortune were discouraged. The ideal settlers were sober, had no debts, and possessed certificates of honesty and good conduct. Families rather than single men were wanted, and a certain amount of capital was thought necessary to begin with. Paternalistic colonizers discouraged hundreds of thousands of people they thought unlikely to succeed. They did not seem to agree that any man with 'brawny arms and a brave heart' could be left to succeed on his own initiative.
>
> (Silver, 1976: 451).

Extrapolating from Silver, we can say that the French-Canadian energy for expansion was devoted to collectivist causes, for the community rather than for the individual. The structures of community, such as the Church and the family, should be established before the colonizer would feel secure. This difference in colonizing policies was a factor in preventing French-Canadians from any significant expansion into Canada's West, a fact which reinforced Quebec's isolationism as the only French homeland in Canada. But these colonizing policies were only one way of encouraging isolationism to preserve the French-Canadian identity from the threat of Anglo-Saxonism.

Policies to isolate and to preserve the French Canadian identity

In seeking to isolate and to preserve the French Canadian community, the Church at the turn of the century and in the beginning of the twentieth found itself in an ambiguous position. While it preached the virtue of obedience to the legitimate authorities, including the Anglo-Saxon capitalists and those who collaborated with them who were now making their advances into the Quebec economy at the invitation of the Quebec ministers in the government, it simultaneously opposed the ideology of capitalism. Fernand Dumont expresses this paradox succinctly:

> Catholicism used to play the part of framework in our social tradition. It acted also, in a profoundly ambiguous way, as the base for criticism of capitalist society and also as the justification for our submission to its imperatives.
>
> (F. Dumont, 1974: 86).

Because the church was in an uncomfortable, ambiguous position, seeking to shield its members from the impact of imported capitalism and shunning the social problems created by this capitalism, it developed policies that would promote isolation and preserve the French Canadian identity. The Church diverted attention away from the social problems by idealizing rural and village parish life, perhaps believing that the trend toward industrialization could be reversed (Herbert Quinn, 1963: 55). For the Church was uncomfortable with the disturbing effects of industrialization: private capitalism, and attendant changes in urbanization, secularization, and technology.

Negation of these processes was part of the overall strategy to isolate French Canada from Anglo-Saxon influences and so preserve the distinctiveness of French Canada. Richard Jones uses the Tremblay Commission to make this point:

> One means of protecting this culture was adamant opposition to English and Protestant influences. And so the Catholic and Protestant social orders were contrasted to provide grounds for a rational basis for criticism. Catholic society, according to the Tremblay Commissions's statement, "is arranged according to an organic method, founded on the dignity of the person and tending towards the common good, that is, the accomplishment according to their hierarchical order of all the goods necessary to the fulfillment of the human, natural and

> supernatural vocation. Liberty defines itself with respect to this order." Protestantism, on the other hand, holds liberty to be pre-eminent, and "the best order is that which arises spontaneously according to the circumstances under which liberty is exercised. That is, in short, the social peace necessary for the common prosperity, and which should be assured through a minimum of restrictions on personal liberty. This liberty is defined with respect to the individual..." Here, then, were two significantly different conceptions of the social order. To some, it was not only a matter of differences, but of "inferior" and "superior" systems. This left only one conclusion possible. Since Anglo-Protestant influences were "deleterious and assimilative", and since these influences were incorporated into British political and economic institutions, then all these institutions had to be opposed because of their doctrinal and psychological inspiration. The acceptance of anything foreign, regardless of its intrinsic merit, could only undermine the autonomy of French-Canadian life. There was no choice, if the community wished to save its identity, other than the least possible accomodation to the imposed regime. Through isolation within Confederation, an attempt could be made "to organize a collective life independently in all sectors according to the demands of their philosophy of the higher life and of their transcending national interests"
>
> (R. Jones, 1972: 47).

In the terms of this thesis, the characteristics of the French Canadian collectivistic orientation were emphasized in order to differentiate them from the characteristics of Anglo-Saxon individualism.

French Canadian antagonism toward industrialization also developed because industry was under Anglo-Saxon control. Brown and Cook (1974: 130-133) point out that French Canadians, in general, lacked access to pools of capital. Anglo-Saxons owned the major financial institutions and even French Canadian investors often favoured keeping their investments in the more affluent investment institutions. As these historians also note, a tendency to leave business matters to Anglo-Saxon controlled institutions was deeply ingrained in the thinking of French Canadians, and these divisions were compounded by the ghettorizing of the two languages:

> It was not merely that the entrepreneurial impulse developed out of a more pragmatic educational philosophy than the Quebec educational system's. It was also that the commanding heights of the Quebec economy were increasingly occupied by Anglo-Saxons. This meant a language barrier had been raised that the French Canadian found difficult to cross. He had no desire to abandon the language which he knew was the key to cultural survival while the English-Canadian entrepreneurs showed little willingness to accomodate their economic system to the language of the French-speaking majority in Quebec. All these factors, then, help to explain the English dominance of the industrial revolution that was taking off in Quebec at the turn of the century.
>
> Brown-Cook, 1974: 133).

The new collectivist approach

In the early thirties, a change in the position of the Quebec hierarchy took place which subsequently led to collectivist programs.

According to Quinn (1974: 54, 72) an immediate cause for change was the Depression which brought about sharp questioning of the virtues of the capitalist system. Hence, Ottawa began a promotion of policies and programs that would provide for remedial measures. But behind this promotion was the sanctioning of socialist reforms through papal encyclicals (Quinn, 1974: 54-72). The encyclical, *Quadragesimo Anno,* issued in 1931, reinforced and clarified the *Rerum Novarum* of 1891 which had denounced Marxist militant socialism. The encyclical of 1931 was stronger in its rejection of laissez-faire capitalism as well as Marxist socialism, but moved away from the extreme position of denouncing *all* types of socialism; it now advocated a democratic socialism, that is, state intervention to promote the general well being of the nation and to protect the underprivileged classes against exploitation by the rich and powerful classes. It is noteworthy that opposition had grown to economic liberalism and its justification of great differences in income distribution. Quinn notes the Pope's strong critique of capitalism:

> The Pope's critique of capitalism was expressed in statements such as this: "... the immense number of propertyless wage earners on the one hand, and the superabundant riches of the fortunate few on the other, is an unanswerable argument that the earthly goods so abundantly produced in this age of industrialism are far from rightly distributed and equitably shared among the various classes of men." As a remedy for this situation, he called for a redistribution of private property.
>
> (Quinn, 1974: 56).

In Quebec, opposition was manifested in the formation of the *Ecole Sociale Populaire*, sponsored by the Jesuit Order. The Jesuits did not themselves draw up the proposed program but called together a group of prominent laymen from all areas of French Canadian life to do so. The specific purpose of this organization was to outline a set of proposals for concrete application of the papal encyclicals (Quinn, 1974: 57). Its intense antagonism toward capitalism's unbridled individualism is evident in the proclamation of a co-founder, that the "Catholic concept of the social problem" had an answer to the "materialistic and utilitarian concepts" which if left unchecked would "legalize self interest, unbridle all appetites, deliver the weak to the exploitation of the strong and lead this society into the worst disasters" (Mackirdy, Moir, Zoltvany, 1971: 338). In his full statement, this co-founder calls for state intervention to mitigate the self-serving business practices of the wealthy class, to act as a levelling agent in society, and to protect the financially weaker groups against "unscrupulous exploitation" by this wealthy class. But the State was not to engage in excessive centralization and control; it had to encourage private initiative at the same time (Mackirdy, Moir, Zoltvany, 1971: 338).

We now come to the immediate background for the politicization of the Church's collectivist reform programs. The agents of this politicization were the various types of nationalism of the political parties, the first being that of the Union Nationale. Though there were earlier nationalistic movements, these had looked away from economic conditions and had instead given allegiance to a Church that dominated the state. But in the twentieth century, nationalism set Quebec on the road toward the Quiet Revolution and the new view of the state as an aggressive intervener.

The Significance of the Collectivistic Orientation in the Nationalistic Movements

We will now examine some complex forms of nationalism and will attempt to simplify them somewhat by analyzing them from the collectivist perspective. Nationalism will be studied as a manifestation of the collectivist orientation of the Church, though conformity in time gave way to variation. As A.I. Silver (1976: 459) states, "French Canadian nationalism itself can be seen as a secularized version of French Canadian Catholicism." The socialization process of subordinating the individual to the collectivized authority was still in effect. We will look first at messianic nationalism then at the economic nationalism of the Quiet Revolution.

Messianic nationalism

Messianic nationalism was an extension of Roman Catholic imperialism. When it was adopted by the entrenched Church in Quebec, it became a significant influence in the development of sociopolitical policies. After Confederation, there was a renewed defence of French and Catholic causes, for now this ethnic group saw itself more acutely as a minority. The minority status of French Canadians was worse in the federation of 1867 than in the Union Government of 1841, which had functioned as a type of federation and had therefore set a precedent. But now the Anglo-Saxons were increasingly disdainful of the French Canadians, displaying the racist overtones of their imperialism. (See Silver, 1975: vi-xiii; Brown and Cook, 1974: 26-27 & Posgate and McRoberts, 1976: 23.)

The incidents that followed Confederation strengthened the defensive policies of French Canada. The execution of Louis Riel, for instance, was seen as evidence of the denial of French rights outside Quebec. Further evidence was found in the school questions in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and Ontario, which involved a denial of separate school rights in some cases and discrimination against French as a language of instruction in others. Later the conscription crisis of World War I gave more evidence of Anglo-Saxon imperialist ambitions. In the Union Government of 1917 it seemed that English Canada had conspired to force the sons of French Canadians to fight for the Anglo-Saxon imperialist causes.

These successive crises caused French Canada to take a closer look at the implications of Confederation and to formulate policies to protect their rights and resist assimilation. We will restrict our examination of nationalism as an agent of collectivism somewhat and will not examine all the complexities of provincial/federal constitutional problems, but rather will concern ourselves with the policies of nationalism directed to protectionist causes. These policies were evidently collectivist in philosophy, for they were primarily concerned with (1) preserving traditional institutions, such as the rural parish and the family, as a bulwark against assimilation pressures; (2) preventing the rise of the secular state, for it was of foreign origin and had been associated with revolutionary activity; (3) amplifying the prestige and authority of the Church; (4) promoting agriculture as the ideal economic base, and (5) negating industry. Though some disagreed with these policies, their views did not prevail against those of the exponents of messianic nationalism. (See Brown and Cook, 1974: 127-143; Silver, 1975, vi-xiii & Mackirdy, Moir & Zoltvany, 1971: 264-282.)

The main exponent of messianic nationalism in the political area was Henri Bourassa, who strengthened the religious emphasis of Tardivel, analyzed above. At the outset of his political career, Bourassa's type of nationalism was pan-Canadian, but with mounting ethnic tensions his nationalism came to approach the narrow, clerical type of Tardivel and the ultramontanes. Bourassa at first lent support to the pan-Canadian nationalism of Honore Mercier, premier of Quebec from 1887 to 1891 and the first of the prominent nationalists in French Canadian politics. Then later, Bourassa not only withdrew support from Wilfred Laurier's pan-Canadian nationalism, but he worked against his position in federal politics, undermined his base in Quebec and helped to defeat him in his struggle against Robert Borden, the fervent Anglo-Saxonist.

In Quebec, Bourassa stood out as the most prominent of the nationalists, for he came to be the popular independent Member of Parliament who had broken with Laurier over the issue of Canadian participation in the Boer War. He was also taken to be the leader of the most impressive of the nationalistic groups, *La Ligue Nationaliste Canadienne* founded in 1903. Then he established the widely read *Le Devoir* in 1910 to oppose Laurier's policies. In accord with the narrowing of his nationalism, Bourassa also withdrew support from the policies of *La Ligue,* which advocated protection of French Canadians both inside and outside of Quebec, as well as the promotion of Canadian autonomy in the British Empire. Gradually Bourassa and his followers, who for the most part came from the classically educated middle class professionals, became convinced that federal politics with their pan-Canadian concerns drew their energies away from the real interests which lay in Quebec.

Thus as Bourassa departed from the policies of *La Ligue* he met the new demands of the concentrated French Canadian nationalism now emerging. Moreover, Bourassa was a staunch believer in the Church and did not question its ambiguous position in regard to imported Anglo-Saxon capitalism. However, at this time the politicians were encouraging the foreign capitalists to invest in Quebec and their exploitation practices had not yet become apparent. Hence, the crucial economic issues were largely circumvented in the beginning of the twentieth century.

Witness the cool reception given Errol Bouchette's modest proposals for cooperative economic enterprises and a more active state (R. Cook (ed.), 1969: 161-181). We recall that at this time the influence of the Church was decisive in having Bouchette ignored. Concern over the economic issues was also voiced by Olivar Asselin of *La Ligue* whose views were somewhat anti-clerical, but "failed to develop a realistic, or at least a politically acceptable, alternative to the predominantly capitalist developmental philosophy of the age" (Brown and Cook, 1974: 138).

But though messianic nationalism was weak in dealing with economic issues, the vigorous Church hierarchy organized the Catholic Action movements of college youths, who took up this cause and attacked Anglo-Saxon capitalism. French Canadians were now reacting with renewed vigor to perceived Anglo-Saxon intolerance, racism and exploitation.

The nationalistic movements and the influx of capitalism

The Church-sponsored Catholic Action youth groups were organized in the early part of the twentieth century, the most noteworthy being *Association Catholique de la Jeunesse Canadien ne Francaise*. Its chief exponent was the young Abbe Groulx, who attempted to integrate nationalistic and religious ideals in his approach to history.

But as the century moved on, nationalist and economic concerns superceded religious issues. The threat of imported capitalism increased with its increased exploitation of Quebec resources and labour. It was becoming painfully obvious that Quebec's great economic enterprises were being more and more controlled by *les etrangers*. Hence, the Church, through its Catholic Action groups, began extending its influence into the labour movement and advocating reform of the capitalist system. Extension into the unions would ward off American influences, and the Church was allowed to advocate reforms following the papal encyclical of 1891. The example Ontario set when it converted its hydro plant to public ownership was not lost upon some of the more ardent and unorthodox youths. But most of the opposition to private capitalism at this time was moral, though political formulas were being developed. As Brown and Cook explain:

> The purpose of Catholic action groups was to bring the social teachings of the Church to bear upon the social and economic life of Quebec, thus providing French-Canadian Catholics with the means of organizing themselves against the abuses of laissez-faire capitalism while at the same protecting them against the unacceptable materialistic doctrines of socialism.
>
> (Brown and Cook, 1974: 142).

Even though the motivation for nationalism had changed from religious teachings to economic issues, the nationalists of the early part of the twentieth century were often diverted from the economic issues to the more traditional ones concerning school rights and preserving the culture inside and outside of Quebec. (See Brown and Cook, 1974: 127-143; R. Cook, 1969: 92-97; Posgate and McRoberts, 1976: 29 & R. Clippingdale, 1973: xvii.) However the thirties were approaching, when concern over economic issues would be stimulated by the problems of the Depression.

Nationalism in the 1930's

Herbert Quinn gives an overview of the factors that led to a change in nationalism from a moral issue proclaimed by the elite to a mass movement that would subsequently gain political strength.

> With the depression of the 1930's the ideas of the nationalist intellectuals and their bitter antagonism towards all aspects of the industrial system spread rapidly among the masses of the people. This ready acceptance of the nationalist ideology was not too difficult for the average French Canadian once he awakened to the fact that the ownership and control of the economic system which was the cause of all his hardships were in the hands of foreign industrialists. Resentment against the capitalistic system as such quickly became coupled with antagonism towards the English-speaking people who dominated it.
>
> (H. Quinn, 1974: 43).

Thus, the net effect of the Depression was public antagonism towards Anglo-Saxon enterprises and exploitation, antagonism that gathered momentum as the Depression deepened. French Canadians now realized they were dependent upon alien employers for their livelihood. It became obvious that in many cases the foreign capitalists maintained their profit margin by drastically cutting wages and salaries. The small French Canadian businessmen were less able than their large English competitors to withstand the impact of the Depression. The nationalists were now formulating reform policies. The failure of Taschereau's Liberal government to translate these policies into legislation aroused political opposition, for this government was now seen to be working with capitalism (Quinn, 1974: 43-47).

A new party, the *Union Nationale*, led by Maurice Duplessis, was able to challenge and unseat Taschereau's Liberals in 1936 with the help of several factors, the most significant being the approval of the Church organizations and hence of the public. The complications of political intrigue and patronage Duplessis employed to gain the leadership of the party need not concern us. The significant point for this thesis is that because he appealed to the nationalistic sentiment he was able to gain and to hold power.

> Perhaps the greatest source of strength of the Union Nationale was the fact that it had the unofficial, but nevertheless effective support of all the various Catholic Action and patriotic organizations across the province; the Catholic trade unions, the farmers' organizations, the co-operatives and the credit unions, the youth organizations, the associations of French-Canadian business men and merchants. All of these organizations were supposed to be neutral in politics, but as pointed out earlier, they were all strongly nationalistic and therefore opposed to the Liberal party's policy towards the industrialists.
>
> (H. Quinn, 1974: 61).

The significance of appealing to the nationalist sentiment and promising economic, social, and administrative reform soon became apparent. The people of Quebec rejected the Liberal party and elected the Union Nationale. This election victory was a clear indication of the strong opposition that had developed against the Liberal party's policy of promoting industrialization through the aid of Anglo-Saxon capitalists. Quinn sums up the significance of collectivism in this political action.

> The defeat of the Liberals was a protest, not only against an economic system which had changed the traditional way of life and brought economic insecurity in its wake, but also against the dominant role played by English-speaking industrialists in that system. This protest was accompanied by a demand that the new capitalist economy be reformed and modified and that positive steps be taken to enable the French Canadian to regain control over the wealth and

> natural resources of his province.
> The direction these reforms were to
> take was to be determined by the
> principles of social Catholicism as
> laid down in the encyclicals of Pope
> Leo XIII and Pope Pius XI.
>
> (Quinn, 1974: 72).

The significance of nationalism in defeating the Duplessis regime

But Duplessis did not implement the promised elections reforms. On the contrary, he permitted, and in some cases encouraged the influx of capitalist industrialization. Through power struggles within party ranks and through the use of manipulative procedures, Deuplessis was able to maintain his sway over the electorate during most of the twenty-four year period between 1936 and 1960. Duplessis was able to win the necessary support by appealing to traditional nationalist policies, that is, opposing Ottawa, and appeasing the rural and conservative elements. Though a devout Catholic, Duplessis ignored the Catholic critique of capitalism and he also balked against reform. In time he became so reactionary in comparison to the prevailing climate of opinion that the hierarchy was moved to speak out against him, particularly his suppression of union rights. Even in the face of this opposition, Duplessis retreated only temporarily before enforcing his labour code through piecemeal legislation.

The crisis came in the Asbestos Strike of 1949. This was the turning point for the Church, which withdrew its customary support of duly elected governments and began attacking the Duplessis regime. Though the Church had been slow to attack, it now became vigorous in this cause, attacking both Duplessis and the capitalistic system that he condoned. (See Quinn, 1974: 81-169.)

Perhaps the clearest evidence of this vigorous attack is to be found in a pastoral letter authorized by the bishops in 1950, entitled "Le Probleme ouvrier en regard de las doctrine sociale de l'Eglise." A summary of this letter shows its collectivistic orientation:

> This letter was the most important pronouncement made by the hierarchy on this particular subject since the beginning of Quebec's industrial revolution. Its basic theme was that, in spite of the improvement in economic conditions since the 1930's, the wealth and resources of the province were still far from being equitably distributed, and large numbers of workers lacked economic security and proper housing conditions. The letter outlined in detail the various measures which should be taken to remedy the situation. Many of these proposals had been put forward in previous statements of the hierarchy: the payment of "a just wage" by industry; better hygienic conditions in the factories; more effective legislation to protect the stability and economic security of the family; the promotion of co-operatives of various kinds. There were, however, three aspects of the letter which had a new and impressive emphasis. One was the recognition that the

> workers had not only the right, but actually the duty to organize into trade unions for the purpose of bargaining collectively with their employers and thus raising their economic status. On this particular point of collective bargaining the bishops indirectly criticized the inadequacy of the guarantees provided the workers in existing provincial legislation. The second major point, and the most radical aspect of the pastoral letter, was the official sanction which it gave to the demands of the Catholic unions that the structure of private enterprise be gradually reformed so that the workers would participate in the management, profits and ownership of the industry in which they worked. Finally, the bishop's statement indicated that they had at last abandoned their old ideas in regard to a return to the land and had accepted the fact that the industrialization of the province was irreversible. . . .
>
> One of the most significant aspects of the pastoral letter was the indirect support it gave to those members of the lower clergy whose interest in economic and social reform had made them critical of Union Nationale policies.
>
> (H. Quinn, 1974: 163, 164).

As Quinn (1974: 164-187) goes on to explain, criticism of the Union Nationale became considerably more vocal and widespread after this open stand by the Church's hierarchy. As the criticism increased, the Duplessis regime was further weakened by the rejuvenated Liberals, who, with their new view of the state as active and interventionist in order to implement reforms, were able to appeal to nationalist sentiment and so win the election of 1960.

Significance of nationalism in Quebec politics

After studying the rise and decline of the Duplessis regime, Quinn (1974: 186-188) draws some significant conclusions that support our thesis. He points to the similarities of the defeat of both Taschereau in 1936 and Duplessis in 1960. For in spite of the propensity of the Quebec electorate to follow the policies of their leaders, these particular leaders were defeated, in part, because they collaborated with capitalism and its ideologies at a time when nationalism was developing collectivist reforms to oppose this system and its individualistic orientation. Quinn enlarges on this point:

> Both regimes were turned out of office by opposition parties with a nationalist orientation although this orientation was obviously more explicit in the case of the Union Nationale of 1936. These opposition parties were supported by many divergent groups, including trade unions, nationalist movements, and important sections of the Church, all of whom, were dissatisfied with the conservative economic policies pursued by the government in office, and its administrative and electoral practices. The nationalism of the parties which were successful in winning the elections of 1936 and 1960 was a left-wing or radical nationalism which placed the emphasis on the social question as the crucial one at the time from the point of view of promoting the well-being of the French Canadian and maintaining his cultural values. These parties were critical of the generous concessions which had

> been granted to foreign capitalists, and were determined that the people of Quebec must regain control over the wealth and resources of their province. The programmes of reform which they put forward were inspired by the principles of Catholic social philosophy, although this influence was stronger and more directed in the 1936 election than in that of 1960.
>
> (H. Quinn, 1974: 188).

Quinn's observation that the influence of the policies of social Catholicism had waned from the election of 1936 to that of 1960 points to the shift of the focus of society from Church to civil government or the state.

The Significance of Collectivist Orientation in the Quiet Revolution

Overview

In the last section of this chapter, we will, with David Cameron, (1974: 118) take "the risk of drastic over-simplification" and say that "the transformation of Quebec [in the Quiet Revolution] was symbolized by the electoral victory of the Lesage Liberals in 1960." He describes this transformation as a paradox:

> Throughout its entire history French Canada's paramount objective as a community has been to preserve itself; this is as true today as it was in 1760. However, prior to 1960 self-preservation meant resistance to

> change, keeping apart from external influences that would threaten to alter the composition of French-Canadian society. After 1960, self-preservation meant the acceptance, even the welcoming, of change, for it was realized that if French Canada was to preserve itself it had to take control of its destiny and become the initiator of change rather than the subject of innovations that were determined elsewhere. This altered consciousness has, I think, grown out of the realization that in the twentieth century no community can hope to sustain itself for long in isolation and immobility, but must seek its security rather in the dynamic pursuit of its own good and in the progressive development of its identity - in short, in the expression of a spirit of epanouissement or a nationalism of growth.
>
> (D. Cameron, 1974: 118).

The analyses by Posgate and McRoberts of the Quiet Revolution also speaks of this change:

> Implicit in this whole-hearted espousal of social and economic development was a transformation of the perception that French Canadians had of their own capabilities.
>
> (Posgate and McRoberts, 1976: 98).

Under this energetic transformation a new attitude developed toward the state, for it was seen as an agent to execute necessary reforms and to implement nationalistic goals, all of which would bring on economic growth. Hence, a new attitude toward the state developed: the ideology of statism, that is, the active, interventionist, and positive state, and particularly the *etatisme* of the government of Quebec.* (See Posgate and McRoberts, 1976: 98-99 & Cameron, 1974: 118-122.)

It was particularly the development of *etatisme* that was revolutionary in the Quiet Revolution. As Posgate and McRoberts (1976: 97) see it, "the popularity of this label can be better understood if one focuses not upon political structures but upon ideologies, i.e., beliefs about the purpose and character of society and polity". These new beliefs about the purpose of the state were particularly revolutionary. When the Lesage ministry embarked on their various reforms, they were indeed acting upon a very different conception of the role of the state than had ever been envisioned in Quebec before the sixties (Posgate and McRoberts, 1976: 97, 117).

Ramsay Cook (1966: 81) also finds there was "physical transformation" and an "equally radical intellectual change: a new view of the role of the state in society". However, according to Andre Larocque (1973: 78), it was particularly the new political structures, such as the nationalization projects, that took on "great symbolic meaning in Quebec's political life". In this sense

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* In the 1960's the nationalists increasingly focused upon Quebec alone, thus abandoning their traditional concern with preservation of French Canadian rights throughout the rest of Canada (Posgate and McRoberts, 1976: 98).

Quebec Hydro was symbolic for it was the "first major economic victory of the population over English-speaking private enterprise". In this section we will outline some of the more significant structural changes, after studying the development of etatisme.

The genesis of etatisme

This new ideology was generated by the "repudiation of the beliefs and institutions of the past, and a grasping for new beliefs and new institutions" (Morton, 1972: 117). First, Quebec was repudiating the dominance of a Church, which was now seen to be outmoded and irrelevant. In fact, it was not so much attacked as ignored. Secondly, Quebec was dissolving the alliance with Anglo-Saxon capitalists and their ideology. The Duplessis alliance aroused particular criticism. Then, too, in conforming with capitalist ideology, Duplessis refrained from using the authority of the state for implementing reforms, and this was also criticized (Morton, 1977: 523).

Thirdly, Quebec repudiated its feelings of inferiority. Quebecers now rejected the limitations, deprivations, and restraints, largely imposed by the clergy, that their fathers had accepted. They would no longer accept prohibitions against a fuller and richer material life. The more vehement critics of the old order compared their lot to that of all repressed people. The cry arose for "decolonization". Now people expected to be free of the restrictions of a dominant Church and free of the exploitation of an economic order that they neither controlled nor shared in (Morton, 1977: 524).

New expectations and a new vigor to oppose the dominating institutions of the past converged in *etatisme*. Morton explains the genesis of this *etatisme:*

> Perhaps the most important, if most intangible, result of this new mentality and those new expectations was the acceptance at long last of the state, the secular state, as their own and as an instrument of their will. Although political life, both in election and in government, had always been vigorous in Quebec, public opinion had never, despite 170 years of representative government, really accepted the state as the vehicle of the popular will. This was no doubt in part because of the prominence of the church in the public life of Quebec; in part because French-Canadian opinion thought of government as limited in its functions and negative in its attitude towards most of civil life. But at bottom it was the result of the essential passivity of the French Canadian in the history of Canada since the Conquest. He had lived under institutions imposed, or bestowed, on him, not with those of his own making. Now, in 1960, he had taken the government of Quebec as his own, and he expected it to serve him. His new expectations revealed the new attitude; it was examplified in the vigorous movement of some of the best minds of Quebec into the Civil Service of Quebec to create there a government service

> as able, as informed, and as dedicated as any in Canada. The quiet revolution had not overthrown the state: it had appropriated it.
>
> (W.L. Morton, 1977: 524).

Wide acceptance of etatisme

Examining the reasons for *etatisme*'s wide acceptance, Ramsay Cook (1966: 81-82) finds, first of all, that under *etatisme,* the state is employed to protect the public against the abuses of capitalism; this was especially important to Quebecers, for the capitalists were foreigners. Secondly, Quebecers needed to be protected against the agents of assimilation in order to assure *la survivance*. This danger had increased with the growth of capitalism; the state was seen as the one effective agency Quebecers could control, to combat these dangers. Cook (1966: 82) points to a statement made by Premier Lesage: " 'it must be clearly understood that the state of Quebec acts as a fulcrum for the whole French-Canadian community, and at the present time it is the instrument needed for that community's cultural, economic and social progress' ".

French Canadian authors are more acutely ~~aware~~ of the added responsibilities that the state has in Quebec. For example, Andre Gelinas (1973: 90) holds that "Quebec as the only Canadian state with a French speaking majority, should add to its regular duties the special task of protecting and developing this community". Writing in 1971, Marcel Rioux claims that the Quebec question arises over the political powers that can be attributed to the state of Quebec. He writes in dramatic terms:

> Quebec public opinion showed a surprising degree of unanimity in favouring more power for the Quebec State, and a significant part of the population now demanded full political power for Quebec. It is here that the Quebec question arises. We are no longer dealing with French Canada, with bilingualism and biculturalism, but with the powers of the State of Quebec and with the collective life of the people of Quebec. It is not a matter of nationalism, racism or prejudice towards anyone; it is simply a question of life or death for a nation of six million people. The fate of Canada's French-speaking people will be decided in Quebec itself. In Newfoundland, in British Columbia, French Canada's culture is finished - in Ottawa too. A century of Confederation has proved that.
>
> (Marcel Rioux, 1971: 114).

Distinctive collectivistic orientation of etatisme

In the Quiet Revolution Quebecers reached out to grasp new beliefs and new institutions. The state had adopted the responsibility of protecting the cultural distinctiveness of the community as well as the welfare of the community. In brief, the Quebecer's concept of the positive state is more aggressive than the Anglo-Saxon's. Quebecers believe that the state should be concerned about cultural influences and about levelling processes, like the equitable distribution of resources. It should be collectivist in orientation.

However, within this broad classification we find variations. We will now study some of them, but will not attempt to ascertain how widely they are accepted, for these versions are still being worked out. In conclusion, we will consider the views of sociologist Dumont as he contemplates the positive aspects of the Quiet Revolution's new concepts.

In regard to the new ideas in *etatisme,* Rioux (1971: 133) asks a penetrating question: why should Quebecers be bound to follow the liberal individualist forms of democracy developed in England? He argues that Quebecers should not feel inferior or guilty because they are not following the English view of democracy. And in attacking the English developments of democracy he further argues:

> The basic federalist idea seems to be that the people of Quebec should go through a complete phase of nineteenth-century liberal democracy; that they should thoroughly involve themselves in the sort of overcompetitive society that more and more people in industrialized countries have already begun to reject . . . . Everywhere in the world, people are searching for other forms of participation in social and political life. The people of Quebec must look elsewhere too, and invest - why not - new forms of democracy.
>
> (M. Rioux, 1971: 132).

Andre Bernard (1978: 101-124) talks about the different forms of *etatisme* being developed. He examines the policies espoused by the main political parties of Quebec, including the new separatist parties,* and finds they differ on their degree of statism.** To simplify, the separatist parties differ from the left-wing parties and are far from being "socialist" in the Marxist meaning of the term. He describes their platform as "socially minded" in that it favours centralizing economic enterprises and providing incentives. Thus the separatist party policies are not completely hostile toward private enterprise, but they are definitely opposed to monopolies in the private enterprise system, particularly in the mass communications media. At the other end is the Liberal party, which is not in favour of massive intervention. However, the general consensus of these political parties (including the Liberals) is significant for this thesis: the Quebec state should be given "substantially increased powers, at least in the socio-cultural domain" (Bernard, 1978: 104). Bernard holds that the collectivist oriented state arose from the collectively-minded political parties of

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* The separatist parties will not be given much attention since they began to form near the cut-off date of this thesis, spring of 1970, with the election victory of the Bourassa Liberals.

** The question of the degree of statism is related to constitutional problems between federal/provincial governments, the complexities of which go beyond this thesis.

Quebec.

Bernard's espousal of *etatisme* is further refined by Fernand Dumont (1974: vii-vxii) in a "letter to [his] English-speaking friends". He also argues that the state should be actively concerned about the "genuine inequalities", and he is very critical of the liberal/individualist ideology that considers citizens "as atoms moving in a society that is nothing more than a mechanical game". On the other hand, "our socialism" refuses to treat the less fortunate as if their social condition is the fault of their individual destiny. Dumont, as a sociologist, goes even further and argues that the state with its fraternal concerns is obliged to resist "foreign powers" that restrict the freedom of its citizens with respect to the development of their cultural values. He points out that Quebecers are one with the small voice raised in English Canada, Kari Levitt, who is also deeply concerned about the "power of the multinationalists" in their "manipulation of cultures, life-styles and needs".

Dumont seems to be saying that French Canadians have the conviction that they are a "distinct people" especially after the developments of the "new consciousness of the 1960's". From this new level of development and maturation, French Canadians can now challenge the ideal of federation "which is, in fact one of the great ideals of this century". But it was a "caricature" of federation that was represented by the Canadian federation of 1867. For this federation was imposed on French Canadians before their contribution to sociopolitical thought could truly be considered a contribution, before French Canadians had reached a point where they could "invent" new forms of democracy, and before a form of collectivistic democracy had been developed to counteract the flood tide of the liberal/individualist form. What seems particularly irritating was that the highly centralized government imposed this liberal/individualist form on them. Perhaps this is why Dumont (1974: xi, xvi) says that now French Canadians are more ready to "conclude [their] alliances" rather than back in 1867 when they were accepted as an inferior partner, as people who "were prisoners of [their] ignorances and archaic customs".

The development of sociopolitical structures

Before outlining these developments, we should recall that the gains made in this area were not as revolutionary as in the ideological. However, what was gained had great symbolic significance. We will also look at Posgate and McRoberts (1976: 117, 123), who argue that though the significance of the revolution lay in the shift of authority from the Church to the state,* the establishment of these new structures by the state served to legitimize and further strengthen this shift of authority.

When the Lesage ministry established the new structures, most gains were made in the areas of education, health and welfare rather than in the area of economics. The nationalization of Quebec Hydro is the exception to this generalization. What the Lesage ministry did gain was due to the indefatigable efforts of Rene Levesque, who campaigned for the nationalization project, and Paul Gerin-Lajoie, who worked for the establishment of the Ministry of Education. Otherwise the Lesage ministry was characterized by reserve and caution. (See Posgate and McRoberts, 1976: 109-110.)

An important change was the shift of authority from the Church to the state in the area of health and welfare. Because it is an area traditionally considered to be the exclusive domain of the Church, this shift had great significance. With the establishment of the provincial Ministry of Education in 1964, the state assumed full authority over all educational institutions in Quebec - public and denominational. No longer a mere provider of material facilities, as was traditional, the state now took full control of pedagogical and curricular matters. In order to placate clerical fears over the continued confessional character of Catholic schools, the clergy were represented on the decision-making bodies, but their authority was limited to overseeing the purely confessional aspects of the curriculum. In addition, ground work was laid for the new non-confessional colleges and the clergy were stripped of control on the local school commissions.

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* As noted in a footnote above, the term, "state" is used in reference to thh conflict of authority between Church and state in Roman Catholic doctrine. However, the use of the term does not imply that the provincial government had achieved the status of statehood, even after the Quiet Revolution.

A similar shift in authority was implemented when the Church-dominated welfare institutions came gradually under the control of the state. With the establishment of a provincial scheme of hospital insurance in 1961, hospitals were gradually forced to conform to provincial norms and regulations regarding personnel qualifications, administrative procedures, and so on. The state was very aggressive in expanding its welfare services and programs into the area traditionally regarded to be the jurisdiction of the federal government, causing conflict. (See Posgate and McRoberts, 1976: 111, 112.)

As we noted, the most successful economic gain of the state was the nationalization of Quebec Hydro. However, the other lesser gains are noteworthy, for they indicate the trend towards nationalization. In 1962 the Lesage ministry created the *Societe generale de financement (SGF)*, whose purpose was to strengthen small, often family managed industrial or commercial enterprises. But the SGF experienced only limited success through investment policies, this is, in part attributable to the difficulty it experienced in selling its shares to private investors. But the SGF was more successful than other provincial corporations, which simply lent money rather than investing directly. The Marine Industries, a large industrial firm involved in ship building and other heavy industry, gave promising returns in this respect. The most controversial venture into economics was the attempted establishment of the steel mill (SIDBEC). Controversy forced the postponement of this establishment until the latter part of the decade. According to Posgate and McRoberts (1976: 115) the potential of the economic programs was in general frustrated by "excessive caution". It seemed the French Canadians had not yet been socialized to aggressiveness in economics.

However, as Posgate and McRoberts (1976: 116) point out, despite modest successes in economic area, the total expansion activities of the state necessitated a commensurate expansion of civil services and the creation of many new ministries. The greatly increased civil service took on the character of an independent bureaucracy exercising considerable decision-making power. Through this means, the scope and penetration of governmental activity was generally assured.

We can see the manifestation of this assurance in the policies of the succeeding ministries. Andre Laroque (1973: 76-81) contends that *etatisme* was entrenched, for it survived the defeat of the Lesage ministry. In fact, the Union Nationale under Daniel Johnson, which succeeded Lesage, was able to carry on reforms with a greater zeal. He also points out that the defeat of the Liberals in 1966 has been attributed to divisions within their own ranks, rather than widespread disapproval of the progress of the Quiet Revolution. One faction of the party called for a slow down, while others became impatient and broke away; Levesque, for instance, launched his own separatist movement. In continuing the reform measures, the Union Nationale maintained full support of the Department of Education despite criticisms of secularization. Between 1967 and 1970 they also created thrity-four General and Vocational Colleges (CEGEPS), whose ground work had been laid under Lesage. These replaced the Church dominated classical colleges. This reform also included the founding of *Universite du Quebec*. In 1967, Radio Quebec and the Department of Public Services were established. In 1968 departments were set up for Financial Institutions, Companies, and Co-operatives, as well as for Immigration.

Then, too, Johnson was said to be more aggressive in fighting for provincial autonomy in the face of Trudeau's strong centralization policies.

Expansion of the state into these new areas challenged the traditional concepts of the role of the provincial government vis-a-vis the central government. Inevitably, Quebecers found unacceptable the old strategy of permitting the federal government to intervene in areas now considered to be the jurisdiction of the provincial government. Consequently there were clashes. Though the complexity of this problem places it beyond the boundaries of this thesis, we will generalize that the Quebec government did succeed in gaining administrative control in the areas of education, health and welfare without losing the benefits of the federal subsidies. This opposition to federal encroachment in areas now taken to be under provincial jurisdiction reflected the new positive role of government, which had been initiated by the Liberals and continued by the Union Nationale. (See Posgate and McRoberts, 1976: 118-122.)

In conclusion we return to the arguments presented by Posgate and McRoberts (1976: 117, 123) against those who claim the advances made by Quebecers in the sixties are no more than the normal workings of government. Posgate and McRoberts point out that the significant element is the change in the legitimation of authority;

this change is revolutionary. To ignore this "shift of authority to the state" is to miss the "essence" of the revolution:

> These new roles that the Quebec government assumed within both Quebec society and the Canadian federal system acted in turn, to legitimize and to further strengthen support for the central beliefs of the "Quiet Revolution" ideology.
>
> (Posgate and McRoberts, 1976: 123).

These new expansions and these new structures strengthened the ideology of etatisme which, in turn strengthened the collectivistic orientation of the Quebecers.

Summary

In the period extending from Confederation to the decade of the Quiet Revolution, we have analyzed socio-political policies, ideologies as well as some institutional developments and have, thereby, to some extent, validated the first and the second hypotheses. The validation of the first hypothesis is indicated by the manifestations of collectivism in the ideologies of the Church, firstly in ultramontanism, which takes the extreme position holding that authority is monolithic under the Roman papacy, and secondly, in the papal encyclicals of 1891 and 1931, which criticized the individualist orientation in capitalism for legitimizing the unbridled ambitions of private enterprise, atomistic individualism and anarchical liberalism.

We also found the collectivist orientation was manifested in the nationalistic movements, wherein the papal policies were adapted, modified, and politicized for the French Canadian causes. The opposition to private capitalism became effectual in statism, particularly the distinctive type in Quebec, known as *etatisme*. When we analyzed the nationalistic movements according to Cameron's definition (1974: 68), wherein the needs of the individual are subordinated to the exigencies of the whole, the collectivist orientation became more evident. With liberal-individualism, Cameron holds the reverse is in effect: the needs of the individual and his freedom to achieve them becomes the primary issue. In Quebec, the policies of *etatisme* indicated that collectivism was more influential than individualism, for government intervention was extended into the area of economics and, what was more significant for the Anglo-Saxonist observers, included language rights and the media. As far as economic intervention is concerned, the trend is toward nationalization of industries, though there are variations among the policies of the political parties. As we recall, Andre Bernard (1978: 101-124) found that the separatist parties hold out for massive intervention and the Liberals for less. But the general consensus of these parties, including the Liberals, indicated the disposition that more authority be extended to the Quebec state, especially in the socio-cultural area.

In this period, the validation of the second hypothesis is indicated by the conflict of the opposing imperialisms of each founding ethnic group: Roman imperialism versus that of Anglo-Saxonism. Though the vigor of these imperialisms and their prejudiced claims to superiority reached a peak in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the effects were long lasting and reached into the Quiet Revolution. The conflict of ideologies, and henceforth of expectations, which emerged during the decade of the Quiet Revolution saw the shift of authority move from the Church to the state. In other words, the influence of collectivism remained in effect but there was a change of agents. This explains the conflict of expectations: those predisposed toward Anglo-Saxon liberalism approved of the reduction of Church authority, but they failed to understand the extension of government authority in Quebec, such as its attack on the permissive society.

We also found this conflict indicated by the representations of Fernand Dumont (1974: ix-xvii), who in his letter to his English-speaking friends gives us a strong indictment of the ideologies of individualism. These indictments are a refined echo of those found in the papal encyclicals and in the nationalistic movements: the liberal ideal of the state sees its citizens as merely atoms moving about in a mechanical game in society while ignoring that which causes genuine inequality, the weight of social structures, the existence of classes as well as the milieux of these powerful classes.

CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In this chapter we will first state the conclusions reached in the process of the research and then summarize the cardinal points made in the thesis, to show how they illustrate the hypotheses. In closing we evaluate the conclusions.

This thesis is an exploration of the significance of collectivism. According to the analysis by Christian and Campbell (1974: 21, 25), it was the opposition of collectivism that moderated the effects of liberal-individualism and prevented it from reigning unchallenged in Canada thus contributing significantly to the Canadian political scenario. From this point of view, the moderating effects of collectivism on individualism (or vice versa) has served to provide the necessary conditions for the development of the freedom of ideological tolerance, a freedom to be discussed further in the last part of this chapter.

The origins of collectivism can be found in European immigrant groups, particularly in British toryism,* but the base in Quebec is more pervasive, more distinguishable, and hence more appropriate for our research purposes.

This thesis can also be considered to be a response to Dumont's (1974: vii-xvii) plea in his "letter to [his] English-speaking friends" wherein he pleads that English Canada develop an appreciation of the distinctiveness of the French Canadian contribution to the sociopolitical make-up of Canada, a distinctiveness which emerges from the collectivist orientation of the French Canadians.

We believe that this orientation has had a moderating effect on Canadian sociopolitical philosophies and institutions. For if these philosophies and institutions have the capacity to provide the individual with alternatives then the individual has a social (or political) freedom to choose between these alternatives. Dumont (1974: xvi) sees a limitation of freedom where the policies and practices of individualism are allowed to dominate to the exclusion of those of the collectivity, be it in industry, in the media or in life styles. We suggest that the French Canadian political mind may be prudent to recognize the debilitations of the excesses of individualism. The French Canadian seems to be aware of the past it has inherited from France, a past which acknowledged the excesses of the individualism of the French Revolution. This may be a factor in causing the French Canadian to oppose the excesses which they perceive to be developing on American soil.

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* To recall the Hartzian analysis, Christian and Campbell (1974: 20-31) hold that collectivism entered Canada through the United Empire Loyalists. But, what has been neglected with the Hartzians, it also entered through later immigration of British toryists, particularly with the immigrant waves of the nineteenth century. (We recall from the methodology discussion, that A.V. Dicey (1962:xxx-258) analyzed the oscillations between collectivism and individualism in nineteenth century England.) The significance of pointing out the element of British toryism is that there was an ideological diversity in Britain and that only part of these immigrants can be categorized as being adherents of the "new imperialism" of Anglo-Saxon individualism.

In expanding upon the significance of collectivism, we can say with Christian and Campbell (1974: 21-25) that the effects of opposing, and hence, moderating individualism are two fold: first, it encourages ideological tolerance which in Canada has prevented the emergence of a "one-ideology country" such as that which prevails to the south of us; secondly, it moderates the effect of capitalistic exploitation, which can be excessive if unrestrained. It is the moderating effect of collectivism that is so contentious in the issues that have arisen out of the Hartzian analysis, that is, to what degree has continental liberal-individualism, upon coming to Canada from its American base, been influenced by Canadian collectivism? To put it another way, has collectivism in Canada been strong enough to moderate the massive influence of American individualism? Because the moderating effect is so important for the conclusions of this thesis, we will be giving some consideration to the controversy concerning it.

What sparked the controversy was that continentalist Kenneth McRae (1964: 219-274) in following uncritically the Hartzian approach, argued that American liberal-individualism prevailed almost unchanged in Canada. In the McRae view, if there were any differences between the liberal-individualism of the United States and of Canada, then they were "subtle". Gad Horowitz (1966: 143-149) challenged this continentalist view and argued that the differences were not by any means insignificant but were sufficient to establish a specifically Canadian identity. Christian and Campbell (1974: 23) in referring to this "now famous reply" find the evidence Horowitz cites is "persuasive". However, these political scientists go beyond Horowitz in pointing to the crucial differences in sociopolitical attitudes: in Canada there is an openness to new ideas because neither individualism nor collectivism has been able to dominate to the extent that it can shut out competitive ideas; in the United States one ideology has dominated and excluded the other.

> What distinguishes the United States is the exclusive position of the liberal ideology, and all that is needed to differentiate Canada, certainly in a North American context, is to demonstrate a meaningful ideological diversity.
>
> (Christian and Campbell, 1974: 23).

Christian and Campbell (1974: 21, 22) are also concerned with the debilitating effects of ideological intolerance, such as they see in the United States. They go on to explain that this intolerance lies behind the "hostility, verging at times on paranoia" that American society has demonstrated toward manifestations of collectivism. This intolerance also lies behind the desire to convert other societies to the American view, a desire which is "simply the reaction of a culture which cannot accept non-conforming ideas" or understand why others would willingly do so. Furthermore, the growing realization that other societies are profoundly different and prefer to remain so has been in many ways "a traumatic experience" for this one-ideology people.

However, as the historical research of this thesis has shown, this type of intolerance was characteristic of early Quebec society except that collectivism was permitted to dominate to the exclusion of individualist ideas. Christian and Campbell (1974: 28) would agree: that ideological "intolerance has a long history in Quebec, from clerical attempts in the nineteenth century to destroy the free-thinking *Rouges* to the Duplessis Padlock Law of 1937". But because of its historical context and its geographical situation, French Canadian collectivism could not hold onto its dominating position, which required isolation from, and exclusion of individualist influences. The dominance of collectivism was moderated by individualism which entered Quebec mainly through two channels, the influx of private capitalism and the demand for representative institutions, both from the Anglo-Saxon orientation. From our research into the conflict between the agents of these two opposing cultural orientations, we conclude that collectivism in Quebec was staunch enough to moderate this imported individualism to a significant degree, so as to develop a distinctive French Canadian political ideology. This distinctiveness becomes more marked when these political ideas are translated into government policies and legislation.

This brings us to the other aspect of moderation, that collectivism of this type has the potential for moderating the policies, the practices and, in some cases, the institutions of individualism, when they become excessive. Expanding upon the findings of Christian and Campbell (1974: 31) we conclude that because the most effectual base for opposing individualism was developed in Quebec, then the moderating effect is also most evident here: the "deeply rooted" collectivism in Quebec has "clearly tempered" forms of Anglo-Saxon individualism. Although moderation has become more effectual in some areas such as government intervention in cultural affairs and the diminishing of private control of the media, the excesses of private capitalism in heavy industries are still largely unopposed except by populist means. A few notable advances have been made in this area because of nationalization schemes, and we can expect that the firm conviction that "state action is the correct response to modern industrial society" will in time have its effect.

Herbert Quinn (1974: 193-195) supports our conclusion that the moderating effect of collectivism is more pervasive in Quebec than in Canada as a whole, for his focus is on the political importance of Social Catholicism. It laid the base for a "middle way" between the extremes of Marxist communism and economic liberalism. The political ideologies emerging out of Social Catholicism proposed that government intervene to effect a redistribution of private property and wealth rather than the state monopolize control of land and industries. In the conclusions to his book, Quinn (1974: 196) strengthens his argument by pointing to evidence from "strongly Catholic areas" wherein Social Catholic ideologies translated into government reforms mitigated against the deep dissatisfactions with capitalist systems and thus prevented a swing to the Marxist extreme.

Hence we conclude, with Quinn and with Christian and Campbell, that collectivism can be given recognition for its potential to moderate the excesses of individualism.

This thesis can therefore also be considered to be a response to Fernand Dumont's (1974: vii-xvii) plea, that English Canada cultivate an appreciation of the distinctiveness of French Canadian political ideology rather than relegate this distinctiveness to "a folkloric vestige that helped give Canada its inextinguishable uniqueness vis-a-vis the United States" (1974: xi). In his introductory letter to his English-speaking friends, as well as in his book, Dumont works out a critique of the liberal-individualist state.

In this perspective, the state's needs take precedence over the individual's for if the state is weak it is mainly the economically strong individuals who can and often will further their own interests above those of the general society. Dumont implies that this view of the state is a product of the Quiet Revolution and it is an indication that Quebec has now reached a new maturity, Quebec is therefore now ready to "contribute to building something else in northern America". This "something else" should be distinctive rather than merely an "out work for the empire of the United States" (1974: xvii).

Dumont (1974: xvii) sees a "new alliance" between French and English Canadians in which Quebec's "essential quality" would be given recognition by English Canada, and not be held in "contempt" as an inferior partner, as it has since the "caricature" 1867 (1974: xvi). In his words:

> It is in regaining its *own essential quality* that Quebec can best contribute to building something else in northern America than an outwork for the empire of the United States. You cannot escape such a challenge. And is it not in following the search for ourselves, each of us on his own, that our two peoples can make a new alliance?
>
> (Dumont, 1974: xvii, emphasis mine.)

A similar challenge comes from Marcel Rioux (1971: 132), who, we remember, questions why French Canadians should be bound to the Anglo-Saxon view of democracy?

But Rioux (1971: 133) hastens to add that even with the development of new political ideologies "which appeared in the wake of the Quiet Revolution", Quebecers should take into account that Quebec is an integral part of the North American community. It seems that Rioux in his own way is joining Dumont in asking for recognition from English Canada for distinctive sociopolitical ideology of Quebecers.

But it is Dumont (1974: xi) who expresses serious concern over the "mutual contempt" between the two founding peoples: the contempt that the English have toward Quebec's "bemired traditionalism" and the contempt that Quebecers have for the economic initiatives of the capitalist system that permitted the Anglo-Saxons to gain a strangle-hold on the French Canadian economy. Perhaps a recognition of French Canadian distinctiveness in such an important area as sociopolitical ideology will work towards ameliorating this contempt? Perhaps it is more important that English Canada recognize the contribution in this area than in any other? For have those of the Anglo-Saxon tradition not held that the type of democracy they founded is superior to the collectivist type of democracy, the type that is founded on Rousseau's understanding of the general will? (C.B. Macpherson, 1965: 35, 36). Perhaps we in English Canada are forgetting what C.B. Macpherson (1965: 36) points out: "The idea of democracy goes a long way farther back than the period of liberal-democracy, and the modern non-liberal notions of democracy are plainly drawn from that original notion." Recognizing that there are variants of democracy other than that of the English and American tradition makes Dumont's plea for recognition of their socio-political ideology much more intelligible, for that ideology arises out of their "own essential quality", their moderated type of collectivism.

To summarize our research, we set up two related hypotheses. First, the French Canadians of Quebec manifest a collectivist orientation whereas the English who interacted with them manifested an individualist one. Secondly, the conflict between the French and the Egnlish Canadians is, at least in part, a result of this difference in their cultural orientation. Before summarizing the historical research in relation to these two hypotheses, we will briefly review the problems encountered with this research, such as the use of terms, the theoretical orientations and the conflict mode.

Richer and Laporte (1973: 52) have used the term "cultural orientation" borrowing it from cultural anthropology, especially the works of Florence Kluckhohn. They applied it to their study of the differences between the cognitive styles of the French and English Canadians. These researchers found that the accumulated studies of differences between the French and the English Canadians point out that these differences can be stated as a dichotomy: collectivism versus individualism. In the Richer and Laporte study the differences are manifested in different cognitive styles related to this dichotomy.

We have also borrowed the term "manifest" from Richer and Laporte (1973: 51). They find that anthropologists have delineated societies according to their "predominant value patterns" which are "manifested in modal personality types characteristic of each society". The terms "reflect" as used by Neatby (1971: 47) and "illustrate" as used by A.V. Dicey (1963: xxxiii) have a similar meaning.

In this thesis, the collectivist and the individualist cultural orientations are seen as manifested in sociopolitical structures, in institutions, ideologies, policies, and legislation. These types of manifestations were chosen on the basis of the following methodological studies: (1) A.V. Dicey (1962: 17-61) found that "public opinion" was illustrated in legislation; (2) Hilda Neatby (1971: 47) found that the laws "reflected" differences in economic interests and social values; and (3) other researchers, such as I.L. Horowitz (1973: 348), F. Hsu (1961: 5-13 & 1963: 12-237), A. Inkeles (1961: 201), and J.P. Wallot (1971: 121), found that institutions, particularly those of government, religion or politics, as well as ideologies and policies, can also be used to indicate the influence of cultural orientations.

We used the conflict model to understand the interaction of these opposing cultural orientations. Aspects of these models presented by John Rex (1961: 115, 122-134 & 1974: 4), Harry Hiller (1976: 104-114, 116-119), and Fernand Dumont (1965: 386-405 & 1974: ix-86), seemed appropriate to explain this conflict. Rex's model, with its emphasis on the conflict between large political structures, complements Hiller's, which lays the emphasis on ethnicity as a cause of conflict. Dumont (1965: 388) is concerned about analyzing and systematizing the dominant ideologies that influence the socialization processes, for instance religious or educational socialization.

The Hiller (1976: 111) model also explains the conflict that arises out of relative deprivation, that is, the feelings of disadvantage that are arrived at through comparison with another group. Ethnic conflict can also aggravate the in-group's feelings toward the out-group that threatens to assimilate it.

Finally, the conflict model enables us to explain the differences that are so great they become dichotomous. Such differences have the potential for developing opposition between the groups in question and this may lead to conflict.

These problems of research theory and methodology were discussed in Chapters I, II, and III of this thesis. Chapter IV was used to explain aspects of the development of individualism and collectivism in England and France of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, aspects which influenced the cultural orientations of the immigrant movements to their respective colonies in the New World. This survey gained for us an understanding of the differentiated characteristics of collectivism and individualism. Then we could better analyze the subsequent manifestations of these differentiations in the colonies, particularly that of collectivism in Quebec, and thereby illustrate the hypotheses in the remaining chapters.

In England Puritanism and liberalism joined to form economic individualism. A rising entrepreneurial class saw that the right for the individual to acquire wealth and the right to control it was legitimized. Formerly, acquisition of wealth was collectivized.

These developments in England, therefore, contrast with the collectivist ideologies, where wealth was seen to belong to the corporate whole, that is, the religious order, extended family or crown. We also made use of Nef's contrasting of the Bourbon regime with the Tudor regime. He systematized constitutional developments and related them to industrial growth. Using the conflict model, we then analyzed the related developments in the ideologies of religion, political and constitutional growth, and in economics, and found that they roughly correspond. We saw that these respective developments in France and England were dichotomous and carried the potential for conflict.

In chapter V we illustrated the first hypothesis, to some extent by tracing the developments of collectivism in New France through the Bourbon regime's transplanted sociopolitical structures. Because the French trading companies had weakened, the Crown, upon requests from the colonists, took over the fledgling colony in 1663. Thereafter the colony kept looking to the Bourbon state for direction and support. At this time the Gallic state was strong and therefore dominated the Church and the seigneurial system. But all of these structures promoted, in one form or another, the collectivist orientation. The Gallic state of Louis XIV demanded unquestioned obedience and unflinching loyalty. The modified seigneurial system implemented a uniformity in land distribution and prevented the consolidation of landed wealth by the privileged few. Finally, the Church directed the lives of people, even in political affairs, through an efficient, highly centralized organization. Collectivism flourished on colonial soil, for the institutions which could have become possible threats to the king's authority were subordinated, and the doctrine of the divine right of kings had been internalized by the colony. This influence was perhaps most evident in that the entrepreneurs of the fur trade were likewise controlled by the crown through it monopoly of this trade. However, though the Crown could subdue the ecclesiastical hierarchy, it could not prevent the Jesuits, the most vigorous of all the religious orders, from gaining the upper hand in the Church. This move was significant for the cause of collectivism. After the Conquest, when the Church in the absence of the Gallic State could rise to dominance, Jesuit ultramontane views were imposed on the colony.

Though the evidence from chapter V does not permit us to illustrate the second hypothesis, we can draw contrasts in this chapter which anticipated the conflict which emerged with the Conquest of 1760. We pointed to the differences in the expectations that each ethnic group had of its respective institutions. In New England, the institutions encouraged the colonists to be vigorous and energetic, giving them a free hand in developing the frontier, whereas those in New France laid down the regulations for a well ordered communal life. Hence these frontiersmen, even in the rugged surroundings, became more dependent on the institutions, more deferential to authority, and more concerned with community development. Differentiations in the cultural orientations of these groups were taking shape: the one remained loyal to its conqueror of 1760 in spite of differing with its cultural orientation, and the other was gathering strength to rebel against this would-be conqueror.

The Conquest and Anglo-Saxon rule covered in chapter VI, brought with them a number of distinct individualistic influences. By analyzing these influences, we could illustrate part of the first hypothesis that the Anglo-Saxon oriented group in Quebec manifested an individualist orientation, but we limited our source of evidence to four areas: Merchants came up from New England with the Conquest army and set up supply businesses in Montreal. There were the invasions from the newly formed American states, with their antagonism toward the English of the colony for remaining loyal to the British causes, and to the French Canadians for remaining loyal to Catholicism. Anglo-Saxon settlements grew to such an extent that the colony of Upper Canada was formed, which was united with that of Lower Canada in the Union Government of 1841. Finally, there was the influx of capitalism in the twentieth century.

In reaction to these individualist influences, the French Canadians retreated behind the ramparts of their collectivist structures. By analyzing these social structures, we could therefore further illustrate the first hypothesis, that the French Canadians manifested a collectivist orientation. The church, as the preserver of French Canadian language and culture, and as the base for resisting assimilation pressures, sought to gain control of the society and to appease the British government. Largely through the influence of the Church in this period, the Acts of 1774 and 1791 were enforced so that this language and this culture could be legitimately preserved. As the Church rose to dominance it stifled the voices of individualism in the press or in any foreign influence.

Collectivism's influence was promoted even under the assimilation threats of the Act of Union in 1841. For under Union Government the effectiveness of French Canadian bloc support became evident. This is a striking contrast to the support of the Anglo-Saxon orientation, which was dissentious and divisive. Ironically, this bloc support was instrumental in sustaining both the Liberals under Baldwin and the Conservatives under John A.

Macdonald in their difficult, formative years. Another contrast is seen in the differences between Lower Canada's institution of Catholic schools and the voluntaryism in Upper Canada. These contrasts eventually led to conflict, giving us evidence to illustrate the second hypothesis. It was particularly the differences in legislation which established the differentiated types of education in Canada East as opposed to Canada West which promoted polarization and the recognition that these two peoples were bound to have dualistic social structures even under the aegis of one political unit. It was therefore the experience of the French Canadians under Union government that encouraged them to join the federation of 1867. In the dualism of 1841 each group had been permitted to preserve their own cultural identities against the larger American threats.

Chapter VII deals with the institution of Confederation in 1867 and the period following it when new antagonisms developed between the two founding peoples. We observed that this antagonism was, in part, caused by the extension of conflicting ideologies from Europe. An invigorated form of Roman Catholic Imperialism was set in opposition to the "new imperialism" (Brown and Cook, 1974: 27) based on Anglo-Saxon superiority in industry and science. These influences affected Canadian politics from the Riel affair to the nationalistic movements in the twentieth century. French Canadian perspectives were strengthened by the Catholic social philosophy, which was first expressed in the encyclicals of 1891 and 1931. However, until the harsh realities of the Depression exposed the exploitation inherent in capitalism, there was no real, effective opposition. Thereafter, the decade of the Quiet Revolution saw Quebec's nationalistic ideals embodied in political action and the institution of new state structures. This new form of "etatisme" could more effectively oppose the despised foreign ideals of capitalism.

The evidence of this period illustrates both the first and the second hypotheses and the relation between them. For in reaction to the perceived threats of the Anglo-Saxonists to assimilate them as an inferior people, the French Canadians reinforced their lines in the conflict. They turned their hopes for survival to the state rather than the Church. The latter was now seen to be ineffectual in promoting nationalistic causes and socialistic reforms to moderate the excesses of private capitalism as well as other excesses of the individualist orientation. Then as these new manifestations of collectivism were developed, we find more evidence to illustrate the first hypothesis, that this conflict resulted in furthering the collectivist orientation of the French Canadians.

We now have come full circle back to Dumont and Christian and Campbell, who, as we saw at the beginning of the chapter, promote forms of collectivism to moderate the advance of individualism in its Continentalist drive. The research of the collectivist orientation has served to sensitize us to an appreciation of its characteristics in so far as it has the potential to oppose individualism. The manifestations of collectivism, whether as ideology, as policy, or as institution, can moderate those of individualism and this moderation can work towards the freedom of ideological diversity and the ability to resist domination by excessive types of individualism.

While Christian and Campbell (1974: 31) are mainly concerned with the freedom of ideological tolerance, they also refer to what may be called a "social freedom". This freedom can be found where there is a certain degree of order rather than where permissiveness abounds to the extent that there is little order or sense of community, or deferring to the community's authority. Dumond (1974: xi-xvii) in his concern over freedom from the dominance of individualism refers to Kari Levitt (1971) and identifies with her thesis that in order to resist the "power of the multinational corporations in Canada" the authority of the state (including, we can presume, the state power of provincial governments) must be increased. For Dumont as for Levitt, the "power of the multinational" in the "manipulation of cultures, lifestyles and needs" must be resisted. He summarizes Levitt:

> She stresses that if we must resist them it is not simply out of a frivolous taste for economic autarchy, but because men should be free, beginning with their customs, their milieu, and the solidarities that have made their history, to define ways and reasons for living.
>
> (Dumont, 1974: xvi).

Dumont is here at one with those in English Canada who are concerned with freedom from the domination by the privatized powers in capitalism while Christian and Campbell seem more concerned with the freedom of ideological diversity although they do not ignore freedom in the practical affairs of political life.

A major significance of the individualism-collectivism dichotomy, for Canada, we believe, is that freedom can be found in the zone of moderation between the two extreme polar positions. At the collectivist extreme, we would find forms of dictatorship and totalitarianism which would prevent the individual from expressing himself or asserting his authority except through the prescribed means of the collectivist agent. In other words, freedom is limited by the prescriptions of the dominating church, state, or the community or family patriarch. Under these conditions, the freedom to be initiative, creative and spontaneous is suppressed.

At the other extreme, we would find various anarchical agents, who would play down the significance of the collectivist authorities, encourage the individual to be assertive rather than deferential to an external authority and promote the solutions that may undercut public welfare and perhaps even the public order, or use violence to achieve individualistic ends.

At either extreme of the dichotomy it would be hard for the individual to find alternatives, for he would be constrained to follow the prescriptions either of the agents of collectivism or those of individualism. At either polar position the prescriptions would be regarded by the majority to be the norm while deviance from this norm would be undesirable and warrant negative sanctions. We are reminded of examples from the history of Quebec: negative sanctions were placed on the *Institut*, Papineau and the *Rouges*. Examples of the other extreme are harder to find in history and therefore more open to charges of being impressionistic. We are reminded of the excesses of the French Revolution and of Dicey's analysis of the oscillations in British history. Charles Hobart (1965: 157) makes reference to Toqueville's perception of the "extreme majoritarianism in the United States", which limits the freedom of the individual from the majority view. Based on Tocqueville's (1969: 257) observation of American society in 1840, it seems that he distinguishes between men as agents of the public order and those who are working for the "omnipotence of the majority". His statement is an ominous echo of that which we perceive to be developing on American soil.

> The influence of what I have been talking about is as yet only weakly felt in political society, but its ill effects on the national character are already apparent. I think that the rareness now of outstanding men on the political scene is due to the ever-increasing despotism of the American majority.
>
> (A. de Tocqueville, 1969: 257).

Tocqueville (259) further points to the moralists and philosophers who refer to the omnipotent majority as "a people so far above human weaknesses that they will always be masters of themselves". Then he draws the striking comparisons which we have also used in this thesis: "How could the flatterers of Louis XIV improve on that?"

The distinction between agents representing collectivism, such as the public order and those of the omnipotent majority have been drawn in more graphic terms by Pierre Berton (1975: 205-209) in his analysis of Hollywood's version of Canadian history. He finds that those representing the public order or the law are portrayed as weak and ineffectual or worse, whereas the man of the frontier who acts with spontaneity, decisiveness, often with violence, is the hero. This distortion was portrayed even on such documented cases as the building of the Canadian Pacific. In other words, to be with the majority is to follow the style of the American frontier and to be deviant is to permit the influence of collectivism to operate. Though we can say that Hollywood's version is often a distortion of Canadian reality or even of the American, we can speculate concerning the influence of this media and its powerful box-office appeal. What is crucial for this discussion is that in the extreme positions, freedom of alternatives is not easily found.

Easy access to alternatives is most easily found in the zone of moderation for here neither dominates to the exclusion of the other and it is this need which is seen as an essential ingredient in the analysis of freedom in the Hobart paper (1965: 156-157). The common thread running through the definitions of freedom in this paper is the requirement that the individual has access to alternatives.

To conclude, according to the dichotomy of our thesis, these conditions are found where agents of collectivism and individualism are maintained in a balanced tension, where neither is able to dominate and suppress the other. In analyzing the problems which seem to be developing on this side of the Atlantic, we have said that in providing the conditions for this balance, the weight of influence is in favour of the American type individualism. Therefore, we believe that far from having outlived its significance today, this collectivist orientation, for which Quebec supplied a base, should be given greater recognition in English Canada. In this North American context it has the most capacity to oppose individualism and thereby preserve or restore our freedoms - the freedom to be ideologically diverse, to have alternatives and to define our reasons for living with greater independence from the crushing weight of individualism.

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APPENDIX

TRANSLATOR'S NOTES

1. Figures between round brackets, (), are those of notes in the original text.
2. Figures between dashes, - -, indicate where the page of that number begins in the original.
3. Words between square brackets, [], are additions or explanations added by the translator.
4. A row of stars right across the page indicates a gap where some of the original has not been translated.
5. Three stars in the middle indicate the same in the original.

Translator: Julia Boberg

FRÉGAULT, GUY: "Politique et politiciens" reprinted
in Le XVIIIe siècle canadien. Études. 1968
Montréal: Éditions HMH

- p. 176 - In the mind of the Court, his [the intendant's] principal concern should be to "manage" with all possible economy the sums destined by the king for Canada. The colonial government could not make any expenditure nor grant any contract without his approval. No one dipped into the fund of merchandise stored in the king's warehouses unless at his order or at the order of a functionary representing him. This rule even applied to the governor general. If the latter should decide to send out a military expedition or to erect fortifications, it was normally the intendant who allowed the "marketing" of provisions and authorized the withdrawal of goods from the State depots.

Playing such a far-reaching role in the colony's economic development, the metropolitan government took an immediate interest in the agriculture, commerce, industry and finances of Canada. Of course it entrusted the intendant with directing the exploitation of natural resources and controlling exchanges so as to procure every possible advantage for the mother country. As maintaining a prosperous country was less onerous to France than supporting a poverty-stricken colony, the intendant received precise directives for improving the fur trade, organizing lumber transactions and setting up an agricultural industry. (59) He published numerous and varied ordinances on the fur trade, on the payment of import and export duties, on the value and circulation of money, the price and export of food products, (60) not to mention the decisions made on conflicts between merchants, on the practice of trades and professions, on the formation of commercial companies, and even on the holding of slaves. (61) As a result of intervening in all these affairs, the intendant became the most knowledgable man concerning the colony's internal situation. He was, much more than the governor, in contact with the daily activity of the whole population and with its leaders.

Through the social milieu to which they belonged, but even more through the careers they engaged in, the governor general and the intendant represented two types of colonial leaders. In the 18th century the former always had a military past; to the prestige of his campaigns or his commands was added that of his age: Callières was over 50 when he was made governor general and Vaudreuil was probably - p. 177 - over 60 when he was called to succeed him; finally they were both of the old provincial nobility. A fact not to recur before the French regime's last years is that the two king's representatives had served long years in the colony before attaining the supreme dignity. Vaudreuil, who married a Canadian, was linked to the local aristocracy through his wife. None of this is true of the intendants. Not one of them occupied a subordinate post in the country before being entrusted with its administration.

The social milieu to which governors and intendants belonged distinguished them almost as strongly as the years of service behind them. Champigny was "from one of the most illustrious legal families in France". (62) Beauharnais, his successor, was from a long line of military men, naval officers, but also several high-ranking magistrates; he was 36 years old when he received his position. The Raudots, father and son, from a family of parliamentarians and finance officers, were the next to share the functions of intendant; one was 58 and the other 28 years old at the time of their nomination. Michel Bégon, following them belonged to a 'dynasty' of Navy officials and was not yet 40 on his arrival in Quebec in 1712. Contrary to the governor, who could not aspire to a more important job in the metropolis, the intendant did service in the colony so as to reach a higher rank in the administration of the Navy in France. One was an old soldier, another a civil servant still young and on his way up.

Though the governor wielded more authority, the intendant held more extensive powers. The latter would feel the very natural temptation to shine more than was proper, and the former the understandable desire to intrude himself more firmly than he should in the administration. Thus everything united to push these two personalities into conflict: their training, ambitions, mentality and the imprecise division of functions attributed to them. The court apparently intended them to counterbalance one another, but never ceased to recommend that they live in harmony, "since nothing could be more contrary to the good of the Colony than the division between two men such as they, thus giving cause for action on the part of evil men who would gain from the colony's disorder." (63) In 1700 the governor and the intendant had been quarrelling for 25 years. Thus, at Frontenac's disappearance, the minister of the Navy declared to Callières that his nomination depended on - p. 178 - his seeming the most likely to reestablish peace in the country. His first duty, Pontchartrain wrote to him, would be to concentrate on "bringing to an end all the conflicts there had been in the past between the Governor General and the Intendant." Furthermore, he should allow the magistrates the freedom to carry out their duties and only involve himself in "affairs of Justice to carry out the decisions these judges will make." (64) When he conferred on Beauharnais the intendance of New France, the minister warned Callières that the new administrator had been ordered to earn his "friendship", after which he emphasized: "And as I am interested in anything concerning him, ... I beg you to be good enough to give him [your friendship] and to render him the honours which may be yours to give." (65)

Although the disputes of the two colonial heads were the subject of many reports, it remains true that their united action, in spite of all the squabbles accompanying it, was after 1700 of far greater importance than their disagreements. The latter could create uneasiness and cause problems for those who felt the repercussions, but they never compromised the country's government. Looked at closely, these struggles for influence sometimes take on the appearance, somewhat confused indeed, of party struggles, that is to say collisions of interest and ideas. What State, however authoritarian, does not experience such things?

The governor's and intendant's power depended not only on their having the necessary authority to carry out the orders from Versailles, but also on their having enough influence on the Minister of the Navy to inspire him with the policy to be adopted in Canada. After all, however well informed he was, the Secretary of State was not on the spot. It was the two administrators who informed him about people and events in Canada. The governor and the intendant, wrote Auteuil, exercised an "absolute and despotic" authority by virtue of "the blind and violent protection granted them by the Minister," whose "instruments of iniquity" they were. If Canada, the same magistrate continued, was developing so slowly, it was "because the Court, or rather the Secretaries of State, who have successively taken care of this colony's affairs..... have based their policy only on what the governors and intendants, their creatures and often their relatives, wrote to them, thinking of anything but the growth of this colony." (66)

- p. 179 - The court, for its part, feared that its agents would allow themselves to be dominated or overwhelmed by the people around them. Every governor had his friends and flatterers and so did every intendant. In the months following the death of Frontenac, Callières and Vaudreuil both expected to succeed him: each had his court. (67) The Minister of the Navy warned Vaudreuil more than once to be careful of the excessive influence his wife's family might exercise on him, and his adversaries did not fail to accuse him of showing himself too sensitive to the views and interests of people connected with his wife. (68) Family ties had a singular force at that time. Autueil, Ramezay, Cadillac, Clairambault d'Agremont, Mme de la Forest and even Mme d'Iberville, who agitated against Vaudreuil, formed a faction in which family connections reinforced a coalition of interests. Of Ramezay, as of Vaudreuil, it was said that "he gives to everyone in his family, which is numerous," the means to trade "in preference to all other inhabitants". (69) Finally, it happens that leaders court popularity. In 1699, annoyed by Champigny's attitude which seemed to him too favourable to the beaver traders, the minister warned the intendant to behave "not as a man wishing to attract the applause of a number of inhabitants who speak only in their own little-known interests, rather than the country's welfare, but as a man who looks after the general wellbeing of the Colony..." (70)

In short, the governor and the intendant secured the link between the metropolitan State and the colonial collectivity. The tone of their dispatches and, even more, that of the orders they received from Versailles, make one suppose that their role consisted principally of executing the Court's decisions in

Canada. This supposition is misleading. In the ordinary course of events, it was they themselves who proposed to the Minister of the Navy the majority of directives he sent them. For example, it is considered an intolerable expression of absolutism that the Court often repeated its order to prevent Canadians from raising too many horses, for fear that their immoderate use of them might lead to a "lack of exercise" which would make the people "less strong, less healthy" and incapable of "going to war in the snow". To allow the inhabitants to have many horses was to expose them to "leading a soft life..... which would in the end diminish their strength and completely destroy their courage." From riding on horses or in carriages the colonists - p. 180 - would become "effeminate" and would lose "the superiority they have over other Nations." On this subject the French government appears inexhaustible. (71) But who started the subject? A Canadian woman, Marquise de Vaudreuil, who observed to Pontchartrain, in 1710, that "since there have been so many horses in Canada the young people are no longer as vigorous as when they were forced to go on foot in summer and on snowshoes in winter." The result was that "if one is obliged to give a party in winter, one has difficulty finding people who can go on snowshoes as in former times." The moral: "To remedy this we must have some of the horses killed." (72) The recommendation came from the governor's wife; for 20 years the Court's order merely repeated it.

In addition, each administrator had his own policy. Frontenac's had a very personal flavour. Callière's was heavily marked, in internal affairs, by the governor's hostility towards the Company of the Colony, and in external affairs, by his attitude towards Louisiana, his concern with pacifying the Iroquois and his prudence in connection with military operations against the English. Vaudreuil's, Raudot's and Bégon's are also characterized by the ideas, methods and personalities of the men who proposed and applied them. Though not an independent head of state, a governor general was more than an executor of orders. The same may be said of an intendant.

THE UPPER COUNCIL [CONSEIL SUPÉRIEUR]

Though the two principal administrators of the colony weilded much power, they did not exercise it alone. Beside them, in what was in truth a somewhat equivocal position, was the Sovereign Council. Beneath them there served the subordinate officers.

The Council's situation was a strange one. When it was established in 1663 it was a powerful organism. The king had created it, in fact, to give Canada a judiciary and legislative body whose functioning would eliminate the inconveniences of government at a distance, the state of affairs "usually having changed by the time our orders arrive on the scene", and "conflicts and urgent problems needing more immediate remedies than we can bring from so far away." - p.181 - So the metropolitan government had granted to the Council the power to pass sovereign judgment on all civil and criminal cases. It had also charged the Council with deciding on "the expenditure of public moneys", controlling the fur trade and carrying out laws concerning the trade between colony and kingdom. Finally it had entrusted the Council with "all matters of public and private law and order", and with the organization of courts of first instance in the three governments of the country. (73)

The Council had set to work with authority. It had hardly been two weeks in office when it annulled the lease whereby the former governor of Avaugour had disposed of the collection of dues on a quarter of the furs "on the understanding that it is outrageous that in this country another governor be involved in disposing alone of public property." It had regulated the way Mézy would receive his "Governor's wages". It had commanded the payment of ordinary subsidies reserved for religious orders. (74) In short it had made an impressive entry into the political scene. Then Talon had come and after him Frontenac. Henceforth the Council saw a rapid reduction in its duties. The intendant took over the administration of finances, the control of justice and, with the governor, that of general law and order. In 1684 the councillors received a blow, or was it a distraction? Without consulting with the king's representatives they adopted a bylaw fixing the price of wine and brandy. Some months later a decree of the Council of State nullified this legislation and forbade the councillors to make "any ruling on the general law and order of this country in the absence of the governor and the intendant."

A rather significant change occurred in 1703. In a declaration of 16 June the king no longer gave the name of Sovereign Council to the tribunal, but that of Upper Council. (76) Garneau saw in this modification a sign of the plan Louis XIV was hatching, "when he no longer governed but from the depths of Mme de Maintenon's bed-chamber", to annihilate "any idea of independence, removing even the term sovereignty in a distant country, where revolts would be so easy to form and so difficult to destroy." (77) It was not the first time, some people have pointed out, that the king had substituted the expression "Upper" Council for that of "Sovereign" Council. (78) The year before, Beauharnais' commission had given the new intendant the power to "preside over the upper council". But the clerk Peuvret had registered this piece "according to the decree of the council......"

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- p. 194 - ...... from 7,000 to 4,000 pounds at the most". To arrive at this latter sum, the author of the proposal advises reducing all the salaries. Could it be a case of one of those sacrifices to which a galant man consents willingly provided others make it? Not at all: Riverin is solliciting for himself the post of agent with a salary reduced to 750 pounds. (115) The manpower of the colonial government does not appear to be exceptionally weak. It seems to correspond fairly well to the needs of the time. As will be shown, its ranks expanded more or less in time with the growth of the whole collectivity.

Neither too few nor much too numerous, the king's servants seem to have been repaid stingily. However, they do not complain about it yet. One can hardly fail to understand why. At this period of economic crisis, the security offered by State employment was not to be sneezed at. Besides, we lack too much fundamental data on the structure of prices and revenues to be able to determine the value of a yearly salary of 400, 500, or 600 pounds. But did members of the Upper Council not demand better salaries? One must nonetheless understand the meaning of their complaints. As magistrates they believed their dignity gave them a right to be a cut above others. The rank they wished to maintain forbade them to enter into any kind of trade. They have been described as "merchants who were formerly minor salesmen". (116) But had they not risen from the legal profession? They were not poverty-stricken since they acknowledged themselves to be capable of spending 300 pounds per year - more than a surgeon's earnings - for carriage expenses. The great merit of their evidence is to emphasize that in Canadian society much prestige was attached to money. What upsets them the most is that from the inadequacy of their salaries "there arises some scorn" for their positions. They lived in a world where money had an odour, but where decent people could hardly shine without the lustre it provided.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STATE

In an attempt to define the principal characteristics of the state apparatus whose mechanism we have tried to describe, three essential points stand out.

- p. 195 - First of all it appears that the State we are observing is a colonial State. It therefore evolves within the limits proper to a subordinate government. Without signifying powerlessness, subordination does imply action directed and conditioned by a sovereign power. Therefore there is nothing surprising in the Canadian government's not being able to assume the attitudes of an independent State. On the other hand, sovereign power is not necessarily the same as tyrannical power. The shared customs, interests and freedom which exist between a metropolis and a colony are of far greater importance than the occasional ill feelings which may spoil the normal relationship between the two societies. An excellent historian has stated: "The history of a colony is made in the metropolis." (117) This historian was thinking of the British empire. The same observation holds true for the French empire.

The metropolitan French government was authoritarian. It is natural that New France's should be likewise. Not that the mother country imposed all of its own institutions on its American branch: the colonial State did not have the same structure as the central government of the kingdom and its organization differs significantly from that of a French province; neither the governors nor the intendants of France had the same duties as those of Canada, and the Upper Council of Quebec was not a parliament. The French government was an ancient machine, extremely heavy, encumbered with out-dated parts and gears which no longer fitted properly: designed for a new country. that of Canada was simpler and more economical in its means than that of the mother nation. Both, however, were inspired by absolutist principles and paternalistic methods. The surest way of not understanding anything about the government of France is to repeat with confidence that the king was the State. In reality the sovereign was at the head of the State, but he did not absorb it. To add that in Canada the governor was the State is to reveal a complete ignorance of what the State was, of what the governor was, and of what Canada was.

Finally, although less complex than those of the kingdom, the political and administrative organisms of the colony were composed of more interlocking parts - more services, more offices, more civil servants - than is generally believed. That was their third characteristic. The public function does not seem to have been badly organized.

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- p. 231 -

Two conclusions can be drawn from a study of Canadian politics at the beginning of the 18th century.

In the first place, the nature of the questions which excited discussion at that time emphsizes the mediocrity, already mentioned, of the majority of men engaged in public life. One is tempted to add that this mediocrity represents faithfully that of the milieu. That would, however, be rather too severe. A generation previously a policy of the calibre of Jean Talon evolved in the same society; it is true that after the first government of Frontenac , when the great intendant sought to return to Quebec, old hostilities sprang up against his possible return and were able to keep away from the colony for ever the man who had served it so well. The most coherent political ideas in these sad years of the 1700s, are not found amongst the administrators but in the vast projects of a soldier, Pierre Le Moyne d'Iberville. D'Iberville, however, ended his career outside Canada, and the established leaders of the colony wrote against him. Perhaps if he had been able to escape his father's domination and come forth from the shade, Antoine-Denis Raudot might have succeeded in making a name for himself: the ideas he expressed on the colonization of Ile Royale show him capable of daring and true opinions, but he was only a young man lost in the rule of old men. As for the upper classes, they were destroying themselves around the wreck of the Company of the Colony which threatened to sink with their possessions. In 1706 the Raudots qualify the country's judges: the quality they recognize in them most freely is that of "honnete homme", which they give to 13 magistrates, including Villeray, in whom they see a "fairly honest man", demonstrating "very little talent"; concerning competence they find five judges "capable", three "fairly capable" and only two "very capable". (252)

The second observation of importance arising from an examination of political life draws attention to the existence of small coalitions gravitating around the ruling power. If we call these groups parties we risk certain errors; if we do not we contribute to perpetuating misunderstandings. In the first case the danger is of anachronism. To avoid it it is important to point out that these "parties" really constituted - p. 232 - pyramids of interests which arose around some old families of whom - a witness has warned us - "each one hated the rise of the others". In addition, in a society where the State is already one of the biggest clients of the merchants, where a permit is necessary to practice trade and where politics penetrates everywhere, the leading citizens' ambitions are tied to economic aspirations: Raudot, it will be remembered, reproached Vaudreuil with making himself master of all permits "necessary to others for their trade." On the other hand, if we do not use the term party, in its widest sense, for the groups in question, we favour the perpetuation of narrow concepts which have done so much harm to the understanding of what happened in Canada before 1760. From the fact that these groups are not based in the popular masses, it is indeed legitimate to conclude that the mentality of the regime excluded the participation of inferieur classes in its government, but it does not follow that it refused entry to all classes. In other words, it would be wrong, merely because these pyramids have a narrow base, to believe that they do not exist. They simply are built only in the upper layers of society. Furthermore contemporaries certainly felt their reality. Raudot explained Vaudreuil's arrogance by the ideas inspired in the governor by the flatterers surrounding him. For his part, the general attributed Raudot's hostility to the manoeuvring of "wicked minds" who obsessed the intendant. Both of them, before accusing each other of being the playthings of rival factions, combined their forces against the powerful "cabal" dominated by Ruette d'Auteuil.

To understand Canadian politics, one must therefore begin by reconstructing the metropolitan and colonial mechanisms. But this is only a first step. One must then try to come into contact with the men who animated those institutions and be careful not to neglect other frameworks which are not at all constitutional: the groups within which the politicians associate their interests, ambitions and passions.

FRÉGAULT, GUY: La Civilisation de la Nouvelle France, 1713-1744. 1969 Montréal: Éditions Fides

- p. 122 - The bureaucracy is reduced to the minimum. There is too much to do in New France for the king to distribute sinecures. One should note that these civil servants, as few as possible, are so badly paid that - p. 123 - at a certain point they suffered a dearth of salesmen and clerks. Bigot complains of it, explaining that it could not happen "otherwise, since the King hardly gives them enough to live on". (109) It would therefore be out of place to deplore, as M. André Maurois has, that New France had "too many judges, bailifs, overseers, all paid by the Colony," especially when it is remembered that all the civil servants of Canada received their salary from the metropolitan government and not from the colonial government.

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From all this it is easy to draw two conclusions. The first is that the administrative mechanism of New France was as simple as could be desired. The result was that the people did not suffer the nuisance caused inevitably by State parasites when they form a numerous, powerful, well-organized class. The second is that the Canadian people only participated in the administration rarely and from a distance. Consequently their role was to make very few decisions and to carry out the orders they received. The first is an undeniable advantage; the second is worth a more lengthy consideration. Let us look at the question more closely, trying to determine the people's part in political life, the nature of the demands imposed on them and their reactions to these demands.

At the start the Canadians - or rather a certain class, the important ones - had a voice in affairs through the King's Council. This was at an early date when the latter exercised a great influence on the administration of the country. No doubt, even then, the councillors were not elected by their compatriots but nevertheless they represented the interests of Canada to the extent that these interests were opposed to those of the metropolis. - p. 124 - However, as we have just stated, the period under study saw the Council humiliated, its prestige broken and its authority reduced to the mere administration of justice.

However, in 1717 an important institution arose. At the request of Quebec and Montreal merchants, the king gave permission to Canadian merchants to meet every day to discuss their business; he allowed them at the same time to elect two delegates responsible for "making the necessary representations on behalf of all of them for the good of their trade". (112) This is not in itself of great significance: merely the interest of a class determined to express itself through these delegates. But by a natural evolutionary process these delegates would eventually represent not only their corporation but also, at times, the entire population of their city. In 1750 the representative of the Quebec merchants would, without raising the slightest opposition nor the mildest protest from the authorities, call himself the representative of "the bourgeois, merchants, and 'habitants' of this city". (113)

The 'habitants' of New France had still other means at their disposal when they wanted to expose their grievances or make their feelings known. First of all there were the assemblies of leading citizens which were customarily convened when the need was felt, but these consultative meetings, though fairly frequent in the 17th century, practically disappeared in the following century. Then there were the requests or remonstrances which Canadians were still welcome to present either to the metropolitan authority or to the colonial administrators. (115) Finally the situation arose frequently where the 'habitants' of a - p. 125 - parish or a seigneurie were consulted about the construction of a church, a bridge or a section of highway. Since these works were usually undertaken by means of forced labour, it was deemed fair, apparently, to consult the opinions of the 'habitants' as to the amount of work they should provide. (116)

Here, nevertheless, a comment of a general nature must be made. When the interests of the community were represented, this representation was rarely of a permanent and official nature. It was always limited to the individual situation. It is easy to find the reason for this: without being hostile to the requests and remonstrances whereby popular sentiment was expressed, the absolute monarchy wished to preserve an individual rather than a social flavour to these initiatives. In other words, it wished to deal with its subjects on a person-to-person level, but found it distasteful to deal on a power-to-power level; let each person speak, if he wished, but in his own name; let no one express himself in the name of everyone.

Did this administration, in which the people played so little part, oppress them heavily? This is a complex question, to which it is impossible to give a categorical answer. It brings us to a realm where institutions are of less importance than the men responsible for applying them. That certain governors and especially certain intendants imposed definitely vexatious measures, is a fact that hardly needs proving because it is a definite part of history. One instance is the intendant Bégon's forbidding the Québecois, on pain of a fifty pound fine, to employ any masons during 1715, so that he could rebuild more quickly the intendant's palace. (117) Another is the act of 1719 allowing agents of the India Company to enter people's houses without warning and to examine the contents to make sure they were not violating the company's monopoly. (118) Another was.......

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- p. 128 - The other reason is found in the Canadians' reactions to power. Parkman adopted the illusion of seeing here a subjected people; he wrote in his best style: "Seigneur, land-owner and citizen were crushed beneath royal authority in degrading subjection." (132) On the contrary, the most authoritative witnesses state exactly the reverse. Scandalized on hearing grumbling in Montréal, Vaudreuil at the end of his career affirms that "the same spirit of mutiny and independence" is found "in all the inhabitants of the countryside". (133) This spirit is so deeply rooted that Beauharnais and Hocquart recognize that it will take a long time to eradicate it. (134) But it is Hocquart who finds the most apt phrase: "They are naturally lacking in docility," (135) he writes of the Canadians. The expression is a useful one. It is no exaggeration.

Authority was often forced to invent. In 1720, despairing of getting the Montrealers to pay up their overdue taxes, Begon thought of siezing the possessions of the wealthier citizens. He soon had to abandon his fine project "so as not to be exposed to the Tumult" which might ensue. (136) Three years earlier Vaudreuil had gone to discuss with the 'habitants' of Longeuil that fine institution known as forced labour; but it turns out that the 'habitants' did not show much taste for the turn the conversation was taking. First they grumbled, then they unloosed their guns and stood at arms for two days and a night. (137) Such reactions are of a kind to give pause even to an absolute authority. There were circumstances in which the will of the people showed itself so inflexible that power had to give in. (138) Furthermore the policing force - p. 129 - was insufficient, especially in the presence of this armed populace, and however much the administration demanded troops, for example asking for three companies of Swiss guards "to enforce the King's authority" (139), His Majesty turned a deaf ear. Besides, the forest opened up everywhere, dense and welcoming: recalcitrants escaped easily beyond reach and the governor's agents could run for ever in vain.........

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What should we conclude? The government of France and the administration of Canada were ruled by certain principles which are as good as many others and in which, it appears, human dignity was valued. New France did not suffer from absolutism; for these men, not touched by British ideas of Reform, this doctrine was an old habit of mind with which they could get along comfortably. Serving the king was an honour as much as a duty. "Service of God, service of the king, was a complete formula for these Frenchmen, these Catholics of the 17th century." (140) In this respect the Canadians of the following century had not changed. The public order reflects the moral order.

In describing the functioning of New France's institutions we cannot fail to observe, on the one hand, that they rarely offend by excessive complexity, while, on the other hand, they do suffer from an obvious shortage of representative organizations.

Rarely consulted, men who were ready to die for their country at the first sign of danger revealed a very understandable lack of interest in public life. In general it was sufficient for these great individualists "who do nothing, it is said, unless the fancy takes them," (141) to prevent power from annoying them, to go their own sweet way observing the laws when they were good, evading them.........

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- p. 218 - "The difference between the manners and customs of the French in Montreal and Canada, and those of the English in the American colonies, is the same as between these two nations in Europe." (34) "Here, everyone is Monsieur or Madame, the peasant as well as the gentleman, the peasant woman as well as the great lady." (35) This is quite explicit. Is more required? One has only to re-read Begon's correspondence to see that a very polished society existed in Montreal in the 1750s. (36) M. Claude de Bonnault, who analysed this important document in detail, summarized his impressions as follows: "As if they were not sure of tomorrow, because risk was for these men their daily bread, they hastened to enjoy everything. They wanted to live with all their strength, they read, they wrote as much as they were able, they danced, they played cards frantically, and they loved. They loved one another a lot in Canada in those days. A remarkable concern with charity had humanized the way of life. Speaking generally (37) they did not torture the accused, they did not persecute anyone for his opinions, there were few assassinations, they only killed one another in duels by accident...... Nothing, in short, disturbed the harmony of society, because nothing prevented anyone from arriving where he wanted to be." (38)

At that time the Austrian War of Succession was just over and the Seven Years' War was about to start. - p. 219 - Soon the fate of New France would be at stake. The country would be covered with ruins. The people would be terribly beaten. But the civilization it represented was destined to survive because it was the product of a slow and sure historical development, because, in the 30 years of peace granted to it between 1713 and 1744, Canada was made real. It became a moral entity, a complete being, a new nation, supported by a past whose irreducible power thrust it into the future.

FRÉGAULT, GUY: "Les Finances canadiennes" reprinted in Le XVIIIe siècle canadien - Études, Collections Constantes: 1968 Montreal, Editions HMH.

- p. 350 - These statements help us to point out a phenomenon we have already noted in another study. Between 1720 and 1743 there is no lack of testimony to Canada's poverty. Charlevoix declared in 1720 that the 'habitants' were going "naked", especially those in the settlements far from the towns, because they could not sell the townspeople "all the surplus from their produce". In the previous year the Bishop of Quebec wrote, "The hardships of the colony increase every day." In 1724 Vaudreuil pitied the suffering of the poor. In 1733 Hocquart reckoned that the majority of Canadians "need extreme thrift and hard work to make a living". In 1738 Dosquet spoke no differently. In 1743 Hocquart represented the colony as a "miserable" country. And that was only the tip of the iceberg.

However, now we come to the middle of the century. Now observers change their tone. Whether it be Kalm, Franquet, J.C.B., or Montcalm, they all emphasize the founding of important fortunes, commercial activity and the ease of the 'habitants'. Montcalm compares them with "minor gentlemen of France". Bougainville says that they should not be considered peasants. Others describe the luxurious clothing the women wear. We have seen that Pontbriand advised the imposition of an import tax on silk. Franquet, as Salone astutely recalls, was so well received by an 'habitant' of Lachenaie that he found himself reflecting, on leaving his host's house, that the king ought to "tax somewhat" people who lived so grandly. (288)

Should we dismiss these two groups of observers without credence? On the contrary, let us remember what they say but without forgetting at what time they were speaking. The first were seeing Canadian society at the time when it received little from the king. Not that he gave them nothing at all: between 1730 and 1740 he maintained the ironworks of Saint-Maurice, he ensured the success of naval construction by his subsidies and even more by his orders, and finally he contributed to agricultural expansion by reserving for the colony the Louisbourg market. However, in spite of the subsidies benefitting industry, the State expenditures continued to decrease in proportion to the population, and agricultural progress did not compensate for the recession in the fur trade.

- p. 351 - After 1743 contemporary accounts coincide just as well as before that date with the facts presented in this essay. The French government now allocates large sums to the defense of Canada. In proportion to the country's population it invests 3.5 times more money between 1740 and 1750 than between 1730 and 1740. At the same time the fur trade kept going. Did revenues from the soil increase? We do not know. But even if they fell to the level from which they had started between 1710 and 1720, the resultant loss would be largely made up by State spending. We must, then, conclude that the difference between the sums France invested in its colonial enterprise before and after 1743 is reflected in a clearly marked variation in Canada's wellbeing.

In this way it becomes evident what an essential role the metropolitan State played in the development of Canada. The extent of this role - which proves itself as decisive when the French government plays it well as when it plays it badly - proceeds from precise causes and gives rise to certain consequences. It would take us too long to analyse these. We will content ourselves with indicating the principal ones. Since Parkman's work it has become banal to emphasize the economic control exercised over Canada. Considering the direct and indirect activity of the State in the financing of colonial enterprises, would it not be inconceivable that matters should develop any other way? On the other hand, it was not capriciously, not even because it was important to it, that the State made its presence felt everywhere. This policy was imposed on France as it was imposed on Canada, and France resigned herself to it - somewhat unwillingly - because no other policy was available: the manner in which she assumed its costs should be sufficient to prove that.

To colonize is essentially to transplant men organized as a society into a territory suitable for exploitation. With the men travel ideas, techniques, capital, along with the establishment of policy, the management of an economy and the development of social structures. Population appears to be the first of the factors conditioning the growth of a colony. It may be favoured in the metropolis by economic and ideological pressures which determine emigration, and in the territory to be colonized by - p. 352 - the wealth and variety of exploitable resources. In other words, colonial populations are not established and do not increase by reason of the importance of the metropolitan populations: at that rate it would have been France who poured the most people into the New World; they are strengthened by reason of the needs compelling groups of men to emigrate and, at the same time, by reason of the attraction exercised by the new country on these people. These two sets of causes may play a strong or weaker role. If they play a strong role colonization gives the impression of developing by means of its own internal dynamism, without the metropolitan State's being forced to play a dominant role. In the opposite case the government of the mother country is all the more concerned about organizing the populating of the colony, paying the costs of its administration, financing its industry, providing outlets (internal and external) for its commerce.

In both cases, one can see the State and Society working together: it would be untrue to say that Society acts alone in the first and the State alone in the second. What is true is that in the first case Society contributes most heavily (because it profits by it) and in the second the State pays the greater share (because Society, though making a real contribution, does not feel it to be profitable to do more). Does this mean that colonization is better when it is mostly carried out by Society than when it is mostly carried out by the State? There would seem no reason for this to be so. One must not forget that the State and Society are closely linked and that, consequently, the same people, the same ideas and the same techniques are seen at work within the two. The question of the quality of colonization is a false problem. It is the density of colonization that counts. Obviously colonization will be more dense if it is more profitable and the role of the State will be more limited in proportion to that of Society when the difficulties of establishing settlements are less and the immediately realizable profits are greater. Thus, when the State is forced to play a major role it is a bad sign: not because the State performs its job badly, but because it is natural that failing enterprises will be abandoned to its care.

The French government's attitude towards Canada, the choice of methods it applied to the management of the country, and the eventual fate of the colonization it started there can all be explained in this way.

OUELLET, FERNAND: "Mr. Michel Brunet and the problem of the Conquest", Bulletin des Recherches Historiques Vol 61, 1955, pp 92-101.

- p. 92 - Michel Brunet has attracted attention through his efforts to impose a new interpretation of Canadian history. This new interpretation is based on two factors: the Conquest and French-Canadian nationalism. But is this position indeed a new one? We can find numerous precursors to it. In fact it is to be found in the works of most of the nationalists in the past who attributed to the Conquest all the evils that afflicted French Canadian society. This enabled them to avoid questioning the institutions in which they lived. For them there was no need to seek a solution to our problems through a knowledge of the milieu and through reforms, the Conquest was uniquely to blame. Such an attitude is particularly strong among the most conservative nationalists and also among historians. For them the focal point of Canadian history was an event which escaped any analysis and which had determined irrevocably the destinies of the French Canadian population. To raise their hopes and to escape defeatism, they had constructed for themselves a past of which they wanted to be proud. Seeing the period of the French regime as the golden age of nationalism, historians envisaged the period after the Conquest as a hopeless struggle on the part of a people to regain that lost paradise in spite of an implacable destiny. Having its roots in a past which they saw as a mystical, military epic, embued with bravoury, unselfishness and heroism, nationalism seemed to them a supreme value on which they claimed to base the present and build the future. They had read Thierry, Taine, Guizot, Tocqueville, Fustel de Coulanges and even Voltaire. They, too, believed they were working scientifically. The idea they constructed of the Conquest had much more serious repercussions than the Conquest itself.

It is in this tradition that one must view the members of a new school of historians which has appeared in the last few years. It is true that they do not believe in Dollard des Ormeaux, in Madeleine de Verchères and in the profound morality of the men of the French regime, but they remain nevertheless the spiritual sons of the historians of the previous period. - p. 93 - For them the conquest is still present as a powerful and inescapable determinant. Such is the meaning of an article published by Michel Brunet and entitled The English conquest and the failure of the Canadian bourgeoisie. This article poses the important question of the repercussions of the Conquest on social groups. In this field professor Brunet's article seems to us to make an interesting and positive contribution. But this does not imply that we accept the conclusions and statements on which the work is based. On the contrary, we see in this study an attempt to apply once more to the past the criteria of present nationalistic thinking.

However, the author claims to base his article on essentially scientific lines. He invokes certain data from economics and sociology. But this is merely a screen. He states also that he rejects modes of judgment made popular by Marxist historians and idealists. But where can one place Mr. Brunet within the contemporary scientific movement? In the realist school, he tells us! "Rejecting all determinism, economic or other," he proclaims, "the historians of the realist school have tried to describe as exactly as possible how our modern society was built up. Adopting a rigorous scientific method, they have made use of the science of economics and sociology (p. 19)." We see here a highly commendable ambition. This is why we are going to try and examine his study in the light of the method he advocates.

Professor Brunet begins his essay with a statement which seems to him generally accepted: capitalist bourgeoisie "has been the ruling class of the modern western world" and it is this class that "has made the Atlantic world". He deduces from this that "deprived of this elite a 19th century society could not develop normally". Such seems to him to be the case of French-Canadian society in 1800. But how can one explain such a social deficiency? For the historian wishing to discover profound realities a first solution appears possible: the society under French rule might not have possessed an authentically capitalist bourgeoisie. But then the myth of the Golden Age of French rule vanishes and at the same time nationalism loses its strongest legitimization: its support from history. One can understand why Professor Brunet did not make this hypothesis and why he constructs his study around the determinism of the

Conquest. This explains the deficiencies in his analysis of Canadian society under French rule.

- p. 94 -

A - CANADIAN BOURGEOISIE UNDER THE FRENCH REGIME

Mr. Brunet assures us, first of all, that "New France had its bourgeoisie." "The latter," he adds, "had its command posts in commerce, industry, the army and the administration. It consisted of nobles and commoners, Frenchmen and Canadians." (p.20) This statement leads us to ask what Mr. Brunet means by bourgeoisie. This notion appears so clear to him that he points out Garneau's and Bibaud's inability to define it. More serious still, he shows no hesitation in defining it himself. "We give the name 'bourgeoisie' to that elite class of rich merchants and businessmen, land-owners, military men and administrators who formed the natural and indispensible framework of colonial society before 1760." (p. 25 n. 8) Such a definition makes the historian's work easier since he only has to prove the existence of traders, land-owners, soldiers and administrators to conclude the existence of a capitalist spirit. This poses a fundamental problem with respect to Mr. Brunet's article. No doubt one cannot reproach him for not defining the terms he uses, but it is important to question the value of his concepts applied to a particular situation. What is a bourgeois?

Sombart and the contributors to "Annales d'Histoire économique et sociale" who have studied the question, stated that it is impossible to give a definition of a social type. They tried instead to discover attitudes, a conception of life and an economic pattern of behaviour. Halbwicks did the same. All these researchers came to the same conclusion that there was not one bourgeoisie but several bourgeoisies. Sombart, for example, points out different types of bourgeois from one century to another and from one country to another. One must take into account historical evolution and social and economic conditions. There are differences between Jacques Coeur, the Venetian merchants, Fugger, B. Franklin, Cecil Rhodes, Carnegie, etc. Also there are bourgeoisies of minor shop keepers, legal men, intellectuals, public officials, members of certain middle classes. The latter groups may be considered to form bourgeoisies to the extent that they penetrated the modes of thought peculiar to the bourgeois. One must therefore try to discover the elements which underlie their group consciousness. It becomes obvious what a problem is posed by Mr. Brunet's attitude, when he claims to enclose the bourgeoisie within a rigid definition without considering these diversities. Furthermore, this part of his work is not based on personal research. It is based - p. 95 - mostly on the works of Guy Frégault, who has not studied the question as such, and on the thesis of E. Lund, who did not raise the question of a Canadian bourgeoisie. This over-simplified conception of the bourgeoisie, and the inadequacy of his documentation have led the writer to include the nobility in the capitalist bourgeoisie. This confusion seems to us particularly important if one approaches the question from the point of view of the attitudes and view of life of the bourgeois and the nobleman. Riches do not mean the same thing for one and the other.

Aware of individual values, the capitalist bourgeois is characterized by his economic dynamism. Consequently he rejects all paternalism while remaining capable of using political power for his own ends. His activity is oriented towards production. He shows in his business affairs a sense of precision, calculation, foresight and opportunity. He has an extremely developed love of order. In short, he tries to rationalize completely his economic behaviour. He avoids luxury, without being miserly, and he uses his capital for the creation of new wealth. Can we say that the society of New France enjoyed such a class? We hesitate to believe it for a number of reasons.

Firstly Canadian society at that time was a society of the "Ancien Régime", its social magnetic pole being the nobility. The demands of the milieu helped to accentuate this phenomenon. This means that the nobility's view of life as well as their peculiar economic behaviour attracted the majority of individuals. A large number of noblemen were seen to engage in the fur trade. This was a means for them to refurbish their fortunes. Like the European nobility, the Canadian nobility had a taste for luxury, sumptuous feasts, etc. To be convinced of this one need only look at post-mortem inventories: luxurious furniture, imposing silver, fancy carriages, large debts, etc. It will be - p. 96 - objected that a large part of the nobility was made up of military men and former merchants. This shows us that a good number of merchants sought wealth for the social rank it conferred on them. Furthermore, Murray was to state after the Conquest that the Canadian nobility was conscious of its titles and proud of its ancestors. This implies a serious deficiency in Mr. Brunet's work.

Professor Brunet also failed to take into account one factor which has important social and economic repercussions: economic control. The French regime saw the State take control over all economic activity. Agriculture, industry, money and commerce were tightly controlled. The majority of large economic undertakings appear to us to be artificial creations. The State intervenes into even the smallest details of economic life and secret denunciation appears to have been a powerful and normal way of forcing the individual to accept this economic paternalism. Monopolies of all kinds also contributed towards crushing any individual initiative. One can say that the individual at the time of New France was economically stifled. The only means of escaping the system was to become "coureur des bois". Trade, industry and the fisheries were concentrated in the hands of a few privileged people and in those of public servants whose mode of action was misappropriation of funds, simple opportunism, fraud, etc. They were to leave the country at the time of the Conquest because they realized that their careers as prevaricators were over. About them Professor Brunet states: "Are we to be the last to recognize the creative audacity and the successes of Canadian bourgeoisie during the period of New France?" (p. 22) "These men, so severely punished, were also great business entrepreneurs, similar to those who built the capitalist economies of all western nations." (p, 24) This is a puzzling position for a historian to take. Certainly, capitalists have often conducted their affairs outside the restraints imposed by religious morality; but this does not mean that they were not imbued with a business-world morality implicitly recognized by most members of dynamic bourgeoisies. The studies of Weber, Tawney and Sombart are very explicit on this point. The absence of such a morality amongst the supposed capitalists of New France is strangely significant in relation to Mr. Brunet's thesis. He tells us also that there were forty millionaires at the end of the French regime. But what does that mean? It is not enough to have money to be a capitalist; one must have acquired it in a capitalist fashion and use it in a capitalist fashion. What made a man into a millionaire at that time? Owning - p. 97 - a million pounds? Is this statement backed by a study of prices?

All this implies that the individual who had a business sense had to tag along behind a group whose sole function was to exploit the country for its personal benefit. However, we believe we must look for the existence of a capitalist spirit within the group that Brunet qualifies as the second layer of the bourgeoisie. Certainly a large number of these merchants enjoyed a taste for risks, adventure and even a spirit of enterprise on their arrival in Canada. But could this mentality develop and flourish? Wasn't it tightly restricted by economic controls, monopolies and the civil servants' hold on economic activity? Wasn't this seed of the capitalist spirit transformed by the appeal of the nobility's way of life? This factor seems to us rather influential in a colonial society of the 18th century where the aristrocratic system existed and where a fully developed nobility set the tone. Brunet shows us, for example, that this second layer of the bourgeoisie had viewed the Conquest favourably. This means that these bourgeois were reacting against an economic order which had prevented them from becoming authentic capitalists. At the same time it shows us that they were imbued with a somewhat capitalistic spirit since they believed that the Conquest would allow them to establish themselves with complete freedom in the economic field. The failure Brunet speaks of is not a failure but purely and simply a disappearance. After the Conquest they were to be eliminated from the field of business because they were not prepared to enter an economic order in which, in order to succeed, one must be a true entrepreneur, capable of conducting business without the direction of the State. This is the phenomenon Brunet points out when he describes their inability to adapt to new commercial techniques. All this imposes important limitations on anyone trying to affirm the existence of a capitalist bourgeoisie at the time of New France. The cases of Augustin

Legardeur de Courtemanche and Raymond Martel seem particularly significant to us in this respect.

A soldier by profession, De Courtemanche had managed to obtain privileges for trading on the coast of Labrador. We know also that his commerce included numerous interests: fishing, furs, imports. A number of bills reveal the size of several of his transactions: from 3,000 to 75,000 pounds. Likewise the profits he realized might lead us - p. 98 - to see in him a first class capitalist. But on examining the documents we reach different conclusions.

In 1693 he formed a sleeping partnership company with Raymond Martel. Courtemanche supplied a capital of 15,834 pounds and Martel added 3,808 pounds to this. They agreed to divide the profits equally. Until 1698 the company seems to have prospered. It dealt in fishing, furs and especially the import business (fabrics, drinks, clothing, utensils, etc.). In this way it made worthwhile profits. The balance of payments shows an average credit of 20%. But in 1703 the company was declared bankrupt. How can one explain this situation? Sudden large-scale changes in prices? Let us take, for example, the price of wheat during this period: 1692 - 5 pounds 2 sous per minot [= 39 litres approximately]; 1693 - 6 pounds; 1694 - 4 pounds; 1695 - 2 pounds 5 sous; 1696 - 3 pounds 10 sous; 1697 - 5 pounds 5 sous; 1698 - 3 pounds 5 sous; 1699 - 3 pounds; 1700 - 3 pounds; and 1701 - 3 pounds. Variations in maritime insurance rates? During the same period these rates varied from 6 to 19%. Monetary problems? Exchange rate difference of 25% between France and Canada. Problems in cashing letters of credit: four or five months and sometimes more. In spite of these problems the company saw its profits rise from 5,155 pounds the first year to 11,253 pounds in 1698. How, then, is the bankruptcy to be explained? Drop in prices in 1698 and the following years? No doubt these factors may have contributed to the liquidation of an apparently flourishing enterprise. But we believe that above all psychological factors account for this failure. A letter from Billate, businessman of Larochelle, nevertheless credits Martel with having the qualities of a good businessman: sense of opportunity for making money, a taste for risks, accuracy and respect for promises made. He reproaches him only for certain errors in accounting. In short, Martel seems to have been an alert businessman capable of managing his affairs. But what about Augustin de Courtemanche?

Martel's wife, in 1703, accused Courtemanche outright of causing the bankruptcy. "During the time when Martel was working hardest and was saving money, risking his life on the seas to make a livelihood, the afore-mentioned gentlemen and Mme de Courtemanche were living so luxuriously that from the time of the ships' departure to their arrival they had spent 6,000 pounds, which makes 18,000 pounds in three years, without bothering to keep orderly accounts for the company nor making any profits - a time during which Sieur de Courtemanche could have kept a business record and done what he asks today." - p. 99 - Courtemanche also seems to have taken up gambling. She reproaches him finally of having made trips and expeditions at the company's expense "to gain honour and glory" rather than to increase business profits. Here we can see the opposition of two completely different mentalities: that of the capitalist and that of the nobility. Nor is this an isolated case. The majority of people with a capitalist spirit found themselves in a similar situation because of the power of this pre-capitalist economic behaviour and because of the control exercised over the business world by the privileged, who were characterized by their propensity for consumption rather than production.

We believe, nevertheless, that Canadian society before 1760 did have its bourgeoisie: small shopkeepers, tradesmen, civil servants, who strove generally for wealth because of the social rank it conceded and because of the standard of living which resulted from it. But the causes we have listed contributed towards preventing the growth of a true capitalist spirit. Thus the Conquest merely liquidated a system of economic exploitation. This task was not to be completed since the seigneurial regime would be preserved intact.

A - Canadian Society in the Second Half of the XVIIIth Century

Canadian society at the time of New France had lived under the most complete absolutism. In France social groups had succeeded in moderating absolutism by their traditions and their "freedoms" which formed a barrier in the face of political power. In New France there was no counter-weight to ruling power other than recourse to the king and the competition between politicians and clergy for control of the population. Even there the people found themselves faced with two forms of absolutism. After 1760 the Canadian population lost contact with political power, which only reached the people through the Bishop and the priests. The seigneurie and the parish thus form the true framework within which the French Canadians lived. Mr. Brunet timidly points out these realities to us. But that does not imply that they are "unavoidable" consequences of the Conquest. The seigneurie had begun to play a fundamental role in the formation of French Canadian mentality from the beginning of the century. Likewise the power of the clergy over the population had been firmly established since the 17th century. The Conquest would merely accentuate phenomena already in full growth. Further, another social fact contributed towards strengthening the power of the clergy: the decadence of the nobility.

- p. 100 - Mr. Brunet, having included the nobility within the bourgeoisie at the time of the French regime, did not understand this social reality. Canadian nobility during the second half of the century was gradually losing its importance. This was not the result of the Conquest but that of economic changes. During this period capitalism played a more important role in economic life. The American War of Independence and the French Revolution stimulated an increase in activity. Thus a rise in prices occurred. British capitalists got rich from it. How did the French Canadian population react to these new possibilities? The peasant, because of his mentality and the limits within which he lived, continued, in the majority of cases, to produce almost entirely for his own subsistence and the satisfaction of his primary needs. Mr. Brunet assures us of the opposite. But he did not try to discover the differences between the economic tools of the peasant of 1760 and those of 1800. If he had, his conclusions would certainly have been different.

For his part, the nobleman continued to lose money. A few noblemen, in order to adapt, engaged in the fur trade. Such is the case of Lacorne de

Saint-Luc. But these were exceptions. Economic factors played against the majority of noblemen. It is impossible to detect among the noblemen a movement towards the buying back of lands from their copyholders, which would signify an evolution towards the rule of large land-holdings. On the contrary, inheritance practices led to breaking up properties. The increase in rent and property-holding rates seems to us to have been definitely lower than that of prices. The maintenance of a subsistence economy amongst tenant farmers kept revenues from minor sources quite low. In addition the low mobility of landed property in the countryside prevented inheritance sales from constituting a significant income. To maintain a way of life in keeping with their social rank, a good number of noblemen were forced to sell their seigneuries and the majority of others were forced to go into debt. As a result many were seen to try and enter the civil service; others tried to repair their family honour by marrying their daughters to rich businessmen. They also continued to push their sons into military careers. Such was the case of Salaberry. Instead of taking pity on them kneeling before the Foreigner, Mr. Brunet could have directed his research towards this phenomenon, which is much more important than the study of a social disaster which did not take place. This does not mean that the Conquest did not have important repercussions.

The conclusions reached by Mr. Brunet do not result from an analysis of basic realities; they derive from ideas - p. 101 - which form the basis of all nationalist thought in its return to History: the Golden Age of French rule, the determinism of the Conquest, and the idea of a nationality constituted in the first half of the 18th century. To affirm still more strongly these nationalist imperatives, he has constructed the thesis of a capitalist bourgeoisie, a dynamic elite of Canadian society at the time of New France. If he had sought, for example, the origin of French Canadian nationalism, he would have realized that the idea of belonging to a French Canadian nation is associated with the birth of a liberal bourgeoisie in the first half of the 19th century. In short, one can say that Mr. Brunet's article fits into a tradition of historians who, under cover of a scientific spirit, have revealed themselves to be the servants of an ideology which, more than the Conquest, has been the source of our problems. Finally, we could not help but notice with some amusement the strange origin his gives to the phenomenon of the Stock Exchange in Canada. At the same time as having held up a scientific method for criticism, we have tried to point out research details which we consider extremely important for the understanding of our social environment.

Fernand OUELLET

HAMELIN, JEAN: Économie et société en Nouvelle France, Les Presses Universitaires Laval, 1960.

- p. 136 - ....This is the great problem of the economic history of New France. The merchant class, constantly burdened with work to be done, was incapable of getting organized to take advantage of the natural resources of the colony. Here are some texts which give a good picture of their inability to cope with the necessary work:

1679 "There are so few people in this country able to work the iron mines, which are discovered and abundant, that without the help of people from France there is no hope of finding anyone here to undertake it." (21)

1682 "It is very difficult to succeed (trade with the islands), there being no one here well enough established in business to undertake it, though it would bring prosperity and would greatly relieve the people." (22)

1706 "The merchants are so badly in debt and so poor that they only have a very small interest, if any at all, in the ships coming to this country (......) The merchant in this country is in no condition to carry on this trade by himself." (23)

1708 "This enterprise (naval construction) would cost too much for His Majesty and there is no one in this country who can undertake this construction." (24)

1709 "I encourage all tradesmen to increase it (trade) and all they need is the strength to do so." (25)

1714 "The traders of this country will always be poor as long as they take more from France than they put back." (26)

1729 "The inhabitants are so poor that they cannot undertake big enterprises (that is the inhabitants of the colony in general)" (27)

1735 "The greatest obstacle to trade in this colony derives from the lack of prosperity among the traders, who for the most part only maintain their trade by means of funds from others. At the first setback they cannot satisfy the French merchants who advance them funds and they are ruined by the fines or interests which they are forced to pay." (28)

1741 "The majority of tradesmen in Canada not having, in fact, enough funds to make large supplies of grain..." (27)

- p. 137 - These reflections on Canadian traders are not unquestionable. They should be checked and verified with private and notarial archives. Nevertheless one may suppose that the emigration of some traders in 1760 and the ruin of those who stayed in the colony - if there was indeed ruin - are only one aspect of a much deeper problem. Indeed, supposing there were an established bourgeoisie in big business, owning lucrative industries, what would happen then? They would not emigrate. Did the habitant who owned land emigrate? The majority of those who did emigrate were salesmen or members of metropolitan companies, transients, civil servants who had taken up commerce, Canadians whose activities were dependent on those of French traders and military suppliers. The absence of a strong French Canadian bourgeoisie in 1800 thus appears to be the result of the French regime, not a result of the Conquest. For the problem of French colonization in Canada is one of not being able to form a French Canadian bourgeoisie based on the rational exploitation of the natural resources of the country. Trade with the metropolis, the great fisheries and the monopoly of the beaver trade were in the hands of the metropolitans, while the shipbuilding yard and the St. Maurice ironworks were in those of the king.

OUELLET, FERNAND: "Un Problème économique et sociale"
Bulletin des Recherches Historiques, Vol. 59
1953: pp 157-161

- p. 157 - A Social and Economic Problem

The village, "the very expression of rural life" (1), has not been studied much by historians of French Canada. Émile Salone, in his study on The Colonization of New France , stated that "in this province of Quebec we would not know what a village is, in the normal meaning of the word, if we did not have the evidence of the remains of Jean Talon's work." (2) Talon's failure signifies that New France at the time had not developed sufficiently to support villages. The reason French Canada had few villages is that the need for them was not felt economically until quite late. For 1753 and 1754 we have the charters of three villages and one "bourg" (3). It will suffice here to give the text of "the charter of the village of Château-Richer" and to show the problems posed by the actual text of the document. A study of the economic evolution of the seigneurie of Beaupré and that of the village of Château-Richer would certainly present some problems concerning the economic and social history of French Canada.

A - CHARTER OF THE VILLAGE OF CHÂTEAU-RICHER (4)

(15 January, 1753)

Mis. Duquesne and François Bigot.

With regard to the request presented to us by the Clergy of the Foreign Missions Seminary established in this City, Seigneur de la Coste de Beaupré, thinking that it would be very useful for the inhabitants of the parishes of the afore-mentioned Coste to establish and settle a village - p. 158 - at the place called Château-Richer, which is about in the centre of the afore-mentioned parishes, and that this village, far from prejudicing the clearing and working of the land, would on the contrary be favourable for it, in that, there being few artisans in these parishes, most of the inhabitants are forced to come to Quebec to buy their tools and agricultural implements, or to get them repaired, which causes not only considerable expense but also great waste of time, whereas if an area were set aside for a village, artisans of all kinds would be able to settle there and build houses on lots allocated for that purpose. Furthermore, if such establishments are to be set up this should be done especially in Coste de Beaupré, whence the 'habitants' have difficulty getting away during much of the autumn and spring because of the flooding of the Falls of Montmorency, and since there are already the beginnings of a village in the eight or ten concessions established on plain lots, since it is the seat of the seigneur where courts of justice are held for the whole Coste; and for these reasons they beg us to set up the afore-mentioned village, about four arpents wide one arpent is approximately one acre by four arpents deep, including their Domain in the afore-mentioned parish along the waterfront extending from one side in the N.E. to the line separating the said Domain from the land at present owned by the heirs of Étienne Godière called La Pointe and by Pierre Gagnon, in the S.W. to the line which separates the above-mentioned Domain from the land of one Francois Verrau (53) in front at the St. Lawrence River and behind at the line of the square which separates the said Domain from the land conceded to various 'habitants'; the afore-mentioned request is signed by Villiers, Priest Superior of the Seminary.

With regard also to the King's Ordinance of April 28, 1745, by which in article three His Majesty allows the "habitants" of the towns and villages already established and to be established in future by the Governor General and the Intendant of this country, to make whatever establishments on whatever land they see fit.

We in consequence, having regard to the said request, have established and do establish by these presentations a village at the said place named Château Richer, situated in the said Coste de Beaupré of about four arpents in depth along the water's edge according to the limits designated above in which the suppliants will be required to fix boundary posts established by a sworn surveyor. Within the area of the said village we allow all 'habitants', artisans, workmen and others to set up whatever establishments they judge suitable on the sites which will be - p. 159 - sold or conceded to them in conformity with the ordinary rules and customs of the Voyrie and of the Police; and the present notice will be read and publicized everywhere necessary and registered at the office of the jurisdiction of Beaupré. Ordered at Quebec, 15 January, 1753.

For copying

Signed Duquesne and Bigot

B - AN ATTEMPT AT EXPLANATION

1. Request presented by the Seigneur: Is this an attempt of the Seminary to preserve the closed economy represented by the seigneurial regime, in its full force, by avoiding any contact between the "habitants" and the city and its facilities? If so we should see in the Seminary's action an attempt to defend a system which proved non-viable. Or did the Seminary wish to face "a responsible collectivity rather than isolated individuals"? In that case one must understand the request as an action of purely social intent. In spite of these two possibilities we see in the Seminary's action an attempt to solve economic problems created merely by agricultural progress. This being so, it would appear that the village would bring to rural life an element which the seigneurial regime was incapable of providing. The village thus would mark a step in the colonization process.

2. Seigneur de la Côte de Beaupré: First granted in 1636, the seigneurie of the Côte de Beaupré had been acquired by Monsignor de Laval in 1662. From 1680 this seigneurie of 16 lieues [1 lieue = 4 km.] by 6 lieues had been the property of the Quebec Seminary.

3. Village: With Talon there had been a fruitless attempt at creating villages. This failure is explained by the fact that Talon had wanted to create a system which did not yet answer to economic needs. An institution is not created by will-power. "The village is a grouping of people: this is its social aspect; it is buildings being erected, a form of habitation: this is its geographical or morphological aspect; it is also a continuous stretch of arable land with dependencies and limits. The two first aspects cannot be conceived without the third, nor can the administrative or functional aspect which

dominates the other two." (5) They wanted a village because, economically, the seigneurial regime did not succeed in providing a complete economy. - p. 160 -

4. In the centre of the parish area: Château-Richer was not to have a purely agricultural function; but it was hoped that it would play the role of intermediary between the urban and rural economies. The geographical situation appears to have been the chief element in the choice of Château-Richer as the village for the Côte de Beaupré.

5. Parishes: The seigneurie of Côte de Beaupré included at that time six parishes. Château-Richer had been formed as a parish in 1684. The parish has a purely religious meaning (6). The parish, by grouping people around the bell-tower, helps to integrate the spiritual into the economic structure. To answer religious needs one creates a parish, to answer economic needs one creates a village.

6. Favourable for the cultivation of the land: This phrase signifies that the village is conceived as an essential element in the rural economy. A request for the creation of a village is not made to assure commercial or industrial interests, but to assure those of agriculture.

7. Artisans: Clearly, the time had gone when the farmer could be at the same time agriculturalist, blacksmith, carpenter, etc. What they were hoping for was a greater specialization of jobs. The seigneurial regime, a purely agricultural economic structure, appeared unable to meet all economic needs; it was imposing restrictions on the inhabitants' initiative.

8. Sites conceded for that purpose: Here the Seigneur speaks. In a system whose fundamental wealth is land, one does not ask that land be sold; but one makes a request in keeping with the spirit of the existing economic structure. In a country where money is assuming more and more importance because of the existence of commercial capitalism on the borders of the seigneurial regime, this request shows the opposition between capitalism and the seigneurial regime.

9. Flooding of the Falls: This is not the

essential reason for the request; it is a secondary one with economic repercussions. - p. 161 -

10. Beginnings of a village: The village does not correspond to a fantasy but to needs created by the evolution of the rural economy.

11. They beg us: Though the Seminary presents this request it is because the 'habitants' themselves have realized that they must create a place inhabited by skilled workers. The 'habitants'' request is not the fruit of philosophical reasoning but appears as the result of pressure from economic factors.

12. The king's ordinance: We have not been able to find this ordinance.

13. Villages established: We have not found any ordinance earlier than 1753 establishing villages.

14. Boundary Posts established by a "sworn surveyor": "There are no villages without a fixed, designated area." (7)

15. Sold or conceded: Bigot, a bourgeois long established in trade, knew very well that land could be sold. However, he does not go against the system, preserving the seigneur's freedom to sell or concede.

16. (Note) It is to be noted that the village is not seen as provided with its own administration.

This document is important because it presents the whole problem of the village in French Canada. It shows us all the economic factors which necessitated the creation of a village within the seigneurie of Côte de Beaupré. This seigneurie, which had existed since 1636, was still not very well developed in 1753. In 1762 there would still only be 730 acres under cultivation for a total population of 2,000. (8) Behind the Charter of the village of Château-Richer one can see the whole process of the seigneurial regime. It becomes evident that Victor Morin's idea, according to which "our seigneurial regime, imitated from the good aspects of the French feudal system, but improved to suit the needs of the country", was the perfect solution to provide Canada with a complete economy, is not justified. (9) The whole question of the seigneurial regime should be studied again from a more objective standpoint.

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. . . . This is the great problem of the economic history of New-France. The merchant class, constantly overburdened with tasks at hand, was incapable of getting organized to take advantage of the natural resources of the colony. Here are some texts which give a good picture of their inability to cope with the necessary work:

- 1679 - "There are so few people in this country able to work the iron mines, which are discovered and abundant, that without the help of people from France there is no hope of finding anyone here to undertake it". (21)

- 1682 - "It is very difficult to succeed (trade with the Islands) there being no one here well enough established in business to undertake it, though it would bring prosperity and would greatly relieve the people." (22)

- 1706 - "The merchants are so badly in debt and so poor that they only have a very small interest, if any at all, in the ships coming to this country (....) The Merchant in this country is in no condition to carry on this trade by himself." (23)

- 1708 - "This enterprise (naval construction) would cost too much for His Majesty and there is no one in this country who can undertake this construction." (24)

- 1709 - "I encourage all tradesmen to increase it (trade) and all they need is the strength to do so." (25)

- 1714 - "The traders of this country will always be poor as long as they take more from France than they put back." (26)

- 1729 - "The inhabitants are so poor that they cannot undertake big enterprises (that is the inhabitants of the colony in general)" (27)

- 1735 - "The greatest obstacle to trade in this colony derives from the lack of prosperity among the traders, who for the most part only maintain their trade by means of funds from others. At the first setback they cannot satisfy the French merchants who advance them funds and they are ruined by the fines or interests which they are forced to pay." (28)

- 1741 - "The majority of tradesmen in Canada not having, in fact, enough funds to make large supplies of "bleds"...." (29)

- p. 137 - These reflections on Canadian tradesmen are not without question. They should be checked and verified with private and notarial archives. Nevertheless one may suppose thit the emigration of some tradesmen in 1760 and the ruin of those who stayed in the colony - if there was indeed ruin - are only one aspect of a much deeper problem. Indeed, supposing there were an established bourgeoisie in big business, owning lucrative industries, what would happen then? They would not emigrate. Did the habitant who owned land emigrate? The majority of those who did emigrate were salesmen or members of metropolitan companies, transients, civil servants who had taken up commerce, Canadians whose activities were dependent on those of French tradesmen and military suppliers. The absence of a strong French-Canadian bourgeoisie in 1800 thus appears to be the result of the French regime, not a result of the Conquest. For the problem of French colonization in Canada is one of not being able to form a French-Canadian bourgeoisie based on the rational exploitation of the natural resources of the country. Trade with the metropolis, the great fisheries and the monopoly of the beaver trade were in the hands of the metropolitans, while the ship-building yard and the St-Maurice Ironworks were in those of the king.